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Here my chaste Muse a liberty must take -
Start not!  Still chaster reader - she'll be nice hence-
Forward, and there is no great cause to quake; 
This liberty is a poetic licence 
Which some irregularity may make 
In the design, and as I have a high sense 
Of  Aristotle and the Rules, 'tis fit 
To beg his pardon when I err a bit.  1 
1 Lord Byron, Don Juan, Canto 1, 120 2 
Marx, Aristotle and Beyond: Aspects of  Aristotelianism in Marxist Social Ontology 
Abstract 
Marx's debt to Aristotle has been noted, but inadequately. Usually commentators 
focus on the parallels between discrete ethical theories of  both writers. However, 
for Marx, ethics is not a discrete field, but is founded on a conception of social 
ontology.  This thesis links the two by showing that, precisely because of its 
Aristotelian roots, Marx's political economy of bourgeois society demands an 
ethical view arising from alienated labour. Marx conceives of  bourgeois society as 
an organic whole. But this entails that its social matter can only exist potentially, 
and not fully, setting up a tension that points to the eventual supercession of its 
social form.  In this manner, Marx's Aristotelian hylomorphism provides the link 
between the early and the later Marx, between the critique of alienation and the 
mature works of political economy. 
This reading of Marx is facilitated by combining it with recent developments in 
philosophy. The work of Harre, Kripke and Wiggins, in particular have helped 
retrospectively to justify Marx's intuitive realism.  Their contributions on 
explanation, identity and sortals are applied in order to elucidate and justify his 
ontology. In the course of this, the problematic boundary between analytical 
philosophy and social theory is crossed. 
Marx restates ancient beliefs about the transitory nature of existence and the 
eternal nature of change. In  particular, there are strong parallels between Marx's 
account of the decline and eventual fall of capitalism, and the Aristotelian 
message that all sublunary entities come to be and pass away. These parallels 
are sufficiently striking to allow us to recognise that Marx's account of the crisis 
ridden and ultimately doomed perspective for capitalism, overlooked by his 
protagonists, is but a  variant of the Aristotelian theory of passing away or 
phthora. 
Finally, two attempts to redraw Marx's ontology are discussed. The first is the 
critique offered by Elster. This is shown to be at variance with Marx's ontology, 
and itself confused. Lukacs' Social Ontology of  Social Being is, on the other hand, 
unjustifiably neglected.  Though vitiated politically by his Stalinism,  and 
philosophically by its failure to embrace a clear principle of individuation, it is an 
important work, re-establishing the link  between ontology and ethics. CONTENTS 
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Introduction 
THE CRISIS OF MARXISM AND MARX INTERPRETATION 
The 'crisis of  Marxism' as an intellectual and political project has been brought to 
a head by the collapse of the regimes in Russia and Eastern Europe towards the 
end of  this century. These events were overwhelmingly interpreted as entailing the 
end of the significance not only of 'Communism' but also of Marx's thought. So it 
may seem odd, or just a retracing of old ground to go back to Marx and seek to 
offer another interpretation of his thought and his system. One motivation for 
attempting such a task is a nagging unease at the amalgamation of Marx, Engels 
Lenin, and the rulers of the Soviet Union into a more or less continual thread.  So 
one reason for looking at and thinking about Marx's writings in a specifically 
philosophical way is to see whether it is possible to disentangle Marx from the 
actions carried out in his name. This does not involve simply posing nineteenth 
century texts against twentieth century reality: the Marx corpus admits of a huge 
range of quotation mongering, and Soviet disputes were continually carried out 
under the cloak of  gestures towards his written authority. More important is 
asking whether Marx could have accepted the sort of  'spin' put on his work by the 
theorists of the CPSU.  'Could have' is a tricky modality, but it is the only one 
available.  Assessing what Marx could and could not have done, involves looking 
at some of the hidden structures of Marx's thought and system, or systems, to 
establish the limits that such structures placed on what he could and could not 
have argued. 
This is not to say that it is only as a result of philosophical misunderstandings 
that soi disant Marxists established and maintained some of  the most brutal and 
inhuman regimes in human history. The task  is not to relieve Stalin, Pol Pot, and 
Mao of their responsibility for the many millions of deaths that they directly and 
indirectly caused, by suggesting that if they had only understood Marx's 
conception of  contradiction, or whatever, they would have behaved differently. The 
relationship between theory and practice is nothing like that close. Rather the 
task is to see whether or not Marx's writings are implicated in their actions; it  will 
become clear in the course of this work that I hold that such a connection cannot 
be sustained. 
The Marxian positions that are motivated here, are emphatically humanist,  and 
focussed on the conception of  human potential as a motivating and driving force in 
human affairs. This feature of  his thought, would have involved  Marx in the most 
stringent critique, not only of the capitalist society in which he lived, but also of 
the authoritarian regimes of  the next century to his, which themselves suppressed 8 
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and thwarted human potential in an arguably more vicious way than bourgeois 
society has ever done. But in defending Marx in this respect, by focussing on the 
concept of human potential, it is also necessary to defend his work from some of 
his interpreters in the realm of political theory, and to understand what it was 
that motivated his emancipatory vision. This is not a demand for the  psycho 
history of a dead theorisL Nor is it an imperative to separate out a normative, 
ethical message that can stand alone, distinct from the specific and substantive 
analyses of capitalist and, as  a poor second, the other social forms  that Marx 
offered.  In Marx's work the normative and the descriptive are entwined, in 
Aristotelian manner. 
Recent studies such as those by Kain,l W  ood,2 and McCarthy,3 have noted the 
influence of  Aristotelian principles on Marx's ethical positions and his account of 
the good life for man. This has followed from the widespread rejection of the idea 
that Marx simply did not have a moral position, an idea derived from the 'scientific 
socialism' of the Second International. But the recent revival of interest in Marx's 
moral position has led some commentators to go too far in the opposite direction 
by separating off his ethical view from his critique of political economy. One aim 
of this thesis is to re-integrate both the ethical critique that Marx offers of the 
imposed form of capitalist social relations and the seemingly utopian image that 
he held of a future communist society. This latter form, unlike the contingently 
imposed form of capitalism, is for Marx immanent in the social ontology that he 
offers, and that social ontology provides the foundation for his critical political 
economy.  Unfortunately for later interpreters, that ontology, though implicit in 
his work,  is at no point laid out in a formulaic manner. The reconstruction of that 
ontology is part of the argument offered here.  In outlining that ontology, both as 
the 'bare' nature of existence of  man, and as the nature of the existence of man in 
capitalist society, ethics and political economy are linked as an immanent critique 
of  the current concrete existence of  man. 
The method of argument pursued in this thesis is to bring together different 
elements in Marx's thought, and then to compare the reconstructed framework to 
the accounts offered by other critics. In particular the ancient provenance of both 
Marx's  ontology  and his prescriptive message is brought out. This runs through 
his work from the very earliest Doctoral Dissertation  on the Greek atomists  , 
Democritus and Epicurus to what Engels referred to as the 'thick books' of 
1 Kain, P., Marx and Ethics (Oxford, 1988). 
2 Wood, A., Karl Marx (London, 1981). 
3 McCarthy, G. E., Marx and the Ancients; Classical Ethics, Social Justice and 
Nineteenth Century Political Economy (Maryland, 1990). 9 
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political economy: Capital,  the Grundrisse der Politischen Okonomie and the 
notebooks collected as Theories of  Surplus Value. In this manner it constitutes  a 
unifying theme in the Marx canon. The assertion of a unifying theme itself is 
controversial, entailing a  denial of the interpretation of Althusser who insists on 
an  epistemological  break in Marx between  a  humanist and  a  scientific 
problematic. The case for this has also been set out by Cowling who has suggested 
that Marx moved from  a  theory of alienation to  a  theory of the mode  of 
production.4 Although this accurately indicates a change in the terrain of Marx's 
discussion, aspects of Aristotelian hylomorphism; the form/matter distinction, 
remain as a central organising concept in Marx's work. This distinction carries 
with it profound implications for the prescriptive/descriptive contrast alluded to 
above.  I argue then for a critical integration of Marx's writing seen through the 
prism of his selective appropriation of aspects of the Aristotelian tradition. In the 
course of the thesis divergent interpretations of Marx are considered and an 
assessment is offered of them. Other sources are the recent writings in ontology 
particularly by Wiggins and the work on the theory of explanation and natural 
necessity by Harre and Madden. Additionally,  interpretative work on Aristotle is 
considered. 
My claim to originality, as against works that take a similar sort of line on Marx 
such as those by McCarthy, Wood, and Meikle5  is fourfold. Since Gould's Mads 
Social Ontology6  little has been produced that focusses specifically on ontology, as 
opposed to Marx's ethics or his wider social theory. One exception is Meikle's work 
and its influence on this thesis will be clear.  The general claim that Marx's work 
has a strong Aristotelian element is not new. What is new is the account here of 
the specific ways that the Aristotelian elements of  Marx's ontology are utilised. I 
trace in greater depth the form/matter  framework and the way that this acts as 
an explanatory device in Marx's earlier writings. Second, I provide a retrospective 
justification for  Marx's  approach,  and  an explanation  of his underlying 
assumptions through an analysis of recent work in analytical philosophy that is 
either a  critical response to, or inspired by, Aristotle.  Thirdly, rather than 
constructing the ontology that Marx uses on an a priori basis, I reconstruct it 
through an interpretation of his anti-individualist methodology in the critique of 
the political economists of his day, particularly focussing on Ricardo and Bailey. 
This has consequences for Marx's understanding of the decay of  capitalism, which 
parallels Aristotle's discussion of  phthora. Lastly, this ontology is wielded against 
4 Cowling, C. M., 'The Case for Two Marxes Restated' in Cowling, C. M., and Wilde 
L. (eds.), Approaches to Marx (Milton Keynes, 1989).  ' 
5 Meikle, S., Essentialism in the Thought of  Karl Marx (London, 1985). 
6 Gould, C., Marx's Social Ontology: Individuality and Community in Marx's Theory 
of  Social Reality (Cambridge, Mass., 1978). 10 
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two interpretations of Marx which ostensibly come from radically different 
standpoints; Elster's Making Sense of  Marx7  and Lukacs' Ontology of  Social Being  . 
The ontology outlined here is shown to have politico-theoretical implications, 
serving as a foil both to the individualistic account offered by Elster and to the 
account that is  given by Lukacs,  ordered  around the notion  of totality. 
Paradoxically, both versions of Marx's social ontology can be as stultifying as each 
other for an authentic Marxian praxis. The originality of  this thesis then exists in 
its attempt to integrate divergent sources from the history of ideas, analytical 
philosophy and contemporary social theory into an overall account of Marx's 
Weltanschauung and to point out the consequences of that view for  critical 
interpretations of  Marx. 
It is necessarily the case that much in this account is speculative and provisional; 
these are murky waters. One aspect of the project of  Analytical Marxism that has 
a  strong resonance is the view held by its practitioners, that 'dialectical' 
interpretations of Marx often exhibit an opacity that is both disheartening to a 
reader trying to uncover a dialectical Marx, and that serves to cover up theoretical 
problems.  The way around this, however, is not to reject Marx's distinctive 
methodology and ontology but to attempt to renegotiate precisely those aspects of 
his thought. In the course of this attempt the recourse to 'state of the art' 
techniques is to be welcomed. Nevertheless, one of the basic arguments here is 
that those state of the art techniques  are best drawn from metaphysical 
argument, rather than the techniques of contemporary social science; rational 
choice, equilibrium analysis and methodological individualism. The central reason 
for this preference is simply that Marx explicitly rejects such approaches in his 
critique of political economy. A subsidiary reason is that the importing of such 
techniques flies in the face of the intellectual context of Marx's thought. Taken 
together, these considerations impel a reconstruction of  Marx's thought that is in 
sympathy with its intellectual context and assesses it as, at the least likely to be 
coherent within that context. Elster concludes his book by saying that: 'It is not 
possible today, morally or intellectually, to be a Marxist in the traditional sense.'8 
Not only do  I  wish to differ from Elster's account of what a  Marxist in the 
traditional sense would look like, I also hold that that possibility remains open, 
that, in this respect at least, the crisis of Marxism is in principle resolvable, and 
that an integrative project such as the one offered here makes some small 
contribution to the task of  doing social theory from a Marxist point of  view. 
To this end I begin by tracing some of the elements of  Aristotelianism which Marx 
7 Elster, J., Making Sense of  Marx (Cambridge, 1985). 
8 Elster, Making Sense of  Marx , p. 531. 11 
Introduction 
encountered and embraced in the early 1840's and which later formed a skeletal 
explanatory structure for  the development of his substantial theses. Like 
Aristotle, and unlike Descartes and the British empiricists such as Berkeley and 
Hume, Marx assumed the existence of an objective world, independent of  thought. 
He was consequently concerned with an investigation of the sorts of things that 
that world contained and how its components behaved. Marx and Aristotle share a 
very basic assumption that we can speak meaningfully about that world, and that 
language use can reveal something about its nature. Because of this, both 
manifest an extension of their enquiries from material to social entities and both 
uses analogies between the world of middle sized material objects and the social 
world as explanatory devices. Because of shared commitments about the relation 
between language and the external world, they are freer with metaphors and 
analogies than writers who are more sceptical about knowledge claims. With this 
shared outlook in mind it is possible to proceed to an account of the central 
themes, which link on the one hand Aristotle's metaphysics, conception of society, 
and theory of the soul, and on the other, Marxian social ontology. 
The first of  these themes is the conception of  substance. This is traced through its 
derivation in both the Physics and the Metaphysics. This becomes a guiding and 
systematising concept for Marx, especially in the critique of the work of Bailey 
which is elucidated in  the Theories of  Surplus Value. 
Second, Aristotle's opposition to Plato's universals is examined.  Its role, as a 
precursor to Marx's account of his own method and ontology, is introduced.  This 
theme recurs in key passages such as the Introduction to the  Grundrisse 
Maintaining the focus on metaphysics, the issue of identity through change is 
.  considered, within an account, drawn from Aristotle, of  the logic of accidental and 
substantial change. This is shown to be problematic in the case of composite 
substances, having both matter and form and this paradox of  unity is resolved, 
following GillIs Aristotle on Substance,9 by considering matter in composites as 
potential matter. One social theoretic consequence of this interpretation is the 
explanatory priority of form, and the ontological priority of matter in composites 
such as social wholes. 
Then, moving from the Metaphysics to the Politics, I look at Aristotle's account of 
the nature of  the polis and its simultaneous correspondence to, and distance from, 
a conservative organic conception of  social entities such as that offered by Burke. 
9 Gill,M.L.,Aristotle on Substance (Princeton, 1989). 12 
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I aim to show that there is a common core to these four elements, which emerges 
as the parallels between Marx and Aristotle become explicit. This common core 
lies in the conception of man and society as entities with certain characteristic 
forms of  behaviour. This covers both the nature of man as a species-being and the 
nature of the social entities which men compose and is examined through an 
examination of  Aristotle's De Anima. 
Moving away from the direct application of Aristotle to look at recent work in 
metaphysics, I uncover some of the ontological presuppositions of two different 
conceptions of social inquiry. First, the Humean positing of the problem of 
induction is  examined together with the  ontological  requirements  of its 
supercession. Then I look at the Hegelian/idealist positing of reality as a totality 
comprised of internal relations which is strongly reflected in some Marxist 
analyses. Widely divergent though they are, both approaches fail to accommodate 
the need to pick out persisting and distinct social entities as a first step in the 
analysis of social reality. Through an examination of recent neo-Aristotelian work 
I outline fundamental problems in both such approaches. One of the key problems 
thrown up by the internal relations conception of reality is the possibility of 
individuation. In this context, via a consideration of Wiggins' work on a theory of 
individuation, it  is possible to highlight the significance of  the ontological accounts 
provided by Aristotelians. One great strength of this account is that it has been 
able to give an answer to the question 'What is X?' In many cases what X is, is a 
certain kind of thing, and I go on to give an account of  the relation between law-like 
behaviour and membership of natU1
1al kinds. The nomological basis of  natural kind 
terms illuminates Marx's distinction between essence and appearance, and the 
priority of  behaviour to definition. 
Marx's belief in the eventual supercession of capitalist society by a socialist form 
is also grounded in Aristotelian assumptions. Against Parmenides and Plato, 
Aristotle articulated a theory of coming to be and decay, which subtends Marx's 
analysis of  the nature of  bourgeois society. This analysis incorporates the 'special 
nature of labour'; that it is the revivifying and animating element in social 
existence. As a result, Marx's general social ontology has implications for his 
theory of  the decay of  capitalism, itself  derived from Aristotelian positions. 
This account of Marx's Aristotelian social ontology is then counterposed to an 
examination of two approaches to social theory and Marx interpretation which 
reflect first the Humean and second the internal relations views in philosophy: 
represented by the work of Jon Elster and Georg Lukacs, in chapters eight and 
nine respectively. CHAPTER ONE 
MARXISM AND SOCIAL ONTOLOGY 
13 
Chapter One 
There are unruly children and precocious children. Many of  the old people belong 
to this category. The Greeks were normal children. The charm of  their art for us is 
not in contradiction to the underdeveloped stage of  society on which it grew. [It] is 
its result, rather, and is inextricably bound up, rather, with the fact that the 
unripe social conditions under which it arose, and could alone arise, can never 
return.  1 
In the following chapter, first I outline the manner in which  issues of ontology 
have been progressively moved into the background in the philosophical 
interpretation of Marx through the years following the Second World War 
Within Marx studies, on either a broad or narrow interpretation of that label, 
issues of aesthetics or morality, political responsibility, and more narrowly 
focused social theory, including economic theory, have transplanted questions of 
the meaning of dialectics, or the relations between man and society. In contrast 
on  a  wider  view  of philosophical  debate,  developments  in metaphysical 
discussion have reinvigorated the Aristotelian tradition. These developments 
have potential to reinvigorate Marxism, since they have rendered less credible 
some of the philosophical techniques that have been used to attack his thought. 
Marx himself was well versed in Aristotelianism, as is indicated by a discussion 
of both his general intellectual context and the particular sources consulted in 
preparation for his doctoral dissertation of 1838-41. Lessons learnt in this period 
formed a  pivotal element in the development of his method. Key aspects of 
Marx's Aristotelian background are then outlined. 
Marxist philosophy and ontological neglect 
It may seem incongruous to begin discussion of Marx with Aristotle, though this 
is one symptom of the downgrading of metaphysical discussion in Marxian 
writing. Such downgrading has been a feature of intellectual development in the 
late twentieth century. For example, in his introduction to Marxist Theory, Alex 
Callinicos  offers  a  chronology  of Marxist  philosophy  which  is  a  good 
approximation of the image that many will have in their heads: Hegelian 
Marxism, dominating the Western Marxism school, and associated particularly 
with Lukacs and the Frankfurt school, was swept away by Althusser and 
structuralism which cleared, even razed, the ground and allowed it, refertilised, 
to be tilled by analytical Marxism. This was a development with its geographical 
1  Marx,  K.,  Grundrisse  translated  with  a  foreword  by  M.  Nicolaus 
(Harmondsworth, 1973) p. 111. 14 
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roots in the Anglo-Saxon world and its intellectual roots in the tradition of 
Analytical philosophy. Commentating on these developments, Callinicos himself 
welcomes them,  and in particulate the break with Hegel: 
[Althusser] established the incompatibility of historical materialism with 
the Hegelian  modes  of thinking previously  adhered  to  by Marxist 
philosophers, and therefore the need to re-examine the basic principles of 
Marxism.  2 
One of several reasons to reject such a  commendation of the development of 
thinking about Marx is that in the course of each of these developments, 
questions of ontology have been progressively downgraded, and are virtually 
absent in the canonical works of Analytical Marxism. Even in this, the newest 
paradigm, there exists a curious distance from Analytical philosophy in favour of 
an analysis of exploitation displacing the labour theory of value,  3  a functional 
model of historical materialism,4  and  a  game theoretic  reconstruction  of 
disparate Marxian insights.5 Robert Ware notices this in his comments on one of 
the classical texts of analytical Marxism, Jon Elster's Making Sense of Marx 
which,  he  notes,  has  'virtually nothing to  say about  analytical  Marxist 
philosophers other than Cohen and indeed does not even include most of the 
philosophical works ... in his long bibliography.'6 There are, naturally enough, 
reasons for this, which I go into in further detail in Chapter Eight, below. What 
becomes clear is that although Elster has a conception of ontology, it has little to 
do with a reading of Marx's philosophical influences and more to do with the 
dominant tradition of explanation in the social sciences today in the Anglophone 
world, which is directed towards micro-level understanding at the level of 
individuals. 
Whilst the ontological commitments implicated in Marx's thought have been 
marginalised, other strands have been pushed into the foreground, in particular 
treatment of the moral views of Marx, taken as a discrete topic of enquiry. It is 
commonplace today to distinguish between Marxian writing (the writing of Marx 
himself) and Marxist writing (which is self avowedly in the Marxist tradition) 
2 Callinicos, A., (ed.) Marxist Theory (Oxford, 1989) p.5. 
3  Roemer, J., A  General Theory of  Exploitation and Class (Cambridge, Mass., 
1982). 
4 Cohen, G. A., Karl Marx's Theory of  History: a Defence (Oxford, 1978). 
5 Elster, J., Making Sense of  Marx (Cambridge, 1985). 
6 Ware, R., and Neilson, K, (eds.), Analysing Marxism: New Essays  on 
Analytical Marxism  (Canadian Journal of Philosophy supplementary volume) 
(Calgary, 1989) p. 5. 15 
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and to argue that this distinction remedies the tendencies both to vulgarity in 
interpretation and to polemicist, instrumentalist readings of Marx7• Whilst such 
a distinction has some merit, it has always been impossible to separate questions 
of interpretation from the intellectual and political milieu in which they exist. As 
a  result, much recent discussion of Marx, as well as of Marxism, has been 
conditioned by its aim of disentangling Marx from the actions carried out by 
movements, parties and states which made claims to act in his name, but which 
were widely condemned as morally and politically repugnant. Since the collapse 
of the regimes in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, themselves the 
self-described concretisation of something called Marxism-Leninism, it has 
become clear that commentators on Marx in the West have seen the perspective 
of rescuing the ethically acceptable strands of Marx's writing as increasingly 
important. There has been a  flowering of discussion of Marx's moral views, 
which has  presaged something of a return to Aristotle.  On this view Marx is at 
least still a significant theorist of  freedom, autonomy and eudamonia, even if at 
the end of the day, his thought is irremediably utopian. The moral rescue party 
for Marx is simultaneously propelled by what are widely perceived as the 
dwindling prospects for Marxism as a 'Grand Narrative'. Conceived in this way 
Marxism is thought to be reeling from the postmodernist attacks on the notion of 
ultimate foundations fro theory construction. 
Conversely, the interpretation outlined here of the Marx/Aristotle relationship 
aims to key into a reading that roots Marx in ontological reality rather than 
ethical Utopianism, and thereby takes the post modern critique head on. As 
Arthur points out in his Dialectics of  Labour, an ontological rooting of Marx's 
social view is essential to avoid a situation in which: 
critique would be reduced to contesting the validity of the existing order 
from the standpoint of a historically contingent utopian inspiration. By 
contrast,  Marx's  critique  acquires  a  rootedness  in material reality 
whereby it can ground the historical necessity of existing forms, while 
grasping their limits and the conditions of their supercession.8 
In the search for this 'rootedness' it is useful to turn attention towards the 
Marx/Aristotle relationship. Marx was widely influenced by Aristotle: the 
question is not whether, but how that influence expressed itself. One perspective 
that this influence is evidenced only, or fundamentally, in a  moral  view, an 
ethical outlook implicit in Marx which fits with the conception of human 
7  See, for example Thomas, P., 'Critical Reception: Marx then and now' in T. 
Carver (ed.) The Cambridge Companion to Marx (Cambridge, 1991). 
8 Arthur, C., Dialectics of  Labour (Oxford, 1986), pp. 144-5 16 
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flourishing advocated by Aristotle. However this position is continually tempted 
to  collapse  into  one  of  two  positions  out  of  sympathy to  Marx's  own 
commitments. Either this version of ethical Marxism collapses into utopianism 
because it critiques existing social forms only from the perspective of a utopian 
future. On the other hand, it may divorce ethical critiques of the effects of 
existing forms  from  an understanding of their  necessity,  and  necessary 
development, eventually softening the critical focus on the structural constraints 
bourgeois society places on the development of human beings. Down this path 
lies a retreat from Marx's writing into some version of left-wing liberalism. On 
the other hand, if  Marx drew both an image of how the world ought to be, and an 
explanatory framework of how it is  and could  be from Aristotle, then the 
prospects for integration of the two components are high. That integration 
suggests that in avoiding utopianism, but sustaining the ancient commitment to 
a eudamonic future, Marx is impelled towards his sceptical attitude to bourgeois 
social relations. 
An integrative project such as this, cannot be realised unless we  reject one 
prevailing intellectual context for Marxist discussion of social ontology. This has 
often been anti-realist, influenced by Wittgenstein, and aimed at an image of 
Marxism drawn loosely from radical sociology rather than any work of Marx.  A 
text that is useful for revealing some of the focal points in a Wittgensteinian 
reading of Marx is Kitching's Marxism and the Philosophy of  Praxis.9 While he 
says little about Wittgenstein himself, Kitching is admirably explicit about the 
sort of common assumptions he directs at the nature of Marx's method. His 
favouring of language use over ontology is particularly clear when he discusses 
the question of a mode of  production: 
that a society has such a character, form or stamp is not a characteristic of 
it  as it were. It is rather a characterisation of it in thought. And a society 
is given ... such a character as a mode of production by being compared 
with societies which have preceded it or followed it.  10 
The character of a particular mode of production as capitalist is not an objective 
feature of the social world, but rather mind dependent and subjective, and is 
motivated by the observer having epistemological 
purposes from which it makes sense to consider material production as 
more important than anything else in characterising or classifying 
9 Kitching, G., Karl Marx and the Philosophy of  Praxis (London, 1988). 
10 Kitching, Karl Marx and the Philosophy of  Praxis p. 30. 17 
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different societies. But that Marx did so and that Marxists do  so, is a 
characteristic of their activity as Marxists.  It is not a  characteristic of 
material production itself. In itself production is neither 'central' nor 
'marginal', 'important' nor 'unimportant' in characterising different forms 
of  society.'  11 
This  is  an  interesting  and informative  claim  though  I  believe  it to  be 
fundamentally wrong. It is motivated by opposition to the idea that a  meta-
theory could have some over  arching and privileged claim to the truth and falsity 
of certain sorts of social explanation. The reason for regarding the manner of 
production as primary is transferred from the nature of the social world, or 
social ontology, to the nature of the inquirer's predispositions, and as such, a 
feature of epistemology. This, 1 hold, amounts to a radical misreading of Marx's 
ontology as I explicate it below, and as Marx himself outlines it more than once, 
though, it must be conceded, never plainly. 
One crucial element in Kitching's argument is to suggest that the claim made 
both by Marx, and by Marxists, is that it is something inherent in material 
production itself that makes it primary. It is then a short step to say that one 
type of material production acts as the classification of the whole society. The 
first  step needs a category of 'brute' material production; production 'in itself 
but such a  concept would have to be skinned of any attributes whatever, 
including the attribute of being-ontologically-basic.  Such a  category,  such a 
process, is difficult to imagine, and indeed it is difficult to see what could be true 
about an 'activity-in-itself that could make it explanatorily primary. Since 
material production is not an object, but an activity or a  process, we cannot 
conceive of a possible universe in which there is just material production and 
nothing else; it is ontologically parasitic on an agent who materially produces, 
and some sort of environment which furnishes the agent with the materials from 
which to produce.  But whilst any element in this ontologically basic triple is 
parasitic on the existence of the other elements, so any social form at all is 
ontologically parasitic on this triple: productive activity mediating between the 
human species and nature. The method adopted in this thesis is to view social 
processes as inextricably tied to the conception of the furniture of the world, and 
therefore to be seen as expressive of social ontology. The key elements of that 
social ontology are the human species productively relating to, transforming and 
manufacturing the conditions of existence. This is why, when  Marx regards the 
foundational nature of productive activity as basic, he is making a claim which 
he regards as obvious about the way the world is, and must be: 
11 Kitching, Karl Marx and the Philosophy of  Praxis p. 30. 18 
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Every child knows that a nation which ceased to work  ...  even for a few 
weeks would perish. Every child knows too that the volume of products 
corresponding to the different needs require different and quantitatively 
determined amounts of the total labour of society. 12 
It is true that Marx shies away from constant reiteration of what he regards as 
obvious; the biological necessity of production in order to satisfy human needs. 
This is partially because of his Aristotelian opposition to Platonic universals, 
examined below. However, it is profoundly unsympathetic to the thrust of his 
argument to suggest that this productivism is simply a mental predisposition to 
foreground a certain feature of a society, no more or less intrinsically important 
than any other feature. Kitching appears to look through the wrong end of the 
telescope in that he fails to relate material production to the needs of man, 
instead considering it epistemologically, as a category of thought. It reflects an 
antipathy towards Marx's philosophical position which is again manifested in 
Kitching's account of the vexed, and Short Course13 inspired, question of the 
correspondencies between base  and superstructure. In the course  of this 
discussion, Kitching reconstructs an image of society as a pyramid and parallels 
it to the human body, and argues that the grip of Marx's ontology is explicable 
by linguistic considerations. Through this, he deprecates the classical Marxist 
political project, insofar as it involves the central agency of the working class, or 
in other words,  as Marx understood it. 
The last area in which Kitching's  philosophical failings  reflect upon his 
understanding of Marx to the detriment of the latter is in the account he gives of 
the labour theory of  value, and in particular of the crucial , for Marx and Engels, 
distinction between labour and labour power. Kitching wants to shift the terrain 
of  this distinction from economics to philosophy: 
if 'labour power' is  a philosophical rather than a strictly economic concept, 
then the whole issue is recast. Since for Marx the essence of  human beings 
(their 'species being') is their capacity for creative activity, then in selling 
this, in reducing this to a commodity they quite literally 'sell their soul'. A 
positively Faustian bargain is struck between the capitalist and the 
worker. The full force of Marx's philosophical objection to capitalism 
12 Marx to Dr Kugelmann, 11 July 1868 in Selected Correspondence (Moscow, 
1955) p. 196. 
13 History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Short Course), edited by 
a Commission of the C.C. of the C.P.S.U, (B.) (London, 1938). becomes clear'14 
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But for Marx part of the importance of the distinction between labour and labour 
power is precisely that human beings do lWt sell their soul, either literally or 
metaphorically, that this is a crucial, defining distinction between the form of 
surplus extraction of feudalism  and the form  of surplus extraction under 
capitalism, and that the real freedom (though greatly limited, and fluctuating in 
extent) of workers that this entails has enormous philosophical, political and 
cultural implications. Marx's philosophical objection to capitalism is not that it is 
a  sort of totalistic hell in which the workers are utterly subordinate to the 
capitalists, but that it is a society in which human potential is thwarted by the 
social relations of production. Those relations are themselves the site of a 
struggle over the labour process itself, a struggle inconceivable if the capitalists 
had purchased the worker's labour as well as his labour power.  The elision of 
labour and labour power, one of the banes of Marx's life, only makes sense on the 
basis of the erosion of his entire theory of value. Presumably for Kitching 
though, the labour theory is just one way among many of looking at things, and 
thus has no exclusive correspondence to what goes on in the labour market. On 
his reading the politics that Marx could articulate would be very different: If 
workers  did  somehow  sell  their  souls  then capitalism  would  be  utterly 
condemned by Marx The oft noted paradox in his approval of the political 
freedom  available under capitalism and his commendation of its partially 
progressive nature would disappear. Equally there could be no recognition of the 
class struggle over the level of expropriation of surplus value; over the length of 
the working day,  for example. 
In this and similar ways, questions that begin as concerned with ontology soon 
grow over into questions with political consequences. Analytical Marxism has 
arisen as a consequence of the inroads made by individualist methodologies and 
atomist ontologies into social theory. It should therefore come as little surprise 
that many of its adherents now largely disclaim any substantial doctrine to be 
found in Marx's work. Wittgensteinian interpretations of Marx, with ironically 
the same substantive political consequences,  shows the influence of anti-
foundationalism and relativist replacements for ontology. A redrawing of Marx's 
claims, with reference to their Aristotelian antecedents, will assist in the task of 
reformulating Marxist conceptions of both ontology and method in opposition to 
both anti-foundationalism and relativism. 
What is more, the key themes of social theory; the possibility of reduction, what 
14 Kitching, Karl Marx and the Philosophy of  Praxis p. 111. 20 
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it is to offer an explanation of a phenomenon, the nature of change and the role 
of functional and organic explanation are not only ontological, but are all widely 
discussed by Aristotle.  By re-engaging with the Aristotelian tradition it becomes 
possible to refill the core of Marx's argument with its explanatory force. 
In addition, the commitments of Marx need to be examined again in the light of 
fresh philosophical developments which have made his realist ambitions easier 
to stomach. The realist idea: that real structures that are hidden from view give 
rise to empirically observable phenomena, has received relatively recent support. 
Since Kripke, Wiggins and others reinvigorated the Aristotelian tradition from 
the late sixties onwards, there has been less shame attached to the claims of 
both realism and the related doctrine of essentialism in the philosophical world, 
but this has yet to penetrate very far into the arena of social theory. More 
generally there has been made possible a refocussing on systematic conceptions 
of the world generated by an (muted) quasi-Aristotelian rejection of relativism 
where it tends to permeate into analytical philosophy. Nonetheless, whatever 
the state of play of analytical philosophy, if there were no sign of an influence of 
Aristotelianism in Marx, there would be little point in asserting themes drawn 
from Aristotle in a  reconstruction of his work. Rather, the absence of such a 
strand would militate against such a reconstruction. 
In order to justify claims for the existence of such a strand of thought then, I 
shall initially take two intellectual perspectives. The first is to examine the 
context of Marx's early work at the University of Bonn and then at Berlin and 
the particular reading and study this led him to undertake. The second is to look 
at the interpretative possibilities opened up by consideration of Aristotelianism 
as a major theme in Marx's own writing. Despite the pressing evidence from 
Marx's reading in the early 1840's, and his avowed appreciation of Aristotle as 
'the great scientist'15 later in his life, it is the latter aspect, the substantive 
questions which are central to this enquiry. It is my assessment that, regardless 
of considerations drawn below from Marx's intellectual history, the Aristotelian 
accent  of his ontology is sustainable.  If this is the case, then a consideration of 
these themes in the light of recent developments in analytical philosophy is 
likely to be constructive. 
Marx and Aristotle: the relationship and the commentators. 
It is perhaps becoming more common to point to the influence of Greek antiquity 
in general, and Aristotle in particular, on the work of Marx. He did it himself, 
citing Aristotle throughout his work, and more recent Marxists, notably of a 
15 Marx, K, Capital 1  , (Harmondsworth, 1976) p. 151. 21 
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'humanist' bent, such as Ernst Bloch16, Cornelius Castoriadis17 and Georg 
Lukacs18 have all made something of the Greek accent in Marx's work. However 
it has not been the subject of sustained academic scrutiny until very recently. 
Allen Wood set the tone for the recent surge in studies of this relationship with 
his broadly Aristotelian account of  Marx  19 and George McCarthy has contributed 
both Marx  and the Ancients20  and a  recent symposium Marx and Aristotle: 
Nineteenth Century German Social Theory and Classical Antiquity21  which 
highlights a  number of themes from Aristotle which are drawn into Marx's 
writing. To the extent that any collection can have one, the focus of  these articles 
is on Marx's philosophical anthropology and in particular the nature and status 
of  his moral critique of  capitalism. Much is made, convincingly, of  the fit between 
the emancipatory vision of Marx and the account offered by Aristotle of what 
constitutes the good life.  The bulk of the commentators work on the basis of a 
common 'transcendental understanding of the relation between human nature 
and political economy: economics as the subordinate foundation for the primary 
goals of human achievement in the community.'22 However, political economy, 
rather than economics was Marx's preferred term for his main subject of study, 
and crucial to the distinction is the idea of the irreducibly political nature of 
economic thought, and the irreducibly social natm·e of its meaning and function. 
Such irreducibility implicitly outlaws  transcendence  of 'economics'  by  a 
normative view: rather it demands the incorporation of the potentials of social 
being into the dynamics of social forms and so the incorporation of philosophical 
anthropology into the ontology of  political economy. 
16 Bloch, E., Avicenna und die Aristotlische Linke, (Leipzig, 1952): reprinted in 
Bloch Das Materialismus Problem (Frankfurt, 1970, and for the application of 
Aristotle to Marx, Bloch, Das Prinzip Hoffnung (Frankfurt, 1970), Vol. II  pp. 237 
if. 
17 Castoriadis, C.,Crossroads in the Labyrinth (Massachusetts, 1984) pp. 260-339 
18 For Lukacs, not only is the 'humanist struggle against the degradation of man 
by the capitalist division of labour' inspired by the imitation of Greek literature 
and art (Goethe and his Age (London, 1968) p. 12. Also in his last major work, 
the Ontology of Social Being, (London,  1978) he refers to the need to re-
articulate  the  ancient theory of essence,  by restoring its dynamism.  He 
acknowledges  Aristotle's  attempt to  'experiment' in the direction  of the 
development of a  social ontology, involving 'a conscious recognition of the 
primary existence of  major complexes of  being ... in connection with the criticism 
of idealist systematic thought.' The target is Plato, and the evidence Lukacs 
employs is drawn from the Nicomachean Ethics.  (Ontology of Social Being 
Volume Two: Marxp. 20) 
19 Wood, A., Karl Marx (London, 1981). 
20 McCarthy, G.  E., Marx and the Ancients~· Classical Ethics, Social Justice and 
Nineteenth Century Political Economy (Maryland, 1990). 
21 McCarthy, G. E., (ed.), Marx and Aristotle: Nineteenth Century German Social 
Theory and Classical Antiquity (Maryland, 1992). 
22 McCarthy, Marx and Aristotle p. 7. 22 
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This thesis then argues that such discussion is like Hamlet without the Prince. 
For what is missing is an acknowledgement of the debt Marx owes to Aristotle's 
metaphysics and the role of that set of ideas in fleshing out Marx's social 
ontology. Whilst there is a clear Aristotelian resonance in Marx's moral view, it 
is one of the lacunae of considerations of Marx that it is possible to give an 
account of Marx's normative views, such as they are, in relative isolation from 
his account of the development of capitalism.23  Marx rejects the is/ought 
bifurcation which, emphasised by the Enlightenment, characterises the morality 
of modernity.  Instead, his view is that societies,  and a  fortiori  capitalism 
developed in certain ways, at least in part because they contained certain sorts 
of  things, and that this development had prescriptive implications for the goal of 
human freedom. Just like any other social theorist, Marx had a view of what 
sorts of  things exist, and how they behave, though neither for Marx, nor for most 
social theorists, is this clearly spelt out. In his case, the implicit view is fairly 
systematic. In spite of  this, perhaps the most elemental and elementary quarrels 
between those who see themselves as Marxists and their critics are over the very 
existence of classes, or value, or the state, and hence a question of competing 
ontologies. The father of all such discussion is Aristotle and many of the grand 
themes of social theory such as the nature of explanation and the possibility of 
reduction are rehearsed in his Physics  and Metaphysics. Yet of all Aristotle's 
major works,  these are the ones that receive least attention from  those 
commentators that draw an antique provenance for Marx. In their place, the 
focus  is almost entirely on the Politics  and the Nicomachean Ethics, to the 
exclusion of the metaphysical works 
To argue for a  return to ontological discussion of Marx, as I  have done,  IS 
simultaneously to point to the area in which the influence of Aristotle is at its 
most keen. Just as Marx turned his back on the is/ought of bourgeois thought, 
Aristotle would have been somewhat perplexed by the separation of a  moral 
theory from consideration of the nature of human social existence, or social 
ontology.  And social ontology is  no different in terms  of its demands for 
coherence and explanatory plausibility from ontology tout court. Despite the 
dangers of embarking on another quest to show what Marx really  meant, it is 
essential to redraw Marx's ontological positions in order to make complete sense 
of consequent moral claims. The real basics, for Marx, are the basics of what 
23  This is a  product of the division of labour in the academic world between 
moral philosophers and those who might be called 'social theorists', though even 
this description is usually divided up in a modern university. Such division of 
academic labour, it should be said, is clearly counter to the spirit of Marx's own 
extensive theorising. exists. 
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Another reason for  aiming to reconstruct Marx's most general theoretical 
foundations is the nagging feeling that a  highly theorised and undoubtedly 
contested moral theory is, in the end, just unnecessary as a grounding of Marxist 
normative political positions. This is the line argued, in a  self consciously 
iconoclastic way, by Kai Nielsen in an article in Radical Philosophy:  'Does 
Marxian Critical Theory of Society need a Moral Theory?'24 and if  the argument 
is taken seriously then the focus  on ethical concerns  emerges  as  a  little 
paradoxical. It seems as if commentators have virtually given up on Marx's 
claims to have developed a  theory of the way a particular society; capitalism, 
emerges and matures.  Instead they have turned to moral theories of the 
potential fulfilling type, when such theories are largely redundant in the 
presence of the former theory, and just empty words in its absence. Instead a 
broad series of moral platitudes or truisms can be adequate since the main work 
is done by an empirically informed critical theory. Such moral truisms include 
saying that 'freedom is a good thing, that more equal freedom is a good thing, 
and that democracy is a  good thing' If these are accepted, then the questions 
faced in justifying Marxist political positions are a matter of empirical enquiry, 
such as the claim that 'a democratic, self managing socialist society is a real 
historical possibility. Socialists believe that it is. But it is an empirical claim and 
it may indeed be false.'25  This seems to me to be quite well founded, though 
Nielsen himself is very cautious in putting his new position, particularly since it 
appears to contradict the argument contained in Marxism and the Moral point of 
view. But the empirical theses that Nielsen outlines are generated by Marx from 
a series of ontological points of view, which themselves need to be understood 
before it is possible to embark on their empirical testing in the external world. 
Such a  project; the integration of Marx's social ontology with its Aristotelian 
assumptions, involves  more than a  situating of Marx as  a  'revolutionary 
traditionalist,'26 straddling modernity and antiquity, contrasting the harmonious 
vision of the polis  to the inadequacies and degeneracies of bourgeois society. It 
also  demands  a  consideration  of  the  development  of  contemporary 
Aristotelianism and its impact on the interpretation of Marx. Such a course can 
alter the judgement of some  of Marx's  pivotal  positions,  validating  his 
presuppositions and method, particularly against the influential critique offered 
24 Nielsen, K, 'Does Marxian Critical Theory of Society need a Moral Theory?' 
Radical Philosophy 59, (1991). 
25 Nielsen, K, 'Does Marxian Critical Theory of Society need a Moral Theory?' p. 
24. 
26 McCarthy (ed.) Marx and Aristotle p. 20. 24 
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by Jon Elster.  27 Bringing in an Aristotelian dimension to Marx's thought raises 
new questions; sometimes more than it answers though this in itself may be an 
advance, and points to some new perspectives on some of the hoary old debates 
in Marx studies. Some of these are the ontological roots of the parallelism 
between Marx and Aristotle as ethical thinkers, the prospects opened up by a 
consideration of Marx as an Aristotelian in his account of the special laws of 
capitalism, and the consequences of contemporary essentialism, especially a 
theory of individuation, for teasing out Marx's social ontology. In the course of 
this thesis I hope to suggest some views on the questions of whether Marx is a 
theorist first and foremost of bourgeois society or of society as such, and whether 
he conceives of bourgeois society as natural or as an artificial construct, a 
question with implications for the view one takes on the W  ood/Husami debate.28 
Some commentators, such as Cohen have drawn up an overarching theory of 
history which they aim to derive from Marx, while others, such as Meikle, have 
condemned accounts based on over  arching laws: 'Marx's laws are not universal 
conditional statements but,  as  Marx says,  are  specific  to  a  given social 
organism.'29 While it is worth insisting on the perspective of special laws of 
specific social organisms that Marx accepts (rather than states) in the afterword 
to the second German edition of Capital, it is still true that the specification of 
an overall ontological framework in Marx is a specification of how he thinks and 
analyses the nature of all societies, not just capitalism and therefore has more of 
the status of an over  arching theory. The notion of special laws demands the 
identification of discrete social organisms that those laws apply to. It therefore 
demands a  theory of the nature of social organisms and an account of the 
differentia specifica which make organisms of a certain sort, that particular sort 
of organism in the first place. Marx wields  a  certain series of ontological 
categories that allow him to make that sort of judgement, derived from the 
ancients. Hence Cohen's generalised account of the form/matter distinction and 
its universal applicability is justified; he says for example: 'The relation between 
form and matter may not be the same in pre-capitalist production but the 
distinction must apply to it and it does.'30 
27 Elster, Making Sense of  Marx. 
28  See Wood Karl Marx pp. 130-140 for his view that capitalism exploits justly 
and the comment by Z.  Husami 'Marx on Distributive Justice'. Philosophy and 
Public Affairs 8 (1978) On the argument developed here it becomes possible to 
argue that capitalism is just vis a vis its form and unjust vis a vis its matter. 
29 Meikle, Essentialism in  the Thought of  Karl Marx p.11  footnote 14 
30 Cohen, G. A., Karl Marx's Theory of  History: A  Defence, (Oxford 1978) p.102. CHAPTER TWO 
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SNAPPING THE BONDS; MARX AND ANTIQUITY IN THE EARLY 
WRITINGS 
The Aristotelian context of  Marx's early studies 
Marx transferred his work to Berlin University in 1837, at a time when political 
science and sociology had not yet come into existence as independent disciplines. 
Consequently their putative practitioners had yet to begin their gropings towards 
a 'scientific' methodology, and, partly as a result, Berlin was an academy whose 
'character was determined above all by the cultivation of classical studies and of 
speculative philosophy'l according to Paulsen. These were pre-positivist days, 
where the standardised debates about social theory of the twentieth century were 
only very indirectly prefigured. Consideration of the Hellenic world was still 
dominant, though contending in philosophical circles with discussion of Kant and 
Hegel. In the view of Heinz Lubasz, one of the first commentators to point to the 
Marx/Aristotle inheritance, the intellectual backdrop to Marx's work on his 
doctoral dissertation was a: 
remarkable revival of Aristotle in the 1830's when the first modern 
scholarly edition of his work began to be published, first in Germany and 
then  in  England.  2 
The publication of the great modern edition of Aristotle's works was begun by 
Immanuel Bekker at the Berlin Academy in 1831, five years before Marx's 
arrival and was continued up to 1870, making it much easier for  scholars to 
determine and to clarify Aristotle's texts. Marx, writing in an intellectual context, 
even ferment, of  Aristotelianism, could hardly  fail to become well acquainted with 
the canonical works of  the corpus. And he did not  fail. 
At Berlin Marx worked on his doctoral dissertation Difference between the 
Democritean and Epicurean Philosophy of Nature.3  As preparation for this 
enterprise and in  this milieu, he studied classical Greek philosophy in  general and 
Epicurean philosophy in particular, completing seven notebooks in 1839.4 These 
reveal that Marx became acquainted with key Aristotelian texts in this period, 
most notably the Metaphysics, Physics, Generation of  Animals, On Generation and 
1 Paulsen, G., German Education: Past and Present (place, 1912)  pp. 184 ff  .. 
2 Lubasz, H., 'The Aristotelian Dimension in  Marx', THES (1 April 1977) p. 17. 
3 Marx, Doctoral Dissertation CW Vol. 1 pp. 25-105. 
4 The first four and seventh notebooks are headed 'Epicurean Philosophy' and the 
covers of  notebooks 2-4 are dated Winter Term 1839. These are collected in Marx. 
CW 1, pp. 403-515. 26 
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Corruption,  On the Heavens, and Rhetoric, since the first four are cited in the 
notebooks and all are cited in the doctoral dissertation. It is not therefore at all 
surprising that the  explanatory categories of the Dissertation, such as  essence 
and existence, are drawn from the Scholastic tradition. It should be noted 
however, that the primary focus of the dissertation is not on Aristotle but on the 
dispute between the two Greek atomists, Democritus and Epicurus, one the 
materialist predecessor of Aristotle and the other, his radical and subjectivist 
successor. 
Marx's Doctoral Dissertation 
Marx first distinguishes the thought of  Epicurus from that of  Democritus, against 
the interpretation of Plutarch and Cicero which tended to conflate them,5 and 
then commends Epicurus's thought over that of the earlier atomist. Overlaying 
this story however, are other themes; of the debates over conceptions of science 
and nature, of the relation between social development and philosophical 
consciousness  of it,  and,  unsurprisingly given Marx's  immersion in the 
philosophical disputes of his time, of the disputes within German idealism 
between Kant and Hegel.  This  complexity of theme means that Marx's 
dissertation is a difficult work  to read and interpret since the concepts invoked are 
often opaque, and the limits between differing perspectives and objects of 
discussion are  confused.  It is,  however,  possible to draw out some key 
components of  Marx's system which are rooted in the Dissertation: centrally that 
he is above all a  theorist of freedom and regards this, both ethically and 
metaphysically as a  matter of reconciling essence to existence, and form to 
content. Although McCarthy wrongly claims that 'Marx saw in Epicurus the first 
philosopher to incorporate the notion of the contradiction between essence and 
reality into his thought'6 the fact that Marx recognised the same contradiction in 
Aristotle's thought as well, only helps to reinforce the centrality of it in his own 
thinking. 
Marx's early concern with the question of  how it is possible for humans to be free, 
as well as his grappling with the categories of essence, being or existence, and 
appearance are all expounded  in the doctoral dissertation which takes place 
against a back drop of  the controversies in German idealism. For Fenves, 
the battle lines are drawn between Hegel's science of logic which executes 
dialectical contradiction and Kant's notion of  natural science grounded in a 
5 Marx, Doctoral Dissertation CW 1 p. 38. 
6 McCarthy, Marx and the  Ancients p. 31. 27 
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transcendental philosophy which avoids all contradictory moments.  7 
In Marx's view, Epicurus has the better scientific credentials, welcoming as he 
does Epicurus'  refusal to accept the law of non-contradiction. He objectifies the 
contradiction between essence and existence and thus, according to Marx,  gives 
us the science of atomism. On Marx's reading, Democritus is Kantian whereas 
Epicurus prefigures the Hegelian conception of science. By demonstrating the 
contradictory nature of matter, Epicurus lays the basis for conceiving of science 
as a  form of idealism and avoids the Kantian project of science as endless 
empirical research. Marx is also attracted to the ethical position of Epicurus, 
largely because of its iconoclasm and herein  lies a critical division between the 
two atomists. The young, radical, Marx already cites Prometheus' battle cry 'I 
hate the pack of Gods' in his preface, and his own fire, allied with that of Epicurus, 
is directed not only at alienating theologies but also at the delimiting of human 
autonomy by the deterministic laws of nature that feature in Democritus' 
atomistic mechanism. In contrast, Epicurus is commended since he: 
has nothing  but contempt for the positive sciences, since in his opinion 
they contribute nothing to true perfection.  8 
In validating his perspective, though not his entire system, Marx follows Epicurus 
in championing the possibility of a thorough going epistemology, against Kant, 
through the agency of a  knowing self conscious subj  ect and set against the 
demands of external objectivity. Such a possibility is in stark contrast to Marx's 
indictment of the pessimism over epistemology with which Democritus concludes. 
For him, the reality of the atom is only perceived through reason while the 
information gathered from the senses is only of 'subjective semblances'. This 
Chinese wall between the unknowable essential nature of the atom and the 
sensuous world prefigures Kant and is condemned by  Marx using Hegel's critique 
of Kant's  categorical imperative. For Hegel, Kant was guilty of empty formalism 
in the formulation of the categorical imperative, illicitly importing hidden 
empirical information to do the work in generating moral precepts. Marx inveighs 
against Democritus in a similar manner, condemning his downgrading of empirical 
information to merely subjective semblances (schein): 
while Democritus turns the sensuous world into subjective semblance, 
Epicurus turns it into objective appearance. And here he differs quite 
7Fenves, P., 'Marx's Doctoral Thesis on Two Greek Atomists and the Post-Kantian 
Interpretations', Journal of  the History of  Ideas 47 (1986), p.433. 
8 Marx, Doctoral Dissertation CW 1, p. 41. 28 
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consciously, since he claims that he shares the same principles but that he 
does not reduce the sensuous qualities to things of mere appearance.9 
But for Democritus' programme, the resulting knowledge of semblances is 
vacuous since it is not knowledge of the principles (of the atoms) which are 
unrelated to sensual semblance: 
The knowledge which he considers true is without content and the 
knowledge that gives him a content is without truth.  10 
Marx articulates  a  knowing self conscious  subject, far  removed from  the 
Cartesian self, and grounded in the somewhat bizarre Epicurean theory of the 
swerve or declination (parenklisis) of atoms. Epicurus had argued, to widespread 
mockery, that a  slight swerve of the atoms left open a  space in Democritus' 
determinism and thus made human autonomy possible. It is the nature of the 
atom itself  which causes such declination and thus enables men to attain ataraxy 
or happiness. Just such a  state represents, for Marx, the first form  of self 
consciousness. It derives from the idea of  the atom as abstract individuality: 
What is the source of that will power snatched from the fates whereby we 
follow the path along which we are severally led by pleasure .... But the fact 
that the mind itself has no internal necessity to determine its every act 
and compel it to suffer in helpless passivity, this is due to the slight swerve 
of  the atoms, not determined by place or time.  11 
Commenting on these passages from the poetic philosopher Lucretius, Marx 
writes that' This potestas, this declinare is the defiance, the headstrongness of 
the atom, the quiddam inpectore of the atom.'12 
He clearly approves of this wilful subjectivity. Commentators such as Fenves 
and McCarthy plausibly detect signs of Marx's critique of positivist science in his 
preference for Epicurus in this text. It is indeed notable that Marx favours even a 
grossly implausible explanation that incorporates a teleology of the atoms, to one 
that remains at the level of efficient causation, deadening, as it does, the 
possibility of human intentionality. Despite this, the philosophical shortcomings 
of Epicurus's position are quite well known. Human free will and autonomy are 
9 Marx, Doctoral Dissertation CW 1, p. 40. 
10 Marx, Doctoral Dissertation CW 1, p. 41. 
11 Marx, Notebooks on Epicurean Philosophy CW 1, p. 475. 
12 Marx, Notebooks on Epicurean Philosophy CW 1, p.475. 29 
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not the same as indeterminacy or brute randomness, which both still leave the 
subjective content of human action waiting outside the act, yet to enter into its 
explanation. Nevertheless, Marx's interest is more finely honed to the status of 
such autonomy. Self consciousness in its first form allows a transcendence of the 
contradiction between the abstract atom and its existence in a sensuous world. 
Such self consciousness is the way in which essence and existence can be 
reconciled, and Marx validates Epicurus on precisely this point: 
The following consequences can be drawn from these observations. first, 
Epicurus  makes  the  contradiction  between  matter  and  form  the 
characteristic of the nature of appearance, which thus becomes the 
counter image of  the nature of essence, the atom.13 
The method of investigation of the sensuous world is thus a matter of  honing and 
tracing the development of self consciousness as it overcomes the limits of an 
external world, and in this Marx is at one with Epicurus, in his avowal of the 
primacy of  self  consciousness, and the ethical foundations of all science. 
The extreme iconoclasm of this position is remarkable. Democritus, and Aristotle, 
are condemned as idolatrous, since they hold physics to be distinct from ethics 
and not subordinate to it. If  the natural world conflicts with the demands of self 
consciousness, construed as ataraxy, then so much the worse for the natural 
world: its supposed laws are myths for the restriction of human happiness or 
ataraxy: 
It is an absolute law that nothing that can disturb ataraxy, that can cause 
danger, can belong to an indestructible and eternal nature. Consciousness 
must understand that this is an absolute law. Hence Epicurus concludes: 
Since eternity of the heavenly bodies would disturb the ataraxy of self 
consciousness, it is- necessary, a stringent consequence that they are not 
etemal. 14 
This privileging of the self conscious ethical subject over the constraints of the 
external world is the most remarkable feature of  Epicurus' philosophy. It allows 
Marx to transcend the empty formalism of the essence/existence contradiction 
which he detects in both Democritus and Kant. He expresses his affinity towards 
Epicurus' radical subjectivism by reference to the intellectual context of the end 
of a great philosophical system. Both in subtending the early emergence of his 
13 Marx, Doctoral Dissertation CW 1, p. 64. 
14 Marx, Doctoral Dissertation CW 1, p. 70. 30 
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lifelong concern with the question of how it is that we can be free  and in his  , 
coming to terms with Hegel, Marx's attitude to Epicurus is instructive. The first 
chapter of  his thesis shows the parallel he draws between his own time, five years 
after the death of Hegel, and the period of Epicurean philosophy built on the 
collapse of  the Aristotelian system: 
... It is a commonplace that birth, flowering and decline constitute the iron 
circle in which everything human is enclosed, through which it must pass. 
Thus it would not have been surprising if Greek Philosophy, after having 
reached its zenith in  Aristotle, should then have withered. But the death of 
the hero resembles the setting of the sun, not the bursting of an inflated 
frog. And then: birth, flowering, and decline are very general, very vague 
notions under which to be sure, everything can be arranged, but through 
which nothing can be understood. Decay itselfis prefigured in  the living: its 
shape  should  therefore  be just  as  much  grasped  in  its  specific 
characteristic as the shape oflife.15 
Not only does Marx expound here an Aristotelian stress on change but he uses it 
to underpin an account of the intellectual history of ancient Greece. He wants to 
account for the particular nature of post-Aristotelian philosophy and, most 
importantly,  for  its subjectivism  and elevation of self consciousness.  He 
articulates this by asking rhetorically: 
is it an accident that with the Epicureans, Stoics, and Sceptics,  all 
moments of self consciousness are represented completely  ...  ?16 
The  growing  importance  of self consciousness  in the  post Aristotelian 
philosophers also implicates them in a radical break with Aristotle. Hillman17 
suggests that in this very break with Aristotle and the development of an 
alternative understanding of subjectivity, Marx sharpens his own critique and 
break with Hegel, and that the example ofEpicurus give Marx the strength to do 
this.  As such, the philosophical moment of subjectivism becomes possible. 
The  strongest  theme  therefore  in  Marx's  doctoral  dissertation  is  the 
transcendence of the contradiction between essence and existence through the 
agency of  a radical subjectivity. While he is not well disposed to Aristotle's system 
15 CW, 1, p. 35. 
16 CW, 1, p. 35. 
17  Hillman,  G.,  Marx  und  Hegel:  Von  der  Spekulation  zur  Dialektik 
(Frankfurt/Main,  1966) cited in McCarthy, Marx and  Aristotle,  p. 299. 31 
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at this point, it  is nevertheless clear that this theme repeats itselfin Marx's later 
work. The Greek ideal of squaring essences with their worldly incarnations is 
broached and Marx makes some preliminary gestures towards its resolution. 
Many caveats must remain however. Marx is not at this point a developed social 
philosopher and, much more, he lacks a developed ontology. Nonetheless, some of 
the outlines can be seen. Inspired by  Hellenic ideals, and working with categories 
drawn from the traditions of  Greek Philosophy, Marx already has a critical stance 
towards the emerging positivism and an inextinguishable faith in the potency of 
self  consciousness to overcome the contradictory relations  between the sensuous 
world and its essences. In working this up, he refills the notions of essence and 
existence, as well as the related concepts, towards which he moves, of  form and 
matter, with specific meaning drawn from his social ontology. The images of his 
later work are faintly present in the Dissertation which still serves to lay down a 
plank in the argument that critiques conceptions of Marx as a thinker of the 
Enlightenment. 
The contradictions between essence and existence, and form and matter, which 
dominate Marx's doctoral dissertation are carried over into the political works of 
the next three years albeit with different impulsions. The Articles on the Free 
Press  18 conceive of the state as the realisation of Reason. But increasingly Marx 
is unhappy with the Hegelian identification of the essence of freedom with the 
existing objective world and particularly the class of bureaucrats that controls it 
through the State. For him, this arises through Hegel's failure to reconcile 
universality and particularity in the Philosophy of  Right. In the course of his 
Critique,  Marx develops  his  own thinking on  the  way in which  such  a 
reconciliation can be attempted, involving a development on the explication of 
Epicureanism in  the Doctoral Dissertation. 
Whilst for Hegel the state acts as a terminus for the human struggle to be free, 
for Marx, the contradiction between essence and existence requires a different 
model of freedom, in which it is conceived of as the realisation of the human 
essence through the transformation of the limiting conditions imposed by the 
external world. In these writings, morality for Marx is based on the autonomy of 
the human mind and freedom is the generic essence of all spiritual existence.  In 
this framework the is/ought distinction is overcome by, first, the investigation of 
and then, the realisation of  the human essence: 'only that which is a realisation of 
freedom can be called humanly good.'19  Morality here is then intertwined with the 
18 Marx, CW 1, p. 162. 
19 Marx, CW 1, p. 159. 32 
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idea of  what a thing is, and 'good' is interpreted in a way very close to Aristotle's 
account on which the good man is the one who best fulfils the essence of man.20 
Kain says that for both Marx and Hegel: 
freedom is only realised when the objective external world and our feelings 
fit, agree with and support the subjective rational freedom of  the individual. 
Laws and institutions feelings and customs as well as the rationality of the 
individual must  form a single organic spiritual unity.21 
But, against Hegel, in the Critique of  Hegel's Doctrine of  the State, Marx is at 
pains to recast the essence/existence contradiction into one which necessitates 
the overthrow of  the conditions which bring it in to play. This reveals the nature of 
Hegel's conservatism in that he rejects the 'ought' as unrealised for the 'is' of the 
Prussian state; conceived of as the realisation of reason, with the cry that 'what 
is real is rational'. As the terrain of  the contradiction changes, Marx's programme 
for its resolution changes too.  The common element tying the explanatory 
categories of  the dissertation to the Critique of  Hegel's Doctrine of  the State, is his 
focus  on self consciousness. Insofar as this is the case, he is Hegelian, but 
increasingly the self consciousness is entwined with the sort of practical 
knowledge of  the world that  is- acquired by  interacting with it, thereby  beginning to 
realise the human essence. Fenves comments: 
one can be quite  exact in determining Marx's  transition from  the 
philosophy of nature to the philosophy of politics: the resolution of the 
contradiction of atomism demands the speculative aufhebung of matter 
and hence the dismissal of any science which attempts to investigate its 
general laws, whereas the resolution of the contradiction between civil 
society and the political state requires the determination of its historical 
condition and the  active  participation in the cancellation of those 
conditions.  22 
This active participation occurs through the agency of labour which comes into 
20  G. Cohen has argued, informally, that the attitude of Marx to capitalism is like 
the attitude of a doctor to a debilitating growth in a human being. The doctor is in 
some sense opposed to the growth,  and works to remove it, but he is not 'morally' 
opposed to it. Further more, the reasons for curing someone of a  debilitating 
growth ought not to be related any particular purpose that the patient has, but 
just so they are able to fulfil whatever potential they might have. The Aristotelian 
basis of the 'potential fulfilling' ethic is clear, even if the analogy, like every 
analogy, is incomplete. 
21 Kain, Marx and  Ethics  p. 19. 
22 Fenves, 'Marx's Doctoral Dissertation', pp. 450-1. 33 
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the foreground in Marx's work and reaches its apex in the Paris Manuscripts; 
Kain comments: 
for the young Marx the human species through its labour constitutes, 
moulds and purposively controls the objective social and natural realm  ... 
the subject constitutes the object, objectifies itself in it, finds itself at home 
with it and thus is free.23 
But even by the time of the Critique, Marx has moved beyond his point of view in 
the doctoral dissertation, and never again is he willing to rest contented with the 
idea that the contradiction between matter and form can be overcome by thought 
alone. This is the mark of his decisive theoretical break with Hegel. In the 
Doctoral Dissertation, Marx begins to worry away at the problem of his life: the 
question of how it is possible to free ourselves through the reconciliation of 
essence to existence, and as early as the writing of the Critique of  Hegel's Doctrine 
of  the State he has rejected the idea that the synthesis is to be achieved through 
the agency of thought. This assessment of the philosophical problem at the 
centre of  human existence and the analyses involved in resolving it, are to develop 
enormously throughout Marx's life. Nonetheless, both the  way of posing the 
question, characterised by its Scholastic mode of expression,  in terms of the 
reconciliation of matter and form  and the terrain on which it is first posed: 
presupposing and exhibiting a deep familiarity  with the philosophical texts of 
Ancient Greece, mark out a thread that runs through those later analyses. 
Marx, Aristotle and Ontology 
Marx's very early reading of the Ancients and Aristotle in particular gives a key 
to unlock some of  the hidden structures of  his thought. There is embedded in Marx 
a motivation to uncover the constant tension between the form and matter of 
bourgeois society, and to identify social categories by reaching behind the 
characteristic behaviour exhibited by certain sorts of things to achieve the 
cognitive capture of  their telos. What Marx takes from Aristotle is not reducible to 
the  Graecomania  of  the  eighteenth  century  German  Humanists,  or  a 
consequentialist moral theory  whose end is human flourishing. It goes deeper than 
that. Marx's whole Weltanschauung is suffused with Aristotelian ways of  thinking. 
What is more, such ways of thinking not only worked for Marx, but gather 
increasing support from developments in analytical philosophy in the Aristotelian 
mode, which have occurred in recent years. 
Marx is not simply an Aristotelian social theorist, for his account of historical 
23 Kain, MarxandEthics  p.20. 34 
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change is concrete and is drawn from a reading of classical political economy as 
well as from the historical writers of the Scottish Enlightenment. Rather, he has 
an understanding of existing social forms that is only explicable in terms of his 
early reading. His practical and theoretical efforts to reconcile the form and 
matter of specifically bourgeois society, only make sense on the basis of his very 
early attempts to theorise that relation through the prism of Hellenistic 
philosophy.  The theoretical structure of Marx's later corpus resides in a 
metaphysics drawn from the Aristotelian tradition. CHAPTER THREE 
THE ARISTOTELIAN TRADITION IN ONTOLOGY 
Substance and Matter in Aristotle's Metaphysics 
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One central aspect of  Aristotle's world view that has social theoretic implications 
is his theory of substance and composites. It stems from two sources; in the 
Metaphysics it is derived largely from the logic of linguistic usage whereas  in the 
Physics it arises out of the analysis of change. There are further important 
distinctions in the two accounts of substance; the Physics  emphasises the 
plurality of form and matter while the Metaphysics  emphasises their unity; a 
tension that has implications for Marx's use of the distinction. Despite these 
differences the account can be reconstructed broadly enough for the present 
purpose without diverting into detailed exegesis. 
Aristotle outlines his project in the Metaphysics  as the investigation of the 
knowledge of existence, in a section that sets down the limits of metaphysics and 
can also be taken as definitive of  ontology: 
There is a branch of knowledge that studies being qua being, and the 
attributes that belong to it in virtue of its own nature. Now this is not the 
same as any of the special sciences, since none of these enquires about 
being qua being. They cut off some part of it and study the attributes of this 
part. That is what the mathematical sciences do, for instance. But since we 
are seeking the first principles, the highest causes, it is of being qua being 
that we must grasp the first causes.1 
Aristotle faced two constraints in the investigation of being qua being: that his 
exposition was categorially adequate to cover the range of sublunary entities, and 
at the same time, that the categories he employed provide an adequate refutation 
of the monist claim of Parmenides and the Eleatics, that 'What is, is one and 
unchangeable'. It is worth noting  this purpose for the account of substance: 
providing a reply to Parmenides suggests that, from the first, the conception of 
substance was tied up with the question of  change and also with telling the history 
of change.  Aristotle observes that things are said to be in many different ways, 
but that there is a special class of terms which answer the question 'what is X?' 
These terms capture what falls into the primary category of being; substance 
(ousiai) and so the question; 'what being is, is the same question what substance 
is.'2  What, precisely, substance is, is laid out in  Metaphysics V.7 where Aristotle 
1 Aristotle, Metaphysics 1003a 2l. 
2 Aristotle, Metaphysics 1028a 10. outlines two key criteria: 
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Things are called substances in two ways, whatever is the ultimate subject 
which is no longer said of anything else; and whatever, being this so and so 
is also separable.  3 
The two criteria here are clear enough; they concern individuation: to qualify as a 
substance an entity has to possess 'thisness', and non-parasitism: a substance is 
an entity that has an independent existence. So substances are ontologically 
basic; the basic forms of being; in the sense first that they are existents, and 
second that they are the existents that all else is dependent on,  but are 
themselves dependent on no other thing. For Aristotle, the sorts of  things that are 
substances are neither the subsensible particles of the atomists nor the forms of 
Plato. Instead, he develops his notion of substance by a process of elimination of 
various  candidates;  stuffs  or  materials,  dependent  objects,  powers,  and 
dispensable terms, and generalises his account to include living things of all 
species. He sometimes seems to include a criterion of generation and repeatedly 
remarks that man begets man. In this manner he focuses  on his typical 
substance -the individual member of a genus. 
Empiricist critics have attacked the doctrine of substance for its alleged idealism.4 
Berkeley sets the pace here, jeering at Locke's account of substance as an 
'unknowable substrate'. For Berkeley the notion of  material substance contains a 
contradiction, since it involves acceptance of the claim that an idea may exist in 
an unperceiving thing, violating the 'obvious tho' amazing principle that, for 
sensible things, their 'esse is percipi'; to be is to be perceived. This represents the 
most radical reduction of  ontology to perception.5 
But, regardless of the effectiveness of this point that Berkeley makes against 
Locke, Aristotle is putting forward a substantially different position, which is 
3 Aristotle, Metaphysics  1017b 23-26. 
4 This is ironic in view of, on the one hand, the  importance Marx places on the 
notion in his theory of value, and the widespread understanding of Marx as the 
philosophical materialist. If  Marx is a thorough going materialist, who embraces 
the theory of substance, then the conception of substance as idealist must go. If 
substance theories are irremediably idealist, and Marx embraces them, then he is 
not a materialist. Finally, if  Marx is the materialist he is commonly held to be, and 
substance talk is idealist nonsense, then he cannot avail himself of such talk in 
the theory of value. The alternative to these sets of positions is that he is just 
hopelessly confused. It will be clear that I find the first of these options the most 
plausible. 
5 Berkeley, G.,  Principles of  Human Knowledge and Three Dialogues edited by R. 
Woodhouse, (Hamondsworth, 1988) p. 54. 37 
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metaphysical rather than physical  and has to do with the logic of a subject that 
persists through change. In the most interesting case of substances for social 
theory,  composite  substances,  which possess  both matter and form,  this 
metaphysical status is reflected in the nature of that matter. Matter is not a kind 
of  thing; rather, it exists only relative to form. Martin puts it  like this: 
The  matter then, which at some time makes up a substance, just is that 
substance in so far as it can become another substance, while the form is 
that substance insofar as it is a  substance of that kind rather than of 
another  kind.  6 
These  considerations  come  from  the Aristotelian analysis  of change,  and 
particularly from the question of subjecthood in the substantial change of 
composites. But before we look at that, it is necessary to deal with Aristotle's 
opposition to the Platonic theory of Forms and the delineation of this particular 
Aristotelian theme in the work of Marx and HegeL This has significance beyond a 
historical dispute between Aristotle  and his teacher; the critique of false 
universals becomes operative against classical political economy and is an ever 
present concern in Marx's attempts to outline a broad theoretical starting point in 
the introduction to the Grundrisse. 
Anti-Platonism -Aristotle, Hegel and Marx 
Aristotle produces several arguments for  rejecting the substance claims of 
Platonic Forms or universals. Both in the course of outlining the nature of 
substance in the Metaphysics, and in the Nicomachean Ethics,7 one of Aristotle's 
central arguments against considering universals as substances is that they fail 
since substance is tied to the notion of  individuation: 
the universal is also thought by some to be in the fullest sense a cause and 
a principle  ... But it seems impossible that any universal term should be a 
substance.  For the substance of a thing is what is peculiar to it and does 
not belong to anything else; but a universal is common - that is what we 
mean by "a universal", that which is such as to belong to more than one 
thing. Of  which individual then will this be the substance? Of  all or of none? 
But it cannot be the substance of all; and if it is to be the substance of one 
thing this will have to be the others also; for things whose substance is one 
and whose essence is one are themselves one.8 
6 Martin, C., The Philosophy of  Thomas Aquinas (London, 1988), p. 65-6. 
7 Aristotle, Ethics 1096b 8-26 
8 Aristotle, Metaphysics 1038b 7-14. 38 
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This passage parallels that in the Introduction to  the Grundrisse where Marx 
discusses the possibility of beginning an account of social development with the 
category of production in general. This is discussed in Chapter Six of the current 
work, though I offer a brief outline here. This much discussed section of Marx's 
work, which is the main place where he outlines his method, is premissed on an 
Aristotelian rejection of  Platonism. This is why, although he acknowledges, in the 
Grundrisse, the common thread of human productive activity flowing through 
human history, his method, in Capital, begins with the investigation of  the specific 
social forms under which this takes place. In this respect the Grundrisse differs 
from Capital as ontology differs from methodology.  Marx's approach in the earlier 
work both parallels and diverges in interesting ways from that of Hegel, who, 
according to one commentator, himself attempts a synthesis of Platonism and 
Aristotelianism: 
Hegel's notion of a spirit  ... is like the Aristotelian soul in that it is a form 
giving principle or potency inhering in things. To say that spirit "posits 
itself"  means in part that it gives expression, embodiment and actuality to 
itself, just as the form or essence of a living species does for Aristotle in a 
living organism.  Spirit's  "forms"  however,  are  "concepts"  or "pure 
essentialities", universal natures which philosophers know by abstract 
thinking, and which are (in Platonic fashion) truer and more real than the 
transitory sensible particulars which exemplify them. For Hegel sensible 
particulars  were  created or  "posited"  by Spirit as  the  medium  for 
actualising itself; without them Spirit's thinking would remain abstract -
incomplete, not perfectly expressed, a mere potentiality lacking fulfilment. 
Concepts are what is truly real but concepts demand exemplification for 
their full actuality. Hegel's metaphysics thus ingeniously reconciles Plato's 
thesis that forms  or universals are more real than particulars with 
Aristotle's insistence that forms actually exist only in particulars.9 
Something similar is true of  Marx too. Productive activity though, takes the place 
of Geist, as the analogue for the Aristotelian soul, and takes the role of a form 
giving potency inhering in the persisting social  matter that is the  only 
transhistorical existent for Marx. Yet, driven by his attempts to transcend the 
idealism of Hegel, he is drawn towards an elimination of the Platonic pole in this 
dialectic of universals. Or, to put it more precisely, he only permits concrete real 
universals; universals that are actually instantiated, and not merely logical 
universals within his ontology. It  is the unreality of  the universals proposed by the 
political economists which he highlights and against which he polemicises. His 
9 Wood, Karl Marx,  pp. 191-2. 39 
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overall approach is, in this sense, Aristotelian. Arguably, this is a handicap to 
clarity of exposition since the concomitant anti-Platonism leads him to tend to 
avoid any talk of society in general over time, as an enduring entity which 
undergoes certain changes of form. But such a  conception is, and has to be, 
fundamental to him,  to form  a  consistent viewpoint and so he pursues  a 
universalistic treatment in the Grundrisse. It is certainly true of Marx's position 
that it rejects a  standpoint of the uninvestigated, merely posited, universal 
category such as utility.  In this manner he condemns Bentham for introducing 
the empty universal 'principle of utility' without relating it to the sorts of objects 
that exist in the world such as dogs and men. He states of  Bentham, for example: 
The principle of utility was no discovery made by Bentham. He simply 
reproduced in his dull way what Helvetius and other Frenchmen had said 
with wit and ingenuity in the eighteenth century. To know what is useful for 
a  dog one must investigate the nature of dogs. This nature is not itself 
deducible from the principle of  utility. Applying this to man, he that would 
judge all human acts, movements, relations etc. according to the principle of 
utility would first have to deal with human nature in general, and then with 
human nature as historically modified in each epoch. Bentham does not 
trouble himselfwith this.  10 
Such empty universals can be filled out to serve an ideological function and Marx 
sees Bentham as setting up the English Petty bourgeois as 'the normal man' and 
then he projects and retrojects a yardstick of 'whatever is useful to this peculiar 
kind of normal man.' Marx wants to found his method on something better than 
this, and attempts to do so by advocating a position in which concrete universals 
are directly related to the objects to which they apply; in  his case, concrete human 
beings and their particular needs, living in particular, specifiable social relations. 
In a similar manner, Marx returns to the question in 1868, over ten years after his 
frustratingly incomplete grappling with this question in the Introduction to the 
Grundrisse. Marx spelt out what he regarded as self evident: the distinctions 
between what was  universally true of human social existence;  continual 
production, and the distribution of  social labour in definite proportions as a natural 
law; these were unabolishable features of the world and true of human society, 
just as human society; they were essential properties of that particular. For this 
reason he continues to insist on the existence of some universal necessities for 
social life, in the letter to Dr. Kugelmann cited above: 
10 Marx, Capital 1 , p. 758 (footnote). 40 
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That this necessity of  the distribution of  social labour in definite proportions 
cannot possibly be done away with by a particular form of social production 
but can only change the mode of its appearance, is self-evident. Natural 
laws cannot be abolished at all. What can change in historically different 
circumstances is only the form in which these laws assert themselves. And 
the form in which this proportional distribution of labour asserts itself, in a 
social system where the interconnection of social labour manifests itself 
through the private exchange of individual products of labour is precisely 
the exchange value  of  these products.11 
For Marx natural laws 'which cannot be abolished at all' have a real ontological 
foundation in concrete universals. Production is one such, and has 'attached' to it, 
as it were, certain basic natural laws. But this material, which any human 
sociality is based on, is always enformed. Marx differs from other theorists in that 
he is unwilling to remain on the level of discussion of universals because of his 
Aristotelian impetus to find the specification and concretisation of such universals 
as labour, and production. Hence his unwillingness to accept the abstractions, and 
particularly the abstract universals of the apologists for the existing order of 
society. Such a attitude is Aristotelian, because Marx wants to rehearse the view 
in which universals have their fullest existence only as particulars. Both Marx and 
Aristotle work on the basis of an ontology of universalia in rebus (universals in 
things) rather than on the Platonic schema of universalia ante rem (universal 
before things). He critiques Platonism as early as 1844 in the Holy Family in the 
from of an attack on 'speculative philosophy': 
if  from real apples, pears, strawberries and almonds I form the general idea 
'fruit', if  I go further and imagine that my abstract idea 'fruit' derived from 
real fruit is an entity existing outside me, is indeed the true essence of the 
pear, the apple etc., then -in the language of speculative philosophy - I am 
declaring that 'fruit' is the substance of the pear, the apple, the almond, 
etc. that what is essential to these things is not their real existence 
perceptible to the senses but the essence that I have abstracted from them 
and foisted on them, the essence of my idea - 'fruit'.  I therefore declare 
apples, pears, almonds etc. to be mere forms of existence, modi offruit.12 
Marx goes on in Capital and the Grundrisse to expose, as he sees matters, the 
false universalism in bourgeois apologetics for the established order, and the 
11 Marx to Dr Kugelmann 11 July 1868 in Selected Correspondence (Moscow ,1955) 
p. 196. 
12 Marx, The Holy Family in CW 4, pp. 57-8. 41 
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inadequate universalism in Ricardo's account of  the labour theory of  value. It  has 
been suggested by Moore,  13 that in his move from abstract labour to the labour 
that is made concrete in commodities, Marx commits precisely the sin that he 
inveighs against in this passage from the Holy Family. However, his critique fails, 
as Arthur argues.14 These matters are considered in more depth in Chapter Five. 
The Aristotelian account of change 
A satisfactory account of change is important for social theory since to give an 
explanation of a particular development, such as a social upheaval, a war,  the fall 
of a government, economic crises or the supercession of a particular set of social 
relations is to answer in every case, questions about why certain changes take 
place. Marx's concern in all his major works is fundamentally one of explaining 
social phenomena. The hints of prediction, widely taken to be indicative of his 
method as some form of  determinism, arise only as dependent suggestions derived 
from  explanations of what has already taken place. In particular, Marx's 
explanation of the genesis, development and decay of social entities parallels 
Aristotle's account, which distinguishes between two types of change, accidental 
and substantial: 
Things are said to come to be in many ways and some things are said not to 
come to be, but to come to be something, while only substances are said 
simply to come to be. In other cases there must evidently be something 
underlying which is the coming to be thing - for when a quantity, quality, 
relation or place comes to be it is of an underlying thing, since it is only 
substances that are not said of anything further, underlying them whereas 
everything is said of  substances.  15 
Here Aristotle reinforces the key nature of substance, albeit from a different angle 
to that in the Metaphysics.  Division of the categories in this way and the primacy 
of substance derives from the account of change in the Physics. Involved in the 
account of what comes to be is the idea that it is a modification of what is: matter, 
by the addition of what is not: a particular form. There are three elements to any 
change; the underlying subject of the change, the pre-change state, and the post-
change state; 
It becomes clear that substance comes into being from some underlying 
13 Moore, 'Marx and the Origins of  Dialectical Materialism' Inquiry  14 (1971) p. 
421. 
14 See Arthur, C., 'Labour: Marx's Concrete Universal', Inquiry 21 (1978) pp. 87-
104. 
15 Aristotle, Physics  190a 31. 42 
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subject, for there must always be something that underlies from which 
what comes into being comes into being. And the things that come into 
being do  so in some cases by change of shape, (for example, statues) in 
some by addition (for example, growing things) in some by subtraction (for 
example, a marble Hermes), in some by putting together (for example, a 
house).  16 
This apparently straightforward account nevertheless raises a  challenge to 
outline criteria of subjecthood.  Any kind of change including substantial change 
involves the persistence of a subject over time. The question is then faced: What 
constitutes this subject? and, as part of the answer, what changes can it undergo 
whilst retaining this subjecthood? The question states a demand for the essence of 
a thing, and consequently, what changes can take place in that thing whilst it 
remains that particular thing, and what changes on the other hand make it a new 
kind of thing altogether.  According to the account of substantial change, the 
essence of a  thing appears to inhere in some way to the matter that is the 
underlying subject of that thing, since it is the matter that persists through 
changes of form But in other ways it is the form of a  composite that gives it 
identity: this stems from the fact that, for example, to count Callias and Socrates 
as two means counting them as men and to count them as men is to refer to their 
form. The ability to individuate substances, which does not belong to matter  17  is a 
criterion of substantiveness and belongs to them by virtue of the form of the 
substance. There is then, a paradox at work here; the paradox of the unity of 
composite substances: How can form and matter be combined to give a unified 
substance? The notions of  form and matter will playa large role in the argument 
presented in this thesis. This central role stems from noticing that these sorts of 
distinctions are employed by Marx when he points to the criterion of the form of 
production in the typology of  societies: 
What distinguishes the various economic formations  of society - the 
distinction between for example a  society based on slave labour and a 
society based on wage labour -is the form in which the surplus labour is in 
each case extorted from the immediate producer, the worker.18 
16 Aristotle, Physics  190b 1-8. 
17 See Hirsch, E.,'Physical Identity'  for the view that matter lacks observational 
identity criteria. The idea is that it is impossible to give an account of the 
persisting identity of matter unless it is articulated, or made to stand out from its 
environment. This gives rise to 'a general problem about the concept of identity 
through time of matter insofar as that concept carries with it the problematical 
idea of a  quantity of matter maintaining its identity through periods of non 
articulation' in  Philosophical Review 1976 p. 379. 
18 Marx, Capital 1 , p. 325. 43 
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The distinction between form and matter; hylomorphism, is thus key to Marx's 
mode of analysis. 
However, it is sometimes objected that the Aristotelian account of the distinction 
between substantial and accidental change is a matter of convention. If  this is the 
case, the argument about the essential role of the distinction between form and 
matter in social theory is weakened, since the fundamental nature of the 
distinction between separate social forms becomes a matter of the chopping up of 
history in the mind of the observer, not in the process of history itself. Marx 
appears to be committed to the idea that the distinctions he makes 'between the 
various economic formations  of society'  are objective,  and not a  matter of 
convention. Can this perspective be justified? 
It seems plausible to say that, for example, trees cease to exist when they are 
chopped down, but not when they lose a branch. Indeed, for ourselves, as Brody 
points out, the distinction between changes such as growing taller, or even losing a 
limb, are obviously distinguished from our ceasing to exist. As a result, we do not 
insure ourselves beyond our death. There are, it might be objected, border line 
cases between substantial and accidental change; and this again is undoubtedly 
right. However, borderline cases exist in many fruitful philosophical distinctions. 
They provide interesting problems, but do  not refute the applicability of the 
distinctions themselves, just as the existence of dusk does not refute the real and 
objective distinction between day and night. 
Brody considers the more sophisticated objection that our experience comes to us 
without being divided up into experience parcels of this or that particular 
substance, as it undergoes change,  and that it is we who,  as  a  matter of 
convention apply a conceptual scheme.  As Brody points,  out this objection seems 
to combine two different thoughts; 
(a)  it  is  a  matter  of convention  that  we  distinguish  out  of our 
undifferentiated experience certain experiences that we describe  as 
experiences of a tree. 
(b) it is a matter of convention that there actually is a tree that, among 
other things, we are experiencing at a given time.  19 
The second of these claims is altogether implausible, since if it were the case it 
would be necessary that the existence of  trees was dependent on the adoption of a 
19 Brody, B., Identity and  Essence (Princeton, 1980) p. 74. 44 
Chapter Three 
convention for  distinguishing them. In the case of the critics of Marx's social 
theory, this would entail that the existence of capitalism was timed to coincide 
with its recognition as such. This would be a strange claim. If  it were to be made 
explicitly then the 'relativist' critique of  Marx might be more transparent. 
The first claim points to the need to be specific about the principle of  individuation 
that is used to pick out and articulate the entities that exist.  I will argue that 
Marx's own method is to isolate kinds of  entities through identifying behaviour in 
a particular way. Nevertheless, the problem of  Marx's principle of individuation is 
a major issue in discussion of Marx's ontology. Leaving it aside for the present, we 
may work on the assumption that Marx's adoption of an objective distinction 
between accidental and substantial change is not straightforwardly open to the 
most obvious objection, that it is simply a matter of convention. The distinction 
between substantial and accidental change is twinned in Marx with the distinction 
between form and matter. 
Form, Matter and the Paradox of  Unity 
Consideration of the relationship between matter and form  in composite 
substances introduces  an important problem in Aristotelian metaphysical 
interpretation, which Gill in  her workAristotle on Substance has called the paradox 
of  unity. This paradox is the worry about how a composite substance can be one 
both in definition (which seems to imply that form gives a substance its identity) 
and over time (which seems to imply that matter gives a substance its identity). 
The problem arises since unity in definition requires that form and matter are not 
distinct components of a substances formula, otherwise the substance is not an 
independent existent. But unity through time requires a matter that is distinct 
from the form it gains or loses. This persisting matter provides Aristotle with the 
conceptual ammunition he needs against the Parminidean objection against the 
sheer emergence of  substances and an answer to the question: 'where does X come 
from?' 
Gill resolves this paradox by arguing that the matter of a composite substance 
survives only potentially. Form and matter exist in the composite because matter 
is functional matter; in particular the organs of an organism, and form exists as 
'first actuality', the capacity of those organs to function. The definition of a 
substance is its function, so the definition of the composite is unified. The claim 
that pre-existing matter survives in a product potentially  is critical and in line 
with what Aristotle says in Metaphysics IX, 8: 
Matter exists in a potential state, just because it may attain to its form; and when it exists actually then it  is in its form.20 
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For Gill, this means that the essential and some inessential properties of matter 
survive to modify the higher level construct. These properties are, however, out of 
phase with, and in constant tension with the higher level construct.  The telos  of 
the potential matter is to become  actual matter; that is to  say, the bare 
constituents of a composite tend to act against that composite and subvert its 
formal unity.  This stems from a tension between, in Aristotle's words it is 'the 
principle of  change (which) inheres in its matter,'21 and the principle of persistence 
which appears to reside in its form. 
For Aristotle, potentiality  is secondary to actuality because what something is 
potentially, is dependent on what something is actually. But actuality is also prior 
to potentiality in being since being is directional, teleological, and  potentiality 
exists toward actuality. It is the existence of matter as mere potential, as 
something whose natural tendency (to become actual) is suppressed, that creates 
this tension. The telos of the potential matter is to become actual matter, that is 
to say, the bare constituents of a composite tend to act against that composite 
and subvert its formal unity22 There is therefore a need for an active unifying 
principle to maintain the unity of the (potential) matter and form.  It is this 
principle that directs the further development of the organism. The continuing 
development of the entity is then caused by the entity acting on itself qua other 
and progressively differentiating the lower matter into the complex functional 
body.  But at a  certain point this becomes  unsustainable and the central 
controlling principle of  the entity  is reduced in scope: 
during decline, the creature attempts to act on itself qua itself and thus to 
preserve it in its present state, but finds it acting on matter that is 
increasingly  other  .23 
The supercession of the tension between matter and form,  potentiality and 
actuality, uses up energy, and the active principle of unity becomes less and less 
effective. The organism becomes weak from its exertions and must sleep. After a 
time, the tension between potential matter and form all becomes too much for the 
20 Aristotle, Metaphysics  1050a 15-16, also see 1088b 1, 1092a  3-5. 
21 cited below from the Physics, footnote 25. 
22 For Gill's interpretation of Aristotle this means the return of entities to their 
four elemental constituents, earth, air, fire, and water but we do not need to 
pursue this aspect of  her study. In general, it refers to the return of  an entity to its 
component parts, whatever those component parts might be. 
23 Gill,M.L.,Aristotleon Substance (Princeton, 1989), p. 234. 46 
Chapter Three 
maintenance of unity. The behaviour of the entity becomes increasingly erratic, 
the body becomes more and more difficult to control and finally the heart itself 
ceases to operate. The organism goes through a downward spiral of decline, decay 
and death. The relevance of this account to social theory in general, and Marx's 
account of the decay of the social organism that is capitalism, in particular, is 
developed in Chapter Seven. 
It might be objected that an application of this account to social theory conflates 
the distinctions between natural organisms and social artifacts, such as social 
institutions deliberately put together by men.  But Marx tends to argue not that 
that society is literally an organism. Rather, he suggests that it shares certain 
analogous aspects and can, as a result, be usefully theoretically captured as an 
organic whole.  His reasons for doing so derive from an account of the nature of 
man informed, certainly, by Feuerbach, the conception of species being, and the 
transformative method that Marx derived from him. But it also involves some 
very basic and often unstated foundations which come from Aristotle. The overall 
perspective that Aristotle takes on the nature of man, for example as reported in 
De Anima can be overlaid on the account of the dynamic nature of composite 
things. Both incorporate consideration of actuality and potentiality, and of the 
constitution of  lower order entities by  higher order ones. 
In  Marx's later works, particularly in his discussion of economic crises there is an 
almost directly analogous structure between the pattern outlined above and the 
decline and decay of a mode of production. It is argued in Chapter Six that the 
matter of human society is human productive activity undertaken by concretely 
existing human beings. The potential matter of a  social  organism  such as 
capitalism is the particular modified and suppressed form that human productive 
activity takes, under given social relations: thus the potential matter of capitalist 
society is the alienated labour carried out by the human beings in that society. 
This alienated labour is in constant tension with the social form  which it 
constitutes and is subject to an active principle of unity: the law of value. The 
decay of  a social organism such as capitalism is exemplified in the declining ability 
of the organising principle to do  its job. Decay is marked out by declining 
penetration of  the organising principle, the increasing fragmentation of the entity, 
and ultimately its collapse into its component parts. The crucial element in the 
transition of this model to the macro-social world is contained in the difference 
between the components of the entities. The matter of social entities consists of 
creative human individuals with intentions and aims. The more a social entity 
decays, the more dominant become the subjective intentions of human actors. 
The individual once again takes on 'the mantle of  history.  , Ontology and explanation in metaphysical hylomorphism 
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The form/matter distinction has other implications which shed light on the nature 
of social explanation. It is commonly held that breaking down a complex entity 
into its smallest component parts, and seeing how they fit together is the best 
way (in some uncontroversial sense of best) of explaining why that entity behaves 
in the way that it does. Another way of putting it is that if  we get down to what is 
ontologically basic, we naturally examine what is explanatorily basic as well; 
ontology and explanation fit together. But if  we look at artifacts that possess both 
form  and content such as a  wooden box,  we want to say that all that it is 
composed of is wood (and nails and so on) and nothing but wood (and nails and so 
on). But we do not call the box simply wood but wooden. Furthermore if  we were to 
discuss the uses of  the box we would refer primarily to the qualities it has as a box; 
its size, volume, sturdiness and so on, referring only to its woodenness when that 
made a difference to the other qualities. Working, as Aristotle, does from the logic 
of language use leads us to argue that the matter that makes up the box only 
exists in a derived form (as 'this-en') in the box. This is clear if  we ask how we get 
from a wooden box to just wood. If we wanted to get our wood back, we need to 
break up the box into its component parts. Being made into a box deprives the 
wood of its full'wood'-ness. The general point is that in the case of composites, 
matter is primary on the ontological level, but form is primary on the explanatory 
level. 
This is true of the social world just as it is true of the middle sized composites of 
Aristotle. The picture is more complicated here because society as a substance is 
made up of other substances. Yet this complication is not a problem of category 
but of degree, since matter is generally worked up into a series of forms, each 
higher than the last. Marx adds sophistication to the Aristotelian picture, with a 
picture of  forms in conflict with each other, so that the overall organism is not in 
some steady state but a continually unfolding whole, and this is a perspective 
derived from Hegel. Nevertheless, to anticipate the discussion of Chapter Eight, if 
this explanatory priority of form over matter is generally the case, it does help to 
explain, even in the absence of any other evidence, why Marx was not a 
methodological individualist, reducing complex social forms to their individual level 
matter, even in the absence of any other evidence. 
Aristotle on the nature of  the polis 
The conception of society as an organic whole, constructed by nature rather than 
artificially put together, has a  central place for both Aristotle and Marx. It 
encapsulates a certain view of  the individual person as a zoon politikon: an animal 48 
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of the polis, and consequently as something that can only exist fully in society. 
This picture of the nature of man has ethical, prescriptive commitments 
concomitant to it. In particular, the organic conception of society adds weight to 
the idea that the good life for man is intertwined with the good life for men; in the 
form of the harmony, community, equality and friendship that the Ancients 
aspired towards as a realisation of the social nature of man. For it is the social, 
language using nature of man that makes him capable of a moral rather than 
merely a prudential life. It is the nature of man that makes this the case and 
especially (a fetish of  both Aristotle and Marx) the criterion of delineation between 
man and the beasts: 
Now that man is more of a  political animal than bees or any other 
gregarious animals is evident. Nature, as we often say, makes nothing in 
vain, and man is the only animal who has the gift of speech.  .  .. the power of 
speech is intended to set forth the expedient and inexpedient, and therefore 
likewise the just and the unjust. And it is a characteristic of man that he 
alone has any sense of  good and evil, of  just and unjust, and the like, and the 
association of living beings who have this sense makes a family and a 
state.24 
This consideration has explanatory significance, reflecting relations between a 
whole and its parts, and relations between the individual and the state since: 
the state is by nature clearly prior to the individual, since the whole is of 
necessity prior to the part.25 
Marx gives a  qualified welcome to this piece of information. His account of 
cooperation within the work process: 'originates from the fact that man, if not as 
Aristotle thought a political animal is at all events a social animal.'26 It is also the 
case that the conception of society as a natural thing, and therefore a thing with a 
nature, contrasts with the Enlightenment conception of society as an aggregate 
constituted  by convention, contract or agreement as in the classical bourgeois 
view based on contracting individuals.  Such a  model is  well known from 
Rousseau's The Social Contract, or Locke's Treatise on Government and is found at 
its  most  extreme  in  Hobbes'  Leviathan.  This  contractarian approach is 
condemned by Marx when the political economist Wakefield resuscitates it, in 
passages saturated with sarcasm to be found at the end of the first volume of 
24 Aristotle, Politics 1253a 7-18. 
25 Aristotle, Politics 1253a 19-20. 
26 Marx, Capital 1 , p. 444. 49 
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Capital27•  In and of itself, however, the alternative conception of society as 
natural has no revolutionary or necessarily dynamic content: it is neutral as to 
whether the society is in a state of conflict or not. For example, Aristotle's prime 
concern in the Politics is to reconcile the stasis  of the polis, to achieve harmony 
between men and men, and man and his social environment, and this is at least 
part of the explanation for the appearance of social conservatism when Aristotle 
is viewed from the modern age. G.E.M. de St Croix sees this as a consequence of 
his historical distance from the possibility of any mental prefiguring of a future 
society: 
For  Aristotle  and  his  contemporaries  there  were  no  prospects  of 
fundamental change that could offer a better life for even a citizen of the 
polis, except at the expense of others. The genius of Aristotle as a political 
and social thinker is visible to us not only in his recognition  ....  of the 
structural defects of the Greekpolis, automatically creating an opposition 
between propertied and non propertied but also in his generally practicable 
and often very acute ideas for palliating as far as possible the evil 
consequences  of these  defects  - ideas which compare  at least very 
favourably with the utterly impracticable fantasies of Plato. 28 
A more conservative version of the organic conception of society than Aristotle's 
is found in the work of Burke who iterates the central problem of an essentialist 
account of society: that of the relation between persisting social structures and 
component parts that are constantly changing. In  Reflections on the Revolution in 
France, Burke defends what he takes to be the British Constitutional settlement 
against the rampant egalitarianism manifested in France, and 'Certain Societies 
in London.' In  Burke's view, inheritance of  the Crown, the Peerage, class privileges 
and, above all, property, preserves in the constitution 'unity in so great a diversity 
of its parts.'  But the inheritance principle rapidly becomes more that merely a 
useful policy for securing national cohesion, since it is inherent in the make up of 
mankind; 'the happy effect of  following nature, which is wisdom without reflection 
and above it.' This manifestation of human nature secures the cohesion of the 
social system, and permits of its analysis in an organic manner.  Through the 
natural transmission mechanism of inheritance, all the benign achievements of 
our ancestors are bound up and carried forward, snowballing into a 'stupendous 
wisdom' which, in true myth making fashion, generates a timeless unity of the 
whole: 
27 see below p. 62. 
28 de Ste Croix, G. E. M., Class Struggle in the Ancient Greek World (London, 1981) 
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Our political system is placed in a just correspondence and symmetry with 
the order of the world,  and with the mode of existence decreed to a 
permanent body composed of transitory parts; wherein by the disposition of 
a stupendous wisdom moulding together the great mysterious incorporation 
of the human race, the whole, at one time, is never old, or young, but in a 
condition of unchangeable constancy, moves on through the varied tenor of 
perpetual decay, fall, renovation and progression.29 
This supposition of a stupendous wisdom certainly gives the organic conception of 
society a  conservative and mystical twist. It could well serve as the archetype for 
the historicism Popper attacks in The Open Society and its Enemies. But the fact 
that a  conception of society as  an organic whole  can support ideological 
commitments of both left and right suggests that, in itself, the conception is 
ideologically neutral. If we accept that such a conception is an interesting, and 
ideologically neutral one, we can also assess other reasons for considering society 
in that way. One reason is that an account of a society as an entity that behaves 
in certain specific ways that are, at least in principle, predictable, is a component 
part of any  attempt to explain the nature of society. An account of a society as 
an organic entity that behaves in certain specific ways and not in other specific 
ways and is an account of the capacities and incapacities of that entity. As such it 
provides the grounds for explanations and, in principle, predictions which bypass 
the problems involved in  the  justification of  induction. 
Such a form of analysis is open to the injection of mystical element, such as the 
talk of a stupendous wisdom  referred to by Burke. But the analytical model of 
society as an organism is not fatally undermined by this; if it were, the costs to 
any typology of societies, not just a Marxian one, but also a Weberian framework 
or the identification of societies as 'post-industrial' would be very high. So the 
alternative to what Popper outlines as mystical historicism is to demystify it, by 
excising talk of a stupendous wisdom and replacing it with an account of the real 
integrative mechanisms that operate in the social world. It is not to rest content 
with a  purely empirical account instead, especially if that account radically 
constrains the possibility of explanation. Whilst it is understandable to react 
against the superstitions of feudal  and ancient thought and embrace the 
scienticism and empiricism of Enlightenment thought, it is important to avoid 
throwing out the organic baby out with the conservative bathwater. 
29  Burke, E., Reflections on the Revolution in France and on the Proceedings in 
Certain  Societies  in  London  Relative  to  that  Event,  ed.  C.C.  O'Brien, 
(Harmondsworth, 1969) p. 119-120. De Anima and Social Theory 
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Aristotle's account of the soul in De Anima is a powerful antidote to those who 
conceive of the search for the soul as a search for an entity, with some kind of 
relationship to the body. Considered in this way it can throw some light on the 
theory and practice of  reducing one macro entity to a series of micro entities. His 
view is that: 'If we are to state something common to every type of soul it will be 
that it is the first fulfilment of a body that has organs.  '30 or alternatively, that a 
soul is 'a principle of the aforesaid powers and is derived by them namely, by 
nutrition, perception, thought, movement.  '31 
Aristotle is impatient with attempts to specify the nature of the soul in such 
general terms, and more willing to spell out the different behaviour patterns of 
bodily organs, since it is clear to him that functioning is the mark of the soul. One 
commentator puts it  like this: 
Possessing a soul is like possessing a skill. A skilled man's skill is not some 
part of him, responsible for his skilled acts; similarly a living creature's 
animator or life force  is not some part of it, responsible for its living 
activities.  32 
For Aristotle, the relation between body and soul is one instance of the general 
relation between potentiality and actuality, which he discusses in the Metaphysics. 
Moreover, it is a  version of a version of that distinction, since the body/soul 
relation exhibits the contrast between a capacity and its exercise.  From this point 
of  view: 
it is as pointless to ask if  the soul and the body are the same as it would be 
to 'ask of the wax and the shape or in general of the matter of anything and 
that of  which it is the matter'33 
Thus for Aristotle, Cartesian considerations concerning the relation of mind and 
body would not have been seriously entertained. Along his preferred route, soul is a 
capacity of  body so for a living thing to have a soul, and to live, is for it to behave 
in a certain way.  But there is in Aristotle's account of the soul, more than one 
level of  potentiality and actuality, capacity and its exercise. For a living man to be 
a good man is for him to acquire a higher order, more defined form of  behaviour. A 
good man is one who fulfils his human potential and all men have the potential to 
30 Aristotle, De Anima 412b 4-6. 
31 Aristotle, De Anima  413b 10-12. 
32 Barnes, J., Aristotle (Oxford, 1981), p. 66. 
33 Aristotle, De Anima  412b 6-8 become good men; the potential to fulfil their potential. 
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It is precisely this feature of his work that Hegel commends in his Lectures on the 
History of  Philosophy. He writes: 
In Aristotle's teaching on the subject we must not expect to find a so called 
metaphysics of the soul. For metaphysical handling such as this really 
presupposes the soul as a thing and asks, for example, what sort of thing it 
is, whether it is simple and so on. Aristotle does not bother his concrete  , 
speculative mind with abstract questions such as these.34 
The central feature of this account is that the questions posed by the soul are not 
resolved by relating different sets of statements: mind/brain or mental/physical, or 
by the reduction of one kind of entity to another kind. Instead the account of the 
soul is a  matter of outlining the location of a  capacity and the nature of its 
exerCIse. 
There are two important conclusions for social theory which stem from this 
account. Firstly Aristotle offers a de-reified  account of  the soul and resolves what 
others take to be some kind of thing into a set of powers, or capacities whilst 
simultaneously remaining on the terrain of  ontology, talking of  what exists though 
not of what things  exist. Ironically, this is the opposite of the tendency for which 
Aristotle is criticised by empiricist thinkers. One criticism, based on their 
preference for philosophical systems that are ontologically parsimonious, is that 
Aristotle needlessly fills the world with mysterious substances. The counter view 
consists of accepting, at least on Aristotle's authority and in his system,  powers, 
capacities, and modes of  behaviour into a basic conceptual framework rather than 
introducing them at a  second level as attributes that ontologically basic things 
possess.  It also indicates what is at stake in this inclusion and the depth and 
intensity of the distinction between those ontologies that are inclusive in this 
respect and those that are exclusive. Exclusion of  powers,  potencies and so on, as 
in the Humean (rejection of) metaphysics, is on this reading like the exclusion of 
life from living things. 
Secondly, consideration of  the Marx  Aristotle parallel on the nature of  reduction in 
general  can be put to work in the debate about the reduction, of entities of one 
kind to entities of another kind, such as goes on in the debate over methodological 
34 Hegel, G.W.F., Lectures in the History of  Philosophy trans. Haldane and Simpson 
(London, 1894;1955) Vol. II pp. 180-181, cited in David Depew 'Aristotle's De 
Anima and Marx's theory of Man' Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal 1982 p. 
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individualism in social enquiry. For some theorists this is elucidated by analogy 
with the mind/body relation.35 But for Aristotle this would be like asking if  the wax 
and its shape are one. The approach taken by Descartes, as well as more recent 
theorists, to this problem is to say that two sorts of things are related in a certain 
way. One is corporeal and the other is not; a separation that poses questions of 
whether and how it is possible to reduce one thing, event, or quality to another 
thing, event or quality. On this line of argument mental states 'map' to physical 
states, mind to brain, and soul to body and the task of philosophical investigation 
is to elucidate that mapping as type-type, token-token or just as mysterious. 
The same approach is very often taken to the social world,  implicitly, I will argue, 
in the metaphysics of methodological individualism. Here the questions faced by 
theorists are said to involve the reducibility or otherwise of,  for example,  the 
analysis of classes in capitalist society, and  a posteriori  class conflict in such 
societies,  to the actions of individuals. Even if the need for such a reduction is 
rejected, we still seem to need to specify just what is the relation between social 
events, entities, qualities and so on, to individual events, entities, and qualities? 
How is  society  related to the entities individuals? But it seems likely that the 
Marx!  Aristotle approach would be to reject this way of posing the question. 
What Aristotle argues, in De Anima, is that mind is what body does: to be a living 
thing is to be capable of  doing certain things and functioning in certain prespecified 
ways. He offers a functionalist account of mind rather than a dualist one. Marx, 
too, rejects the Cartesian  programme of separating out the corporeal from the 
incorporeal substance when trying to  determine the essential nature of the self. 
In The Holy Family he gives an indication not only of  his attitude to dualism in the 
mind/body question, but also of  his attitude to reduction more generally, when he 
endorses Hobbes' materialist view that: 
An unbodily substance is the same absurdity as an unbodily body. Body, 
being, substance,  are but different terms for  the same reality. It is 
impossible to separate the thought from the matter that thinks. This 
matter is the substratum of  all changes going on in  the world.  '36 
When this account is brought into social theory, it helps to explain some of  Marx's 
attitudes First, it suggests that the search for some sort of  connection between 
discrete 'social' entities and 'individual' entities is confused. Instead, on this 
35 e.g. Wright, E. 0., Levine, A., and Sober, E., Reconstructing Marxism: Essays on 
Explanation and the Theory of  History (London 1992). p. 117. 
36 Marx, The Holy Family in  CW, 4, p.129. 54 
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account, society is what individuals do, and what individuals do, if  they are not to 
perish, is produce. This view, that society, social entities and social qualities are 
what individuals do,  is certainly more in keeping with the thrust of Marx's 
programme than the approaches which rely on an analogy with dualist philosophy 
of mind. It supports the bare claim that Aristotle makes, and Marx approves of, 
that man is  a  zoon politikon in the sense that sociality, collective action is 
somehow embedded in the nature of human beings. In  this vein Marx warns that: 
Above all we must avoid postulating "societY' again as an abstraction vis a 
vis the individual. The individual is the social being. His manifestations of 
life  - even if they may not appear in the direct form  of communal 
manifestations of life carried out in association with others - are therefore 
an expression and confirmation of social life . Man's individual and species 
life are not different, however much - and this is inevitable - the mode of 
existence of  the individual is a more particular or more general mode of the 
life of the species, or the life of the species is a more particular or more 
general individual  life.  37 
With an Aristotelian viewpoint this counterposition of individual and society is 
avoided. 
There are other considerations that emerge from a consideration of the impact of 
Marx's early reading of De Anima on his thought. Some of these are brought out 
by David Depew's article: 'Aristotle's De Anima and Marx's theory of Man',  38 on 
the nature of Marx's theoretical anthropology. He traces this theory of man 
through the prism of Hegel's lectures in the History of  Philosophy, and back to 
Aristotle: 
Hegel speaks approvingly of Aristotle's discrimination of three types of 
organic function and three souls corresponding to them: nutritive or 
reproductive, sensitive and intellective. Hegel also responsors Aristotle's 
opinion that in man the lower souls service the higher and distinctively 
Human telos  of  theoretical knowing  .... Marx's critique of Hegel in the 1844 
Manuscripts includes a  rejection of precisely this anthropology. His 
alternative view, ... is one in which the intellective and sensitive functions in 
man are not seen as leaving behind the reproductive function but as 
making possible a distinctively human way of conducting that function.  39 
37 Marx, Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts in CW 3, p. 299. 
38 Depew, D. J., 'Aristotle's De Anima and Marx's Theory of Man', in Graduate 
Faculty Philosophy Journal New School for Social Research (1982) pp. 133-87. 
39 Depew, 'Aristotle's De Anima and Marx's Theory of  Man', p. 135. 55 
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In  De Anima, one of Aristotle's aims is to develop a taxonomy of the three levels of 
soul that correlate to plant, animal and human life. Arguing that psyche is  a 
principle of self  motion, he outlines three kinds of  this de re principle identified as 
the fulfilment of species-specific organs; the soul considered as nutritive, sensitive, 
and intellective. The nutritive soul appropriate to plants acts upon environing 
objects in such a  way that in relating to them it destroys them, whilst the 
sensitive soul, derived from organs of sensation and movement and the intellective 
soul, derived from the capacity for self consciousness correspond to animals and 
humans respectively 
Depew's central argument is that Hegel, whilst elaborating on this account 
misreads Aristotle 'double vision' in constructing an unilinear upward hierarchy of 
the three souls. This upwards account eventually 'becomes inseparably conflated 
with Hegel's own doctrine of Absolute Spirit.'40 Marx, however, reads Aristotle 
more accurately, and adds to his picture a restructuring of  the lower souls in 
terms of technical progress, self conscious activity and the ability on which self 
consciousness depends, of abstracting from particulars to universals, from 
members to kinds. Accordingly, the previously upside down conception of Hegel is 
inverted. Key to this is an account of the link between man's intellective ability 
and 'the capacity to apprehend objects as instances or species, where a species 
mark is one or more distinctive dispositional capacities.' This form of species 
poiesis or productive activity contrasts with the characteristic forms of animal 
production which must unceasingly re-embark on the process of need satisfaction, 
producing only to sustain the existence of each individual. Human production does 
not have these difficulties. It is dissimilar in that it 'breaks through the bonds of 
animal life because it reorganises the relation between the sustaining of life and 
production.' 41 
Animal life, by contrast, cannot grasp the notion of  species itself and hence cannot 
intend its preservation by production.  Depew calls this phenomenon 'animal 
individualism' applying the obverse notion of  human production as an end in itself 
to the allegedly non-socialised producing man familiar in modern political theory. 
Such a conception, he suggestively points out 'is a conceptual impossibility, whose 
mere occurrence as a  idea testifies to the distorted animal individualism of 
capitalist society'42  The importance of  recognition of  kin  dim  ember-relations to an 
analysis of the nature and role of human production cannot, it is true, be 
exaggerated. 
40 Depew, 'Aristotle's De Anima and Marx's theory of  Man', p. 153. 
41 Depew, 'Aristotle's De Anima and Marx's theory of  Man', p.169. 
42 Depew, 'Aristotle's De Anima and Marx's theory of  Man', p. 170. 56 
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But this conception of labour under capitalism as transformative activity is 
skewed, because Depew confines his attention to the Economic and Philosophical 
Manuscripts  without continuing his line of argument into the later works on 
political economy. He is cautious, perhaps overly cautious, over the extent to 
which extrapolation is possible from the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts 
to the later works.43 
But such caution is unwarranted in view of the consideration that it is not just 
Marx's philosophical anthropology that reflects his understanding of  Aristotelian 
hylomorphism, but also the development of that anthropology into the critique of 
political economy sustained through the Grundrisse, Capital, and the Theories of 
Surplus Value. Whilst that critique is built on the foundations established in the 
philosophical anthropology of the early works, it adds considerably to that 
anthropology, not least by characterising the ways in which productive activity 
fails to be fully realised under the form of  capitalist social relations. This involves a 
particular  and  historically  specific  account  of the  way  in  which  that 
reconstruction takes place. The limitation of Depew's account is that he does not 
integrate a consideration of specific social forms into his picture, because he stays 
within the bounds of the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts.  Consequently 
he does not investigate the specific ways that Marx's reconstruction of the 
nutritive, sensitive and intellective souls is overlaid by the social form which 
dominates them. Vis a vis Hegel, Depew argues that 'Hegel's world is a world that 
records rather than transcends the ontology of capitalist society - it is a world in 
which objects and nature are abstract entities and men are isolated Cartesian 
egos' which he contrasts with Marx's picture of 'man's socially cooperative and 
purposive interaction with  a  nature full  of possibilities  awaiting human 
transformation' - Hegel's characterisation of human metabolism and reproduction 
is precisely what human life, in fact 'looks like from the standpoint of political 
economy.  '44  But the way the world looks from this standpoint is, in some sense, a 
true reflection of the way that it is. Such forms of  thought, Marx later argues are 
'socially valid' and objective, in a historically specific sense, and for a specific social 
form.45 While Depew is right about the nature of Marx's theory of Man and its 
close relation to the account offered by Aristotle in De Anima, he does not 
integrate it into the social metaphysics, themselves Aristotelian at root, that are 
to be found in the later works. 
43 Depew, 'Aristotle's De Anima and Marx's theory of  Man', p. 140. 
44 Depew, 'Aristotle's De Anima and Marx's theory of  Man', p. 178. 
45 see below p. X, Political Economy and the Ideology of  Capitalism and in 
particular the citation from Marx, Capital 1 , p. 169. CHAPTER FOUR 
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NEO ARISTOTELIANISM: PROSPECTS FOR SOCIAL THEORY 
Central to Aristotle's perspective in the Metaphysics is the notion that scientific 
enquiry seeks to uncover the real essence of things, and consequently that 
scientific explanation is a matter of explaining non-essential characteristics in 
terms of essential ones. This notion forms the basis of a metaphysical tradition 
which runs through to Aquinas and Leibniz, amongst others. It is opposed by the 
view derived from the British empiricist tradition of Hobbes, Locke, Berkeley 
and Adam Smith's friend, David Hume, the most rigorous and consistent of the 
empiricists. In its developed form the empiricist view, to the extent that it 
permits the term essence any meaning at all, reduces it to definition. For a 
philosopher such as Russell, the meaning or sense of a proper noun is given by a 
set of definite descriptions. By reanalysing sentences, Russell believed himself 
entitled to hold that: 
"Existence" according to this theory, can only be asserted of descriptions. 
We can say that "The author of Waverley exists", but to say that "Scott 
exists" is bad grammar, or rather bad syntax. This clears up two millennia 
of  muddleheadedness about existence beginning with Plato's Theaetetus1 
When this method is extended to natural kind words, it entails the claim that 
the term 'essence' be employed, if at all, only as nominal essence, specifying the 
meaning of natural kind words (Le. words that apply to the kinds of things that 
appear to exist naturally in the world; trees, cats and so on) in terms of a series 
of descriptions or appearances. 
Recently this approach has suffered a  two pronged attack, first through the 
elucidation of a causal theory of names and natural kinds by Kripke, Putnam, 
Wiggins,  and Donnellan and secondly through the working up of 'realist' 
accounts of science by Harre and Bhaskar. These two philosophical innovations 
have had some influence on British Marxists, most notably in the series Issues in 
Marxist Philosophy2. In this section I  look at contemporary essentialism and 
point out some of its implications for social theory. 
Kripke has demonstrated in Naming and Necessity the paradox that it is 
possible successfully to refer to someone, even if the definite descriptions turn 
out to be false. This works because the meaning of names is fixed by reference, 
1 Russell, B., A History of  Western Philosophy (London, 1946) p. 860. 
2 Ruben, D-H., and Mepham J., Issues in Marxist Philosophy (4 vols, Hassocks, 
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not by contingent definite descriptions. Putnam and Kripke extend this causal 
theory of names, in which names have their meanings specified by having their 
reference fixed, to natural kind terms. They do this by showing that a theory 
that specifies natural kinds in terms of appearances, in the empiricist manner, 
fails to fulfil the necessary or sufficient conditions for the existence of natural 
kinds. Kripke argues that, for instance, our sense based conception of gold might 
be radically misconceived, and that an account in terms of some underlying 
physical structure is required to calculate the extension of gold. If we were to 
hold to the theory of descriptions we would be in danger of both misidentifying 
fool's gold as real gold, and excluding examples of real gold from the natural 
kind. Kripke reveals the problem involved in then accepting the nominal essence 
of natural kinds  as  accurate  or  as  providing  a  sure  footing  for  reliable 
knowledge. 
Instead the evolution of our conceptions of natural kinds can and should swing 
largely away from a sense based account, whilst still remaining conceptions of 
the  same natural kind.  Consequently for Putnam, not only are Feyerabend and 
Kuhn wrong about the incommensurability of scientific  theories,  because 
meanings have independent objective existence, but a  more scientific, more 
accurate account is one farther from, not nearer to,  the sense based account. 
Putnam says: 
The extension of a  term is not fixed by a  concept that the individual 
speaker has in his head  ... (but) depends on the actual nature of the 
particular things that serve as paradigms and this actual nature is not in 
general fully known by the speaker.  3 
This is reminiscent of the 'more objective conception', a conception further away 
from the anthro-specific conception, that Descartes sees in the Meditations  as 
the  key to  a  non-sense  base,  and  therefore  potentially more  complete, 
understanding of the world. This shared view that the sense based conception of 
the world requires correction by the understanding indicates that there is a 
rationalist element to the Aristotelian account of scientific  ontology,  and 
consequently,  epistemology.  This  is  unsurprising in view  of some  of the 
overlapping conceptions of epistemology between Aristotle and the continental 
rationalists and despite the radical differences in the approaches and substantial 
claims of  each school in other areas 
3 Putnam, H., 'Meaning and Reference' in Schwartz, S. (ed.) Naming, Necessity 
and Natural Kinds p. 132. Competing ontologies and the possibility of explanation 
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The 'actual nature of particular things', the phrase used by Putnam, could have 
been designed to irritate those who take their philosophical direction from David 
Hume. A standard Humean objection to an account of science in terms of the 
concept of the real nature or essence of a  thing is that it presupposes the 
legitimacy of an inductive generalisation.4 The charge is that concepts of power, 
capacity and nature inhering in a thing's essence involve generalisations, and 
the attribution of such properties therefore begs the question posed by Humeans 
of whether such  generalisations are justified in the first place. The general 
claim of the Humeans, in this case, is undoubtedly right: propositions explaining 
events through an account of nature clearly do  involve generalisations. Such 
propositions  include  saying  that  any  and  all  dynamite  explodes  under 
appropriate conditions. This is also true of statements which involve the claim 
that something is  liable  to  behave in  a  certain way,  under  appropriate 
conditions. For example, the Marxist claim that class struggle is endemic to 
capitalist society, though it may be manifest in different ways is to make a claim 
about how any and all such societies are liable to behave. So explanatory claims 
of  this form do entail generalisations and appear vulnerable to Humean attack.  5 
But as Harre has indicated, the posing of the problem of induction in this 
manner is itself a  function of the Humean ontology. The assumption of the 
Humean critic is that the problem of justifying generalisation is ontology 
independent. It is this assumption that justifies the accusation that Humean 
theory privileges epistemology over ontology since it shifts the focus form an 
uncritically adopted event ontology to the possibility of knowledge  of the 
unobserved; from ontology to epistemology. But such problems of extrapolating 
or generalising customary modes of behaviour only surface on an event ontology 
rather than a thing ontology or a thing-and-its-powers. Harre calls the second a 
generative theory in which natural necessity is a  product of the generative 
powers of potent things. On such assumptions extrapolations are guaranteed by 
natural necessity. Our knowledge claims about such necessity are mediated 
through the best current theory we have, and so they are not fully secure. But it 
is only if we take the claim that the world is not populated by enduring things 
with specific natures seriously, that the circularity objection has any force: 
the real basis of the dispute between traditional Humean theories of 
causality and generative theories lies in the acceptance or rejection of the 
4  Harre, R.,  and Madden, E., Causal Powers: A  Theory of Natural Necessity 
(Oxford, 1975),  p. 151. 
5 See for an example of such an attack, Elster's critique of what he calls Marx's 
dialectical deduction in Making sense of  Marx, pp. 37-40. 60 
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event-as-instantaneous-time-slice ontology as the specification of the 
ultimate or simplest entity to which analysis is directed. 6 
Whether we accept or reject certain ontological assumptions must be a reflection 
of the inquirer's estimation of the potential for explanation itself. Humeans are 
massively pessimistic about this potential; more pessimistic than the undoubted 
progress of science, even social science, warrants. For to choose  a  Humean 
ontology rather than an ontology of persisting things is to pose serious problems 
for  the possibility of explanation tout court. Rather than investigating the 
plausibility of contesting explanations, the terrain of the theorist is redirected to 
the justification of explanation itself, and the sterility of this perspective is a 
product of an ontological option that is itself implausible. It is thus a debilitating 
fault that many social theorists either fail to be explicit about the choice of 
ontology or reject talk of ontology itself as a metaphysical mystification. This, 
rather than the acceptance or rejection of substantive theories, is the most 
significant lacuna in versions of social theory influenced by a Humean approach 
to  epistemology,  such  as  methodological  individualist  Marxism.  Whilst 
ontological discussion may never finally be closed off, such discourse is essential 
to reorientate the more applied fields of social enquiry. 
Modes  of explanation presuppose certain ontological commitments: certain 
assumptions about the way the world is, in two ways. On the one hand, different 
ontological commitments throw up different series of questions to be answered, 
on the other, competing ontologies entail different conceptions of what counts as 
an answer.7  What is more, it is, at least in theory, possible to reconstruct a 
thinker's ontology on the basis of the  propositions that are contained within the 
theoretical language used to describe social realities. We may look to a theory as 
it is best formulated to see what objects are required for its comments to be 
about. If  we do not want to be committed to witches or phlogiston then we must 
not talk about them when we theorise about the world. Equally if a  theory 
contains accounts of the development of value, classes and the capitalist social 
form, then we can take it that that theorist is committed to the existence of those 
entities, not necessarily as objects, but as relations, processes and potentialities 
that have a real existence in the external world. Disputes about theories and 
disputes about ontologies  are therefore intertwined.  Competition between 
theories, and competition about how best to read those theories, therefore 
involves considering which ontological commitments are most plausible. In that 
competition it is consequently essential to get the ontological commitment 
6 Harre and Madden, Causal Powers, p. 142. 
7 see the discussion above in Chapter Two. clarified in the first place. 
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Ontology and epistemology in Humean and essentialist explanation 
Kripke's causal analysis of names and its extension to cover natural kinds 
involves the claim that natural kinds are not determined by properties at all but 
by causal generative mechanisms. It has implications too for the acceptability of 
different modes of explanation. The traditional empiricist view links the status 
of the world to our ability to recover knowledge of it, by asserting that for an 
explanatory proposition P, if P  is necessary then P  is a priori and if P  is 
contingent then P is a posteriori. This position founders on Kripkean objections, 
broadly speaking, because how one knows about a particular state of affairs may 
be radically dislocated from the nature of that state of affairs. 
Suppose a light bulb fails to come on when I press the switch. For a conjunction 
of reasons I may take it that the bulb is faulty  and replace the bulb. However it 
still fails to come on so I adopt a second explanation and replace the fuse. Both 
explanations are a posteriori, garnered from evidence I discover about the world, 
and I adopt the second on a posteriori grounds when I find out more about the 
world. But each is about natural kinds and natural necessity; the way certain 
things must behave under certain conditions. So the knowledge we gain in an a 
posteriori manner about the world can be knowledge of what is necessary. 
This applies as much to social enquiry as it does to the causally potent entities of 
natural science. Suppose (somewhat extravagantly) that just as a light bulb fails 
to come on, the working class fails to seize power in Western Europe. I may 
explain this by virtue of the dulling effects on working class consciousness of the 
concession of welfare social democracy. But over time, that explanation unravels, 
with the unravelling of the welfarist consensus itself. I then look to the failures 
of working class political leadership as an alternative explanation. It is difficult 
to give precision to such explanations and they are in any case vastly more 
complicated than the explanation of the failure of a light bulb to operate. But 
they are of the same form and  carry the same implication; that although the 
explanations are generated by empirical, a posteriori investigations they are 
explanations that account for the behaviour of a  thing in terms of natural 
necessity. Of course whether the explanations are right, or,  perhaps more 
usefully, plausible is another matter. But it is arwther matter. Kripkean analysis 
avoids the confusion in positivist thought between the meaning of a proposition 
and the grounds we have for accepting it.  As Harre puts it: 'the fact that any 
given  piece  of evidence  is  dubitable  does  not carryover to  the  nature, characterisation of, or meaning of  the proposition itself.' 8 
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In social theory the evidential support for propositions about the nature of what 
social existents there are, and what connections  exist between them is likely to 
be much more controversial than in natural science.  There is, as Marx and 
Kripke both point out, some distance between essence and appearance, some 
open  texture  between  parts  and  wholes,  which  may  mean  that  social 
explanations are very often contested. Nevertheless, it would be heartening for 
social theorists to acknowledge that there is some sense in arguments about 
what the fundamental nature of the social world is, and consequently  how its 
behaviour is best to be explained. In the case of  Marx this implies taking his own 
ontological presuppositions seriously, as a first step to investigating the forms of 
explanation which they generate. Unfortunately,  such an approach to the 
analysis of  Marx is not common. 
This helps to provide some answer to Callinicos' worry over the scientific status 
of realism.9 If we agree with Harre that 'the point of any ontology is that it 
makes clear the structure of some part of the world'lO then we must reject 
ontologies that fail to give grounds for theory development. Here Callinicos lives 
in the same world as the Humeans, in that he asks for separate criteria of the 
best theory, apart from ontological plausibility, or to put it another way, he 
assumes the ontology independent status of what makes a good theory. 
Wiggins  on individuation 
It is clear that the problem of individuation; of how to identify continuing 
particulars over time and draw lines demarcating them from other persisting 
things, is key to a  critique of both the Humean event ontology and to the 
conception of reality as a totality with every particular as internally related to 
8 Harre and Madden, Causal Powers~ p. 146. 
9 Keat, R., and Urry, J., Social theory as Science (London, 1975) give a useful 
summary of the distinction between realism and positivism, arguing that both 
involve a conception of  science as an objective enquiry, 'But for the realist, unlike 
the positivist,  there is  an important difference between explanation and 
prediction. And it is explanation that must be pursued as the primary objective 
of  science. to explain phenomena is not merely to show that they are instances of 
well  established  regularities.  Instead  we  must  discover  the  necessary 
connections between phenomena, by acquiring knowledge of the underlying 
structures and mechanisms at work.  Often, this will mean postulating the 
existence of types of unobservable entities and processes that are unfamiliar to 
us  but it is only by doing this that we can get beyond the mere appearances of 
thlngs, to their natures and essences. Thus, for the realist, a scientific theory is a 
description  of structures  and  mechanisms  which  causally generate  the 
observable phenomena which enables us to explain them.' (p. 5) 
10 Harre and Madden, Causal Powers,  p.137. 63 
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every other. In his work Sameness and Substance David Wiggins develops a neo-
Aristotelian theory of individuation which is profoundly useful to the current 
enquiry. It indicates the connections between what it is to be a continuant on 
one hand and falling under a sortal concept which itself  figures as a generator of 
characteristic modes of activity on the other. 
The first position that Wiggins outlines is of opposition to the thesis of the 
relativity of identity. This consist in arguing that in reply to the Aristotelian 
question (for example) what was the thing that ran, a  series of different and 
equally correct sortal answers (answers that identify the thing by reference to 
the sort that it belongs to) can be given. Thus, the project of tracing continuants 
over time is relative to which sortal concept in a list we subsume a thing under. 
On this line of argument, the identity of a continuant over time is relative to 
different answers to the question; 'A is the same what as B?,ll  What Wiggins 
argues is that although it may appear that there are a number of alternative 
sortal concepts under which a thing may fall, there is a more basic sortal term 
which gives it identity. Examples which seem to show that different sortal 
concepts such as boy give different criteria of identity arise from  linguistic 
confusion: 
They underline the need to distinguish between sortal concepts that 
present-tensedly apply to an individual x at every moment throughout x's 
existence, e.g  ..  human being, and those that do  not, e.g.  boy  or cabinet 
minister. It is the former (let us label them  ... substance concepts) that give 
the  privileged  and  (unless  context  makes  it  otherwise)  the  most 
fundamental kind of answer to the question 'what is x?'. It is the latter 
(one might call them phased sortals) which if we are not careful about 
tenses, give a false impression that a  can be the same f as b  but not the 
same g as b.12 
This important point leads onto a distinction of what might be termed necessary 
and accidental  phased sortals. The former such as boy or adult describe sortal 
terms which every substance concept of a particular type must pass through in 
the normal course of  events and those such as alcoholic or criminal 
It may be useful to give some immediate guidance as to why this may prove 
significant to social theorists. The notion of phased sortals provides support to 
Marx's notion of the  special laws, which are specific to the nature of an entity. 
11 Wiggins, D., Sameness and Substance  (Oxford, 1980), pp. 16-17. 
12 Wiggins,  Sameness and Substance, p. 24. 64 
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These special laws govern different phases of the development, maturation and 
decline of a social organism. This is made clear in the Postface to the Second 
German edition of Capital,13  especially in Marx's approval of the unnamed 
Russian reviewer's exposition of his work. This exposition is in terms of working 
out the special laws that govern an entity since 'such abstract laws [the general 
laws of economic life]  do  not exist  ...  on the contrary, in his opinion, every 
historical period posses its own laws  ... As soon as life has passed through a given 
period of development, and is passing over from one given stage to another, it 
begins to be subject also to other laws.' 
It is worth noting that Humean approaches to social theory tend to find this 
meaningless. Elster says of the discussion in the Second Postface 'that, on closer 
reading [it] appears devoid of content' 14  Certainly the notion of special laws 
runs against the grain of interpretation which argues that laws (to be laws) are 
not temporally and spatially bounded. An obvious response is to say that the 
idea of the laws of motion of capitalist society presupposes the idea of special 
laws, and more importantly, that one way of identifying whether or not we are 
dealing with a particular kind of thing, such as capitalism, is to see whether 
those laws apply. 
I use the considerations about identity under different descriptions to argue that 
it matters which description we apply to social phenomena if we are to explain 
them adequately. One implication is that methodological individualists and 
holists are not talking about the same things in different ways but talking about 
and explaining different things themselves. Moreover, I will argue that that 
there is a more or less accurate way of describing social phenomena, one that is 
more or less accurate in terms of  the basic constituents of the social world.15 
Having dispensed with the thesis of the relativity of identity, Wiggins goes on to 
state his thesis of  the sortal dependence of  identity 
D: a=b if  and only if  there exists a sortal concept fsuch that 
(1) a and b belong to a kind which is the extension of  f: 
(2) to say that x falls under f  - or that x is an f is to say what x is (in the 
sense that Aristotle isolated): 
(3) a is the same f as b: or coincides with b under f i.e. coincides with b in 
the manner of  coincidence required for members of f.16 
13 Marx, Capital 1,  (Postface to the Second  edition) p.10l. 
14 Elster, Making Sense of  Marx, p. 37, note 1 
15 See, for examples of  this, Chapter Eight below. 
16 Wiggins,  Sameness and Substance, p. 48. 65 
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At this stage, this is a claim about the nature of identity, rather than about the 
way in which we come to know about it. It involves the claim that statements of 
identity imply that if a is the same as b then a and b are the same something, 
even if we co not know what that something is. This reflects the distance posed 
by realist philosophical positions between ontology and epistemology. Lying 
behind the explication of identity in terms of sortal predicates is not only that it 
allows us to say what x is, and so to move on from the bare claim that x is an 
existent to the claim that x  is an f,  but also to be able to make  a  more 
substantial claim about what it is to say that x is the same f as y. This allows us 
to found: 
the belief, which may be called the substance-assumption that for any 
identity statement whatever, there is always to be discovered not merely 
what is what we have called ...  a  phased sortal but also a  substance 
concept appropriate to cover it; and that  ... a phased or restricted sortal 
predicate covering a true identity statement can always be supplanted 
salva veritate by a more comprehensive substance predicate, to yield an 
equally true affirmative identity-statement. 17 
What this does is to show that individuation is a matter of saying what sort of 
thing something is, in some basic sense, and that there are correct and incorrect 
ways of doing this. Combining  individuative criteria with the rejection of the 
thesis of the relativity of identity,  and the idea that substance concepts explain 
the principle of persistence of a continuant, then we can conclude that if there 
are several such concepts which appear to be competing, 'they cannot disagree on 
the persistence condition that they ascribe.'18 
The link between a  thing being a  substance and it having a  principle of 
continuity within it comes from Aristotelian considerations: 
Unqualified coming to be and passing away takes place when something 
as a whole changes from this to that. Some philosophers hold that all such 
change is mere alteration. But there is a  difference. For in that which 
underlies change there are two factors, one relating to the logos  of the 
subject, the other relating to the matter that is involved. When the change 
affects both of these, coming to be and passing away will occur. But when 
the change is not in the logos but only in the qualities i.e.  when the 
17 Wiggins,  Sameness and Substance, p. 59. 
18 Wiggins,  Sameness and Substance, p. 60. change is a change in accidents, there will be alteration.19 
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Returning to Aristotle brings out one common theme: that substantial changes 
consist in changes in the principle of continuity or logos  of the substance in 
question, while changes in accidents relate only to matter. For a philosophy such 
as Marx's that aims to distinguish more and less fundamental forms of change, 
this distinction is essential and fundamental. Logos is usually taken to mean 
speech but has extensive connotations; Castoriadis, in another context writes: 
If there is to be speech, logos  about the question, and logoi,  arguments in 
defence of that speech, then there must be some definition, logos  of the 
question and its terms and there must be some relation/proportion, logos 
between these; and the solution, too, must be arrived at by reflection 
logos .20 
Marx's method of abstraction is based on these contentions. He aims to identify 
the essential elements of bourgeois society, encapsulating 'every historically 
developed form as being in a  fluid state, in motion, and therefore grasps its 
transient aspect as well;'21 and to outline the persistence conditions of them, 
especially value and the laws that govern its different forms, such as capital and 
its accumulation. His polemic against Bailey is aimed at his unwillingness to 
accept the possibility of the objective existence of value which Bailey rejects as a 
scholastic (Le. Aristotelian) illusion and his reply involves pointing out to Bailey 
that identity and difference can only be construed under a consideration of the 
sorts  of things that the two  elements  are.  Equally,  and with the  same 
metaphysical underpinnings, his row with the apologists of bourgeois society is 
directed at their unwillingness to  consider the  possibility of persistence 
conditions for that social form and their consequent raising of the temporally 
specific and temporary structures of that society into transhistorical verities. 
Capital, the Grundrisse and Theories of  Surplus Value are most naturally read 
as the uncovering  of the logos  of capitalism identified by abstracting the 
essential categories of that social organism through the cognitive capture of their 
principles of  continuity such as the self-expansion of capital. 
The nomological basis of natural kinds 
It should be clear by now that the individuation of continuing things is a result 
of their ability to be captured under a  substantial sortal concept. But the 
19 Aristotle, On Generation and Corruption, 317  a  21 ff. 
20 Castoriadis, C., Crossroads in the Labyrinth (Cambridge, Mass., 1984), p. 293. 
21 Marx, Capital 1,  p. 103. 67 
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specification of a  substance concept requires amplification. We have already 
heard from Aristotle that substantial change has to do  with the logos  of a 
subject, and Wiggins echoes this point when he argues that development of the 
thesis of the sortal dependence of identity consists in subsuming substance 
concepts under the 'Leibnizian echo of activity': 
D(v): f is a  substance concept only if f determines either a principle of 
activity, a principle of functioning or a principle of operation for members 
of its extension.22 
The prime candidate for this sort of substance concept are natural kinds. 
Putnam offers an alternative account of natural kinds to the empiricist dismissal 
of them, which states that a thing belongs to a certain natural kind if, given good 
examples of that kind, an adequate theoretical description of that kind applies 
both  to  the  examples  and  to  the  entity in  question.  This  account  is  a 
development in the Aristotelian tradition, expanding on the dominant role of 
nature in his account of natural kinds: 
That which is a whole and has a certain shape and form is one in a still 
higher degree: and especially if a thing is of this sort by nature, and not by 
force like things which are unified by glue or nails or by being tied 
together, Le. if  it has in itself the cause of its continuity.23 
Such an account avoids the limitations of an account based on a list of qualities 
and indicates an important distinction between what is said to be natural and 
what is said to be an artificial construction. Natural kind terms are indissolubly 
linked to the typical forms of  behaviour of members of that kind: 
the determination of a natural kind stands or falls with the existence of 
law-like principles, known or unknown, that will collect together the 
actual extension of the kind around an arbitrary good representative of 
the extension.  24 
The nomological basis of natural kinds means that the identity and development 
of natural terms is much more straight forward than the development of 
artifacts. This is outlined in the Physics: 
22 Wiggins, Sameness and Substance, p. 70. 
23 Aristotle, Metaphysics 1052a 22-5. 
24 Wiggins, Sameness and Substance, p. 80. 68 
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.. animals and their organs and the elementary stuffs  ... differ from what is 
not naturally constituted in that each of these things has within it a 
principle of change and of staying unchanged, whether in respect of place 
or in respect of quantitative change as in growth and decay, or in respect 
of qualitative change. But a  bedstead or  a  cloak or whatever, qua 
receiving the designation 'bed' or 'cloak'  ... , i.e. in so far as it is the product 
of craft, has within itself no inherent tendency to any particular sort of 
change. But in so far as an artifact happens to be composed ... of whatever 
mixture of natural elements, it does incidentally, as so considered, have 
within itself the principle of change which inheres in its matter.25 
Marx was well aware of this distinction and the powerful role of nature in 
Aristotle's  philosophy.  He  repeats  exactly the  same  distinction  in  the 
Grundrisse26 And this should come as no surprise. Social explanation in the 
Marxist tradition requires the elucidation of inherent tendencies to particular 
sorts of change. One distinctively Aristotelian element to such elucidation arises 
from the close relationship between natural kinds and their nomological basis. 
This is reflected in various philosophical slogans: that we encounter not a thing 
and then see how it behaves but rather we must encounter behaviour of a 
certain type in order to ascertain that a thing is a thing of a certain type. The 
stress in individuation is  placed on an account of characteristic forms  of 
behaviour and then seeing if such behaviour is exhibited in the objective world, 
constituting whether or not a thing is of a certain type. Hacking in 'Individual 
Substance' 27 outlines this as follows: 
Which bundles are Substances? Only those bundles that are active in the 
sense of having laws of their own. Laws provide the active principles of 
unity. There is a  tendency in much analytical philosophy to conceive 
things as given and then to speculate on what laws they enter into.  On 
the contrary, things are in the first instance recognised by regularities 28 
This tendency; to conceive things as given is not only apparent in  the arena of 
classical analytical philosophy but is perhaps more prevalent in social theory. 
Just what the given things are might vary, for many that answer may be utility 
maximising individuals in Enlightenment political and economic thought. Most 
of the time such givens are not expressed in a brutal philosophical form. One 
25 Aristotle, Physics,  192b 8-28. 
26  Marx, Grundrisse, p. 360. 
27  Hacking, 1.,  'Individual Substance',  in Frankfurt,  H.,  (ed.),  Leibniz:  a 
Collection of  Critical Essays (London, 1976). 
28 Hacking, 'Individual Substance',  p. 148. 69 
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occasion when they are is found in the work of Eugene Kamenka who argues in 
The Ethical Foundations of Marxism the anti Aristotelian position that since 
Marx's underlying reality is to be society and no longer man, he is forced to treat 
man as no more than a  mere reflection or product of social relations:  'The 
fundamental weakness of Marx's thought then, lies in his failure to work out a 
theory of classes and organisation and of freedom and servility in positive terms, 
in terms of the character of the processes and movements involved. What things 
are is prior to their possible adjustments' 29 
Marx's intuitive Aristotelianism 
For Marx, the idea that things are recognised by regularities and not given 
before the identification of  these regularities runs through his work in the notion 
that capital is a relation, the commodity is a kind of  thing and that humans have 
a general characteristic form of behaviour, and a form of behaviour specific to 
the social relations of capitalism.  The whole approach is reflected in both his 
implicit ontology and his explicit accounts in the Grundrisse of what constitutes 
a certain kind. 
This throws into relief the need to understand the scope and importance of the 
notion of the teleological structuring of the social world,  as Marx outlines 
drawing on Aristotle's understanding of teleology. This is further discussed in 
Chapter Eight of the current work. McCarthy argues, in Marx and Aristotle, that 
In Marx's later writings, there is a  methodological shift - but not an 
epistemological break from his earlier philosophical humanism to an 
emphasis on dialectical science acting as a critique of political economy  ... 
Both Aristotelian and Hegelian metaphysics, denuded of their ontology, 
now become important elements in the methodology of critical science.3o 
But what he describes as a methodological shift, is much more as a working up 
of the ontology of the early writings into a more focussed study of the form of 
capital.  It is certainly an unhappy formulation to speak of  metaphysics denuded 
of ontology. Thus Marx is still concerned with a philosophical anthropology, but 
applies that anthropology in its enformed state to an analysis of the processes 
that constitute it. Furthermore, it seems to me that to describe Marx's shift of 
focus in a way that amounts to dropping of the Aristotelian ontology in Marx is 
mistaken. 
29 Kamenka, E., The Ethical Foundations of  Marxism (Cambridge, 1961).p.163. 
30 McCarthy, Marx and the Ancients, p. 117-8 70 
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Reasserting the place of Aristotle's ontology in Marx's work sheds important 
light on the conception of a developing scientific understanding as moving away 
from  an account of manifestations  and looking instead at essences, thus 
providing contemporary philosophical support for Marx's famous dictum that 
science is the epistemological outcome of the distance between essence and 
appearance.  I  hope to have shown that the accounts of individuation drawn 
from Wiggins suggest that the notion of special laws applying to entities of a 
certain  kind  is  epistemologically  essential;  that  is,  necessary  to  any 
understanding of entities of a certain kind.  It is also intimately attached to the 
notion of such entities as natural. If this is combined with the AristotlelMarx 
conception of society as a  natural substance, we have a justification for the 
approving notice Marx gives to an anonymous Russian reviewer in the Postface 
to the Second German edition of  Capital.31 
I shall expand on the social theoretic implications of this version of special laws 
in later chapters, showing how Marx uses particular Aristotelian formulations. 
But first it is necessary to trace the development of Marx's own conception of the 
constitutive elements of society. This, as has been argued, took place on a basis 
provided by his very early reading of the ancients.  Nevertheless, it was through 
the critique of political economy that the ontology of capitalism was specified and 
applied. 
31  Marx, Capital 1 , p. 102. CHAPTER FIVE 
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Chapter Five 
MARX'S CRITIQUE OF POLITICAL ECONOMY AND ITS 
ONTOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS 
in five more weeks I will be through with the whole economic shit.  And that done, I 
will work over my economics at home and throw myself  into another science at the 
Museum 1 
Introduction 
Marx's disdain for  'the whole economic shit', which was manifested more 
temperately in his detailed attacks on the vulgar economists of his day and the 
preceding decades,  was  matched in extent only by his  antipathy towards 
capitalism itself. In Capital, the Grundrisse der Kritik der Politischen Okonomie 
and the notebooks collected as the Theories of  Surplus Value, Marx attacks both 
the account of capitalism offered by the classical political economists and their 
'vulgar' successors, together with the individualistic assumptions of this account. 
His animus against the savagery of capitalism is expressed in his survey of the 
inadequacies  of the Factory Acts  2 or the account of the death and mutilation of 
workers in Irish Flax mills. It is at the same time, an animus against one of the 
core arguments of  vulgar economy: 
the free trade dogma that, in a society of mutually antagonistic interests 
each individual furthers the common welfare by pursuing his own personal 
advantage.  3 
He argues that this dogma can be subverted by simply looking at the disparities 
between the lives and incomes of capitalists and wage labourers, concluding that 
this common interest is not common at all.  But, more generally, he insists earlier 
in  the  Grundrisse  that these  private  'mutually antagonist'  interests  are 
themselves socially determined interests, and that their form and content are 
structured by wider social conditions independent of  individual social actors. Such 
naive utilitarian accounts of the market are indeterminate in expressing its 
outcomes.  These  outcomes  are,  instead,  just assumed to be universally 
beneficial: 
The economists express this as follows: Each pursues his private interest 
and only his private interest; and thereby serves the private interests of all, 
1 Marx  to Engels, 2 April 1851, CW 38, p. 325. The more colourful translation is 
from McLellan, D., Marx'sGrundrisse (London, 1971) 
2 Marx, Capital 1 , pp. 389-426. 
3 Marx, Capital 1 ,p.  611. 72 
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the general interest, without willing or knowing it. The real point is not that 
each individuals pursuit of his private interest promotes the totality of 
private interests, the general interest.  One could just as well deduce from 
this abstract phrase that each individual reciprocally blocks the assertion 
of  the others' interests, so that, instead of  a general affirmation, this war of 
all against all produces a general negation. The point is rather that private 
interest is itself a socially determined interest, which can be achieved only 
within the conditions laid down by society and with the means provided by 
society; hence it is bound to the reproduction of the conditions and means. 
It is the interest of private persons; but its content, as well as the form and 
means of  its realisation, is given by social conditions independent of  all.4 
The first methodological error of the political economists, therefore, is that of 
reifying existing perceptions of interests into an immutable given, because of a 
failure to recognise the social basis of such perceptions.  In particular, this 
criticism might direct us towards understanding the contemporary construction of 
interests within the dominant set of social relations, such as  the generation of 
desires for useless objects through advertising, and the wider phenomena of 
commodity fetishism. Taking interests as given is a recurring error in social 
theory, precipitated by the difficulties many theorists have with encompassing 
the social construction of interests within a systematic theory. In a different way 
the same error is sometimes committed by game theoretic Marxists when they 
make the assumption of a pre-given rationality held in the heads of individuals 
who come to the market. 
Combined with the view that the national economy is aided by the harmonious 
working out of antagonistic interests is the argument that it is the efforts of the 
capitalists themselves that enables them to accumulate capital.  Capital aims to 
explain  the circular flow of capital - surplus value - capital, but the genesis of 
capital in the first place, what Marx calls primitive accumulation, is also part of 
the story. One way in which the political  economists do this is to regard the 
circular flow as natural and eternal, a super organic interpretation of capitalism, 
and thus to explain it in terms of  some natural and eternal characteristic. Another 
is to falsify the origin of  primitive accumulation as a historical phenomenon. That 
is, either political economists look at the circular flow of capital without asking 
where it comes from, or they give a false account of its genesis. Marx pours scorn 
on this dual error by  telling a story soaked in  irony. 
This primitive accumulation plays approximately the same role in political 
4 Marx, Grundrisse  p. 156. 73 
Chapter Five 
economy as original sin does in theology  ... Long, long ago there were two 
sorts of people; one, the diligent, intelligent and above all frugal elite; the 
other, lazy rascals, spending their substance, and more, in riotous living ... 
and from this original sin dates the poverty of the great majority who, 
despite all their labour, have up to now nothing to sell but themselves, and 
the wealth of the few that increases constantly, although they long ceased 
to work.  Such insipid childishness is every day preached to us in the 
defence of property ... in actual history, it is a notorious fact that conquest, 
enslavement, robbery, murder, in short force, play the greatest part. In  the 
tender annals of  political economy the idyllic reigns from time immemorial 5 
Such an account bases itself on predications of wealth and class distinctions on 
individual attributes, rather than an explanation of the whole social system.  The 
most explicit rendering of  this is Senior's concept of abstinence; the view that it is 
because the individual capitalist holds back from consumption, not because he 
exploits wage labour that the capitalist is able to make profits: 
in his Outline of  Political Economy written for the instruction of Oxford 
students and cultivated Philistines, he had also 'discovered' in opposition to 
Ricardo's determination of value by labour, that profit is derived from the 
labour of the capitalist and interest from his asceticism, in other words, 
from his 'abstinence'6 
For Marx, accumulation is not based on individual dispositions but arises from the 
systematic requirements of the capitalist mode  of production,  and so  an 
explanation at the level of individual characteristics is merely one at the level of 
appearances.  Such explanations are explicitly counterposed to an explanation in 
terms of a social mechanism: 
Only as a personification of capital is the capitalist respectable.  As such he 
shares with the miser an absolute drive towards self-enrichment. But what 
appears in the miser as a mania of an individual is in the capitalist the 
effect of  a social mechanism in which he is merely a cog.7 
Marx's method here is irredeemably social, in the sense that it looks beyond 
properties of  individuals to the whole 'social mechanism'. This approach provides 
the explanation for his much discussed comment in the Preface to the First 
Edition of  Capital that: 
5 Marx, Capital 1, pp. 873-4. 
6 Marx, Capital 1, p. 338, note 12, see also pp. 298-9. 
7 Marx, Capital 1 , p. 739. 74 
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individuals are dealt with here only insofar as they are personifications of 
economic categories, the bearers [Trager] of particular class relations.8 
This is the locus classicus of Althusser and his followers. That school has been 
plausibly criticised, for  incorporating a  static structuralism in their wider 
interpretation of this perspective. But regardless of whether such a charge is 
justified against the followers of Althusser, it is not justified against Marx. He 
continues by  outlining: 
My stand-point, from which the development of the economic formation of 
society is viewed as a process of  natural history  can, less than any other, 
make the individual responsible for relation whose creature he remains, 
socially speaking, however much he might want to raise himself above 
them.  '9 
One serious objection to the other standpoints referred to (perhaps Marx has in 
mind the vulgar economists) is that they invert the explanation of capitalists and 
capitalism.  For them it is the actions of capitalists that explains capitalism, but 
for Marx, it is capitalism 'whose development, as a process of natural history'  is 
what explains the actions and ensuing personal dispositions of capitalists. The 
dispositions of the capitalists are to be explained by the social conditions in which 
they find themselves, but vulgar economy inverts the explanation 
In  this respect, his critique echoes the much earlier 'Feuerbachian moment' in the 
development of  Marx's own approach which is  central to the Paris Manuscripts of 
1844. The transformative method then, runs through from the early works to the 
works of political economy.  In this way Marx's critique of vulgar economy is 
premised on his working out of his young Hegelian influences via Feuerbach's 
materialist critique of Hegelian idealism. The paradox is that the method of neo-
classical economics, which borrows some of  its assumptions about rationality and 
the proper nature of  economics from the targets of  Marx, is regularly conceived of 
by its advocates as hard headed positivism. In this respect it is opposed to the 
mystical Hegelianising of Marx.  For Marx though, such an individualistic 
programme of theory and concept formation  is categorised as another version of 
idealism, whose utility lies only in its ability to provide an ideological buffer for the 
established order. The idealism of the school lies in the extent to which it 
predicates  actual social  systems  as  the realisation of dispositions  of the 
8 Marx, Capital 1 ,p. 92. 
9 Marx, Capital 1 ,p. 92. [my italics] 75 
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abstracted individual. The delineation of the market upwards from the rational 
consumer, the all knowing, entirely selfish fiction homo economicus is not just 
flawed because people are not like that, but also because the extent to which they 
do conform to the model is explained by the social context: capitalism, which the 
homo economicus model is provided to explain.  That is, an idealised individual 
enters into the explanatory chain at the beginning, only to emerge at the end as a 
result. The link up of  idealism and individualism in Marx's critique shows up the 
intimate link between his own contrasting couple of materialism and an ontology 
that includes social wholes.  Marx rejects the claim that the social basis of the 
class division of capitalist society is personality, and additionally denies any a 
priori natural basis to the genesis of capital. Instead he points to the need for a 
historical analysis of  its emergence; the genesis of capital: 
nature does not produce on the one hand owners of money or commodities 
and on the other hand men possessing nothing but their labour power.  This 
relation has no basis in natural history, nor does it have a social basis 
common to all periods of human history.  It is clearly the result of a past 
historical development, the product of many economic revolutions, of the 
extinction of a whole series of  older forms of  social production.  10 
The contractarian approach to the genesis of capital, as well as to the origins of 
the state, is  opposed by Marx's own ontology,  because of his Aristotelian 
conception of man.  When its rears its head in political economy, rather than 
politics, it re-echoes the falsification of  the genesis of capital; a characteristic error 
of the vulgar economists. As a result, Marx is sharply critical of  Wakefield's idea of 
an original contract: 
Mankind have  adopted  a  ...  simple  contrivance  for  promoting the 
accumulation of  capital,' which, of  course, had dangled in front of  them since 
the time of Adam as the ultimate and only goal of their existence, 'they 
have divided themselves into the owners of capital and owners of labour ... 
This division was the result of  concert and combination'.  In short: the mass 
of the population expropriated itself in honour of 'the accumulation of 
capital. 11 
This account, albeit caricatured by Marx, obscures the true nature of the process 
of the primitive accumulation of capital.  In fact this took place through the 
migration to towns, the series of enclosures and clearances, the emergence of 
10 Marx, Capital 1,  p. 27. 
11 Marx, Capital 1,  pp. 933-4. 76 
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landless labourers and a process of the 'expropriation of the mass of the people 
from the soil.'12 
There is a philosophical grounding for this falsification of  history. It  coincides with 
the superficial reading of the nature of present social reality.  The consensual 
estimation of the origin of capital underpins a consensual reading of the currently 
existing system. Against this, Marx argues that the analysis of specifically 
capitalist production shows that the apparent equality of exchange under 
capitalism is only apparent. It is an illusory reflection of the capitalist relation of 
dominance and subordination underlying it, while the original, exploitative relation, 
generated through the process of  capital accumulation, remains intact: 
This  destroys the last vestiges of the illusion so typical of the relationship 
when considered superficially, that in the circulation process, in the market 
place, two equally matched commodity owners confront each other, and 
that they, like all other commodity owners are distinguishable only by the 
material content of their goods, by the specific use value of the goods they 
desire to sell each other or, in other words, the original relation remains 
intact, but survives only as the illusory reflection of the capitalist relation 
underlying  it.  13 
The ontological suppositions are at their most exposed here and The Results of  the 
Immediate Process of  Production is analysed in more detail below. The suppositions 
emanate from the comprehensive way in which the political economists' argument 
is condemned.  It is ahistorical in that it is not rooted in an account of historical 
development, individualist in that it generalises  social phenomena from  a 
supposed explanation of the micro level behaviour of individual capitalists and 
idealist in the sense that it explains primitive accumulation in terms of naturally 
existing ideas and proclivities such as diligence or laziness. 
The Method of  Analysis of  Political Economy 
Marx distinguishes between Smith and Ricardo and the vulgar economists who 
followed them;  Marx attacks the 'vulgar' economists who do nothing but reflect 
the superficial relations of  capitalism: 
Let me point out once and for all that by classical political economy I mean 
all the economists who, since the time ofW. Petty, have investigated the 
real internal framework of  bourgeois relations to production, as opposed to 
12 Marx, Capital 1, p. 94. 
13 Marx, Capital 1, (Results of  the Immediate Process of  Production), pp. 1062-3 77 
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the vulgar economists who flounder around within the apparent framework 
of those relations,  ceaselessly ruminate on the materials long since 
provided by  scientific  political  economy  and  seek there  plausible 
explanations of the crudest phenomena for the domestic purposes of the 
bourgeoisie.  Apart from this the vulgar economists confine themselves to 
systematising in a pedantic way, and proclaiming for everlasting truths, 
the banal and complacent notions  held by the bourgeois  agents  of 
production about their own world, which is to them the best possible one.14 
For the Russian commentator Rubin and Marx himself, the degeneration of 
economic thought reflected the coming of  age of bourgeois power itself: 
With the year 1830 there came the crisis which was to be decisive. in 
France and England the bourgeoisie had conquered political power. From 
that time on, the class struggle took on more and more explicit and 
threatening forms, both in practice and in theory. it sounded the death knell 
of  scientific bourgeois economics.15 
For Marx the vulgar economists  return to the mercantilist idea of 'profit upon 
alienation'; of buying cheap and selling dear.  But in order to overcome this view 
only a distinction between the local and global is required - a total view.  For, as 
Marx points out; 'the capitalist class of a given country cannot, taken as a whole, 
defraud  itself.  '16 
A central error of the vulgarians therefore, is that they generalise from a single 
act of exchange.  While Marx's view is holistic, this does not mean that he 
analyses historical economic change and development solely in terms of abstract 
categories; his understanding is assisted by a more direct and sensuous approach, 
conditioned by the understanding that the vulgar economists get themselves into 
trouble because of  problems within their categorical and ontological framework. If 
the assumption is made that there is a class of buyers who do not sell, it may 
appear that profit upon alienation can provide an adequate explanation of the 
origin of surplus value. Pursuing this issue, Marx points out that one of the ways 
to uphold the idea of  the exchange of  non-equivalents is through the displacing of 
categories from their instantiation; 
Let us therefore keep within the limits of the exchange of commodities, 
where sellers are buyers, and buyers are sellers.  Our perplexity may 
14 Marx, Capital 1 ,  pp. 174-5 note 34 
15 Marx, Capital 1 , p. 97. 
16 Marx, Capital 1 , p. 266. 78 
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perhaps  have  arisen from  conceIVIng  people  merely as  personified 
categories, instead of  an individuals.  17 
There is an apparent contradiction with his stand-point outlined in the Preface to 
the second edition of Capital, since there Marx says that his method is precisely 
the one he now appears to criticise. Marx's approach, therefore, needs to be 
unravelled. 
There are a number of ways to resolve this paradox.  First we could suggest that 
Marx did not have a consistent methodological strategy and was confused about 
what he was attempting. Second, we might argue that the contradiction is 
apparent and not real.  Marx's general criticism of the 'vulgar' economists is that 
their method is ahistorical, and of the classical political economists that their 
method is categorially inadequate. The ahistoricism of the vulgar economists lies 
in their separation of transcendental economic categories from human social and 
productive activity, generalising them as eternal, and explaining them by 
reference to human dispositions.  The criticism of this manoeuvre is drawn from 
the Aristotelian critique of Platonic false universals, hovering above the real 
individuals. And here Marx is anxious to show that the filling out of the roles of 
buyer and seller is done by real human beings who provide an overlapping set 
between the two categories.18  Since Marx aimed his attacked on the categories of 
bourgeois thought, and particularly on their ahistoricism, it should not be 
surprising that he prefers a return to 'sensuous reality' in order to avoid the 
obfuscations of the vulgarians.  That is to say, the individualist approach  of the 
vulgar economist creates a picture that is qualitatively worse than the common 
sense non-abstracted focus on actually existing individuals. 
Marx's critique of  the political economists: Bailey 
It is in his consideration of Bailey, that the link between Marx's methodological 
critique of  the vulgar economists and his ontological presuppositions is at its most 
explicit. He notes Bailey's desire to formulate a  scientific account of price 
determination whilst rejecting the labour theory of  value.  Bailey is, in fact, paid a 
back-handed compliment by Marx: 
17 Marx, Capital 1 , p. 265 
18 It might be suggested that this is a case of categorical inadequacy - that the 
notions of buyer and seller are inadequately conceptualised since the ~lg~r 
economists forget that as categories they presuppose one another. ThIS  IS 
certainly true, but if this was the source of Marx's  prim.ar~ ~ttack  .o~ the 
mercantilist error, then he could have dispensed of  talk of  real mdiVlduals. It IS not 
just that buyers theoretically presuppose sellers, it is also the case that they 
really  are exemplified in  individuals. 79 
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He was the first to give a more accurate account of the measure of value, 
that is, in fact, of one of the functions of money, or money in a particular 
determinate form. 19 
But his failure to recognise the preconditions for  such an account and the 
distinction 'between measure of  value' expressed in money as a commodity  along 
with other commodities, and 'the immanent measure and substance of value' 
vitiates his approach. For Bailey, the idea that there is an independent existence 
of value is a scholastic2o  (meaning Aristotelian) invention of the economists and 
the answer to the existence of value lies in price. For Marx, instead, it is the 
independent existence of value that permits the homogeneity of commodities to 
emerge, allowing them to be compared as exchange values, and therefore, this 
independent existence is a precondition for the development of money.  Bailey 
expresses both his individualism and his ontological commitments in his belief  that 
the price of a commodity and its value are determined at the point of  exchange and 
not at the point of  production. For Marx, Bailey's theory is fetishistic for 
he conceives value, though not as a  property of the individual object 
(considered in isolation), but as a relation ofobjects to one anotherJ. while it  is 
only a  representation in objects, an objective expression, of a  relation 
between men, a social relation, the relationship of men to their reciprocal 
productive activity. 21 
In Marx's view, this results from taking for granted the appearance of value as 
price rather than attempting to investigate its essence: 
This is how things appear directly.  And Bailey clings to this.  The most 
superficial form of exchange value, that is the quantitative relationship in 
which commodities exchange one for the other constitutes, according to 
Bailey, their value.  The advance from the surface to the core of the 
problem is not permitted.22 
For Marx, directly following Aristotle's account of exchange in the Nicomachean 
Ethics  ,23 there must be something in respect of which exchangeable commodities 
are commensurable, which provides criteria to distinguish and compare the two 
entities: 
19 Marx, Theories of  Surplus Value Volume Three (London, 1972) p. 133. 
20 Marx, Theories of  Surplus Value Volume Three (London, 1972) p. 139. 
21 Marx, Theories of  Surplus Value Volume Three p. 147. 
22 Marx, Theories of  Surplus Value Volume Three p. 139. 
23 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1132b 21-1134a 16. 80 
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What is the distance between the syllable A and a table? The question 
would be nonsensical. In speaking of  the distance of  two things, we speak of 
their difference in space. Thus we suppose both of them to be contained in 
space,  to be points of space. Thus we  equalise them as being both 
existences of space, and only after having them equalised sub specie spatii 
we distinguish them as different points of space. To belong to space is their 
0ty 24  urn  . 
Marx continues this point by analogy with geometry.  If a  triangle and a 
parallelogram are equal in area this means that the area of  the triangle is h b 
2 
(where h  is the height and b  the base of the triangle) and that the area of the 
parallelogram is likewise h b.  Therefore: 
2 
As areas, the triangle and the parallelogram are here declared to be equal, 
to be equivalents, although as a triangle and as a parallelogram they are 
different. In order to equate these different things with one another, each 
must represent the same common element regardless of the other. If 
geometry, like the political economy of Mr. Bailey, contented itself with 
saying that the equality of  the triangle and of  the parallelogram means that 
the triangle is expressed in the parallelogram and the parallelogram in the 
triangle it  would be of  little use.25 
Marx insists, that is, that to compare two things as identical in some respect is to 
group them under a sortal concept; to say that a is the same f as b. The triangle 
and the parallelogram are both spatial figures; by the same token, he argues, 
commensurate commodities are commensurate as values. He also indicates that 
the employment of the substance concept f is explanatory, since it allows us to 
make substantial claims about each object. To  say that a and b both take up 
space, have identical areas, or have the same value, allows us to go on to make 
supplementary claims about the two things; to claim that they are such and such 
a distance apart, that their areas are given by h b/2, or to say that they contain 
equal amounts of abstract social labour. If  we recall Wiggin's belief (the substance 
assumption) that for any identity whatsoever, there is a substance concept and 
not just a phased or restricted sortal concept to cover it, the search is on to find 
the most fundamental substance concept, which in turn is likely to allow the 
24 Marx, CW 32 p. 330 (which notes that this passage is in English in the original), 
and Theories of  Surplus Value Vol. Three (Moscow, 1972) p. 143 
25 Marx, Theories of  Surplus Value Volume Three p. 144. 81 
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deepest explanatory insights into the nature of the particulars a and b.  Marx's 
irritation with Bailey is produced by his failure to attempt this task of searching 
for the most fundamental substance concept. Correspondingly, his regard for 
Ricardo consists in admiration for his attempt albeit unsuccessful pursue just this 
enquiry. The recurring focus of  Marx's critique is Bailey's reduction of  the essence 
of a thing to its expression, and it is backed by a whole series of examples that 
would not be out of  place in a text of  contemporary neo-Aristotelianism: 
(As  impossible as it is to designate or express a  thought except by a 
quantity of syllables.  Hence  Bailey concludes  that  a  thought is  -
syllables.  )26 
This inability to root his explanation of value in the substance of commodities 
leads Bailey to construct an idealised and subjective explanation for the cause of 
value. So the cause of value is what transforms use values into exchange values 
the objective social process which secures the existence of abstract labour, the 
substance and the immanent measure of  value.  Bailey writes, in contrast, that: 
Whatever circumstances  ...  act with  assignable  influence,  whether 
mediately or immediately, on the mind in the interchange of commodities 
may be considered as causes ofvalue.27 
If  value is the same as price, and price is determined by the relations of supply 
and demand, then a whole series of subjective factors such as tastes enter into the 
explanation of value. This is in fact the way in which elementary economics 
explains price, insofar as it explains it at all. Tastes are one of the many factors 
which determine the demand curve for a product. But changes in tastes can only 
be discovered retrospectively, when a  change in price leads the observer to 
suspect that something has changed behind the scenes.  Marx's stance by 
contrast, reemphasises the objective existence of value irrespective of the 
circumstances affecting the mind of  those who buy and sell: 
Their "mind", their consciousness, may be completely ignorant of, unaware 
of the existence of, what in fact determines the value of their products or 
their products as values. They are placed in relationships that determine 
their thinking but they may not know it  .... He [Bailey] transfers the problem 
26 Marx, Theories of  Surplus Value Volume Three p. 146. 
27 Bailey, S.  A Critical Dissertation on the Nature, Measures, and Causes of  Value 
(London, 1825) pp. 182-83 cited by Marx in Theories of  Surplus Value Volume 
Three  p. 163. 82 
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into the sphere of consciousness because his theory has got stuck. 28 
This account of the cause of value as something many-sided and subjective is a 
real step back from the account offered by Ricardo and a labour theory of value. 
Not  surprisingly,  the  individualism,  subjectivity,  and  the  consequent 
indeterminacy in the determination of  value have ideological repercussions. 
Political Economy and the Ideology of Capitalism 
The implications and importance of the individualist assumptions of the vulgar 
economists lie in the support which such principles provide for existing market 
relations. The bourgeois  'Rights of Man' provide a  veneer of equality over 
inequitable social relations: 
The sphere of  circulation or commodity exchange, within whose boundaries 
the sale and purchase of labour power goes on, is a very Eden of the innate 
rights of  man. It is the exclusive realm of Freedom, Equality, Property and 
Bentham.  29 
So for Marx the vulgar economists are apologists for the status quo, and dread the 
sort of scientific  analysis  that was  pursed  by  Smith  and  Ricardo.  For 
straightforward reasons of power politics, they retreat from  any attempt to 
penetrate the real nature of the capitalist organism and its production of surplus 
value. The vulgar economists such as Roscher draw on the 'more or less plausible 
excuses offered by the capitalists'. This is because they exhibit: 
besides their real ignorance, an apologetic dread of a scientific analysis of 
value and surplus-value which might produce a result unpalatable to the 
powers that be.3o 
In marked contrast, Marx argues that the attitude of the classical political 
economists mean that their enquiries are of  real worth and do not stem from some 
sort of a socio political imperative. Their theoretical positions are more intriguing, 
because the categories of bourgeois economics are in a limited sense, valid. The 
'absurdities' that Marx highlights in his account of money are absurdities that 
really inhere in bourgeois society: 
The categories of bourgeois economics consist precisely of forms of this 
28 Marx, Theories of  Surplus Value Volume Three p. 163. 
29 Marx, Capital 1 , p. 280. 
30 Marx, Capital 1 ,p. 326 note six 83 
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kind. They are forms of thought which are socially valid and therefore 
objective, for the relations of production belonging to this historically 
determined mode of social production, Le. commodity production. The whole 
mystery of commodities, all the magic and necromancy that surrounds the 
products of  labour on the basis of  commodity production, vanishes therefore 
as soon as we come to other forms ofproduction.31 
The categories of bourgeois economics are read off from the forms of market 
society and are, in this narrow sense,  appropriate to them. But they are 
historically specific. When applied across distinct forms of production they  become 
ahistoric empty Platonic forms.  This is how it is possible for political economy to 
come up with a description of market relations that is to a degree accurate and 
even instrumental without entering into any of the questions critical to an 
understanding of  bourgeois society: 
Political economy has indeed analysed value and its magnitude, however 
incompletely, and has uncovered the content concealed within these forms. 
But it has never once asked the question why this content has assumed 
this particular form, that is to say, why labour is expressed in value, and 
why the measurement of labour by its duration is expressed in the 
magnitude of  the value of  the produce.32 
In short, classical political economy falls down because it fails to explain the value 
expression of  labour, and the source of this lies in its categorial inadequacy. This 
inadequacy that takes us into the realm of  ontology, since what ontology consists 
of is the attempt to devise categories that generate an accurate explanation of the 
social world. 
Marx and the classical political economists on the labour theory of  value 
For Marx the classical economists, in particular Smith and Ricardo are a much 
more serious proposition. They were the predecessors of Marx who approached 
most closely to an adequate understanding of capital, insofar as they utilised a 
labour theory of value. But their accounts were ultimately inadequate. Their 
fundamental problem was that they conceived  of the value form as natural and 
transhistorical. As a result, the main consideration of their work was quantitative 
and they missed the problem of  how it is that the product of  labour takes the form 
of a commodity, and appears as a 'value' of 'things'.  Thus, for Smith and Ricardo, 
there is no connection between the labour theory of  value and the fetishisation and 
31 Marx, Capital 1 , p. 169. 
32 Marx, Capital 1 , pp. 173-4 84 
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reification  of social  relations,  and consequently no  attempt to  progress 
theoretically from social relations to determining the nature of the mode of 
production. Smith was the first economist to develop a labour theory of value but 
later abandoned it for the 'Trinity  Formula,' a development and degeneration that 
Marx saw as itself an expression of the actual development of capitalism.  Marx 
then, rejected the trinity formula, seeing it as obfuscating real relations that 
enform the labour process: 
When the political economists treat surplus value and the value of labour-
power as fractions  of the value product  ...  they conceal the specific 
character of the capital-relation, namely the fact that variable capital is 
exchanged for living labour power, and that the worker is accordingly 
excluded from the product. Instead of revealing the capital relation they 
show us the false semblance of a relation of association, in which workers 
and capitalists divide the product in proportion to the different elements 
which they respectively contribute towards its formation.33 
Ricardo,  however, kept and developed Smith's labour theory of value and 
attempted to generalise its applicability from the  early 'rude state' of society to 
bourgeois society itself.  But Ricardo failed to reach the understanding that value 
is not derived from labour alone but from socially necessary labour.  Because he 
had no concept of abstract or socially necessary labour time, Ricardo found no 
exact relation between value and labour time. Marx isolated this error: 
All commodities can be reduced to labour as their common element. What 
Ricardo does not investigate is the specific form in which labour manifests 
itself as the common element of commodities. 34 
This is rooted in the failings of Ricardo's method which looked to find labour 
concreted in an object, because he failed to get beyond the individual commodity, 
embodying a  specific amount of a  particular type of labour35  to the social 
processes and networks of commodity producing society, Ricardo was therefore 
unable to resolve the problem of  how labour determines value. Two contemporary 
Marxist economists put the ensuing possibilities as follows; 
Two possible resolutions of Ricardo's contradiction exist.  One way out of 
the dilemma is to abandon the first approximation of the labour-embodied 
33 Marx, Capital 1 , pp. 670-l. 
34 Marx, Theories of  Surplus Value Volume Three p.138 
35 Marx on Ricardo's mistake is in Theories of  Surplus Value Volume Three p.  131 
see also p. 137 and p. 138-9. 85 
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theory of value in search of some other account of the magnitude of 
exchange value.  Such a  path historically comprised the retreat from 
science to vulgar economy.  The other possible resolution involves the 
complete reconceptualisation of  value, a recasting of the theory of value as 
an abstraction rather than as a  hypostatised assumption, wherein its 
significance and status is such that its apparent inconsistencies can be 
recreated  as the expressions of the real contradictions of capitalist 
society.36 
The second path is the option of Marx, since Ricardo's solution (undifferentiated 
labour) to the problem of value became his problem. It is resolved by a method 
which penetrates the commodity form to investigate a social whole with distinct 
laws of development. Such a penetration is necessary because 
Value, ... does not have its description branded on its forehead; it rather 
transforms every product of labour into a social hieroglyphic.  Later on, 
men try to decipher the hieroglyphic, to get behind the secret of their own 
social product:  for the characteristic which objects of utility have of being 
values is as much men's social product as is their language.37 
A commodity does not possess a value corresponding to the amount of labour time 
logged in that particular individual commodity but is determined by the socially 
necessary labour time for that kind of commodity. This double view of labour gives 
rise to a paradox, since the: 
labour which constitutes the substance of  value is not only uniform, simple, 
average, labour; it is the labour of a private individual represented in a 
definite product.  However, the product as value must be the embodiment 
of  social  labour and, as such, be directly convertible from one use value into 
all others ... Thus the labour of  individuals has to be directly represented as 
its opposite, social labour; this transformed labour is, as its immediate 
opposite, abstract, general, labour which is therefore represented in a 
general equivalent.  Only by its alienation does individual labour manifest 
itself as its opposite.38 
Ricardo fails  to see this because his individualism constrains his vision to 
individual concrete labours. In Marx's resolution of  this paradox he introduces an 
36 Himmelweit, S., and  Mohun, S., 'The Anomalies of Capital', in Capital and Class 
6 (1978)  p.72 
37 Marx, Capital 1 , p. 167. 
38 Marx, Theories of  Surplus Value Volume Three pp.135-6. 86 
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original  category;  abstract labour, which offers  a  completely new way of 
conceptualising human productive activity. It  is a new kind of social process, with 
new ways of behaving and is manifested through the customary and essential 
mode of behaviour of commodities. Marx embraces abstract labour in a profoundly 
Aristotelian way.  The concept involves the contrast between essence and 
appearance, the relationship between potentiality and actuality, and the idea of a 
customary mode of behaviour by means of which things can be identified as of a 
certain kind. In addition, abstract labour is the solution to an Aristotelian problem, 
the problem of the commensurability of commodities and it is articulated in an 
Aristotelian way. 
But there is a twist. Abstract labour appears to be an abstraction; a Platonic 
universal which, somehow, makes its appearance in the diverse products of 
human labour that exist in the bourgeois social form.  Marx thus appears 
vulnerable to the Aristotelian critique of Platonism, or its nineteenth century 
variant, his own critique of  Hegelian speculation whose 'essential character' is ' the 
operation called comprehending the Substance as Subject.'39  This is indeed the 
criticism made of  Marx's novel concept by Moore, who compares the derivation of 
the idea of fruit from apples and pears, and which Marx condemns, to the 
derivation of abstract labour from the commodities that exchange.4o  Is Marx 
employing a Platonic false universal at the heart of  this theory of value? 
Moore's parallel is unwarranted. The key distinction between the two abstractions 
is that the first takes place in thought and the second takes place in the market 
place. Marx summarises this innovative analysis in the Contribution  to  the 
Critique of  Political Economy: 
This reduction appears to be an abstraction but it is an abstraction which 
is made every day in the social process of  production, The conversion of all 
commodities into labour time is no greater an abstraction and is no less 
real, than the the resolution of  all organic bodies into air.  41 
But the overall basis of his claim for the actuality of the process of abstract 
labour in bourgeois society rests on an account of  the organic inter relatedness  of 
that specific form: 
this abstraction of labour as such is not merely the mental product of a 
39 Marx, The Holy Family in  CW 4, p. 58. 
40 Moore,  'Marx and the Origins of  Dialectical Materialism' Inquiry  14 (1971) p. 
421. 
41 Marx, Contribution to a Critique of  Political Economy (London, 1970) p. 30. 87 
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concrete  totality  of labours.  Indifference  towards  specific  labours 
corresponds to a form of society in which individuals can with ease transfer 
form one labour to another, and where the specific kind is a matter of 
chance for them, hence of indifference. Not only the category, labour, but 
labour in reality has here become the means of creating wealth in general, 
and has ceased to be organically linked with particular individuals in any 
specific form  .... The simplest abstraction, then, which modern economics 
places at the head of its discussions, and which expresses an immeasurably 
ancient relation valid in all forms of  society, nevertheless achieves practical 
truth as an abstraction only as a category of the most modern society.42 
This 'ancient relation' - so ancient as to be noticed by Aristotle, has finally 
achieved practical truth. Abstract labour is no Platonic universal for Marx. it is 
rather the distinctive kind of labour undertaken in a specific social form. At the 
same time the sociality of  labour provides the raw social matter from which a new 
and distinct mode of  production can be constructed. Conceived of in this manner, it 
is the potential for a new form altogether, and, as such, it is bound to be in tension 
with the social relations that lead to its constitution. On this argument it is only 
conceivable that Marx's theory of value can be reconstructed if recourse is made 
to the key categories that Marx takes from Aristotle.  Additionally, the more 
stress that is laid on the way that bourgeois society can be conceived of as an 
organic totality, the more that we are faced with the paradox of unity that 
confronts any unified composite substance. The lesson from that paradox was 
that the matter and form of a unified substance are necessarily in tension, and 
that the form must at some point be sloughed off. 
Marx's critique of Ricardo combines different philosophical strands, not only the 
method of  critique derived from German idealism but also the critique of all forms 
of false  universals which is part of the Aristotelian inheritance of Marx. 
Himmelweit and Mohun's way of  putting Marx's preferred route for the resolution 
of Ricardo's dilemma is to see the theory of  value as an abstraction. This is a valid 
way of putting matters if we take, with Marx, the position that the nature of 
abstract labour is that it  is social, and not a predicate of a commodity, but rather 
of commodity production. As a result it is a product of relationships which, as 
argued above, Marx held to be dependent on the specific social form involved. 
Ricardo's error then was that he failed to analyse the specificity of the type of 
labour involved.  It is necessary then, to resolve clearly the status of this sort of 
error. In that task it is helpful to look at McCarthy'S interpretation of the 
MarxlRicardo distinction. 
42 Marx, Grundrisse, pp. 104-5. Marx and Ricardo: McCarthy's interpretation 
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In Marx and the Ancients, George McCarthy gives an account of the divergence 
between Marx and Ricardo which differs significantly from that above  He 
identifies the divergence over the nature of labour that is congealed in the 
commodity within the capitalist form of social organisation, but he goes on to 
condemns Ricardo's account of the labour theory of value on the basis that it 'was 
ontological and metaphysical  - not historical.' 43  This depiction is intended to act 
as a  token of the superiority of Marx's account over that of Ricardo.  It is 
surprising to see a writer who is familiar with the influence of  the Greeks on Marx 
using metaphysical and ontological to denote what Marx abandoned, rather than 
what he retained form Aristotle. Marx did not abandon Aristotle's ontology for his 
meta-ethics,  and it is  insufficient for  commentators  to  acknowledge  the 
relationship between the two theorists; it is also necessary to reconstruct the 
connection  in an  appropriate  manner.  In line  with  McCarthy's  general 
interpretation of the Marx!  Aristotle relationship in terms of their shared concern 
with metaethics, he argues that the labour theory  of value is the substance of 
Marx's ethical view. He contrasts the early philosophical works as ethical, and the 
later historical and structural works as metaethical, and the thrust of his 
argument is to see Marx in the tradition of Aristotelian ethical thinking, rather 
than as sharing a metaphysical framework. 
In the course of his discussion he makes some over-extended claims about the 
nature of  Marx's critique of  capitalism. Whilst arguing, rightly in my view, that the 
substance of the critique of capitalism remains the same across both the early 
works and the works around the Capital project, he maintains that the problem 
with the economics of the nineteenth century is that 'everything is reduced to 
simplistic models of exchange relations based on formal abstractions from the 
nature of needs, the commodities produced, and the complex social relations 
inherent in modern capitalist society; it is capitalism without the Industrial 
Revolution' and the clear implication of McCarthy's writing is that this is both 
Marx's point of  view and a central plank of Marx's critique of Ricardo as well. He 
goes on to condemn: 
Economic abstractionism [which] fails to consider the following:  (1) the 
nature of work; (2) the structure of work organisations; (3) the power and 
authority relations of the workplace (4) the class structure of society (5) 
the role of the state in maintaining a  system of exchange value and 
production based on profits and wage labour; and (6) the importance of land 
43 McCarthy, Marx and the Ancients p. 214. 89 
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appropriation, exploitation, wars and imperialism for  overcoming its 
internal contradictions (counteracting influences). 44 
But the account provided of  the labour theory of value in Capital also commits all 
these crimes; it is abstract, simplified, and fails to consider items (1) to (6) above, 
(although it clearly has implications for all of  them). Marx begins with the analysis 
of the commodity, comprising both use-value and exchange value; not with the set 
of complex social relations that go to make up nineteenth century capitalism. This 
is perhaps unsurprising in view of the fact that Capital is only part of a much 
larger, and unfinished work. It clearly contains abstractions and simplifications. 
The infantile abstractions of the vulgar economists are condemned not because 
they are  abstractions  or because they are  simple  but because  they  are 
inadequate at representing the reality of commodity production: they are the 
wrong  abstractions.,  Such problematic  abstractions  include,  for  example, 
abstractions of false universals, or the wrong simplifications, for example, non-
contradictory simplifications of  the superficial appearances of entities. Because of 
this they fail to represent things as they really are; they are thus ontologically 
inadequate. 
The core issue dividing Marx and Ricardo, let us remind ourselves, is that Ricardo 
failed to investigate the nature of the labour that creates or manifests itself in 
exchange value.45  What kind of error is this? Obviously in a  sense it is an 
epistemological error, of  failing to analyse an entity deeply enough. But this sort of 
epistemological error only makes sense as an error, if there is a further, deeper, 
more fundamental way of analysing the entity at hand. Is there  another way of 
looking at the labour contained in a commodity? Certainly  Marx takes it that 
there is such a view; we can see it as abstract labour; the particular form of 
labour under capitalism. This question is concerned with the particular being of 
labour under capitalism; it is an ontological question. What McCarthy gets wrong 
is shown by his counterposition of an ontological approach to labour, which he 
says is taken by Ricardo, and a historical and structural approach, which he says 
is taken by Marx. Implicitly, this rejects the possibility of a historical ontology, the 
sort of ontology that Aristotle has, that is driven by the need to explain change as 
well as persistence. But it is just such an ontological perspective, particularly of 
the same matter being enformed in different ways, that Marx gets from Aristotle. 
Thus Ricardo's error lies in  not having a historical sense of the changing nature of 
labour in different historical epochs certainly, but his error is not that he has a 
ontological and metaphysical theory of value, or if  he does and it is, then Marx 
44 McCarthy, Marx and the Ancients p. 219. 
45 This is precisely how Marx puts it in Theories of  Surplus Value volume Three p. 
164 commits the same error. 
90 
Chapter Five 
Such  an  objection  to  Marx  IS  untenable  because Aristotle's  ontology  is 
fundamentally what Marx inherits, rather than his morals. There are at least two 
reasons for this; first, that when Marx uses material from the Nicomachean 
Ethics, it is the discussion of exchange that he employs, rather than the more 
broad discussion of the good life for man, and secondly because, in line with the 
discussion from Nielsen above, the moral perspective of Marx comes  a  poor 
second to his analysis of the potential for the development of capitalism as a 
social organism. CHAPTER SIX 
THE DEMANDS OF MARX'S CRITIQUE 
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'Labour is the living, form giving fire; it is the transitoriness of  things, their 
temporality, as their formation by living time' 1 
Introduction 
At this point it will be worthwhile to recapitulate some of  the preceding work, since 
the first sections of this thesis come from differing theoretical directions. In 
Chapter One I present an essentially negative argument for a return to study of 
Marx's metaphysics, by showing that an absence of such study has problematic 
politico-theoretical consequences. To move away from Marxist positions via the 
neglect of certain aspects of the theoretical framework attached to Marxism is 
discreditable, since it is the overcoming of positions that should lead to a 
rethinking of overall theoretical commitments, not just their overlooking.  I also 
indicate,  as  an account  of intellectual  history,  the  wide  knowledge  and 
understanding that Marx had of  the ancient Greek world. Nevertheless I make it 
clear that it is the substantive, rather than the political or historical issues which 
are the bedrock for an Aristotelian redrawing of  Marx's most significant analyses. 
In the third chapter, I move from the history of ideas in order to give  an account 
of those considerations drawn from Aristotelian metaphysics which have some 
purchase on social theory. This includes considerations of substance, change, 
laws, and natural kinds. There is an overlap of this discussion not only with 
themes in Marx but also with some of the hardy perennials of social theory and 
with contemporary analytical philosophy. Nevertheless the ultimate justification 
for  such discussion is still to come, couched in terms of the purchase such a 
framework gives us on Marx's account of society. 
The fifth chapter moves away from Aristotle and on to Marx. In it I give an 
account of Marx's opposition to the conclusions, method, assumptions and, 
ultimately, ontology of classical political economy. Although this account can 
stand alone, it  will  emerge strengthened  from the following discussion. 
This negative side of  Marx's work has a corresponding positive side which is less 
well known and less clear in Marx's work. After working through his destructive 
critique of the canons of classical political economy, Marx needs an Archimedean 
point from which to move the world. He works for a starting point for theoretical 
1 Marx, Grundrisse (Harmondsworth, 1973) translated with a  forward by M. 
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exposition which can overcome the critical failings which vitiate the project of 
political economy.  In the course of  this, both interpretative issues surrounding the 
status of different sections of Marx's corpus and philosophical issues revolving 
around the nature of the individual/universal and abstractJconcrete divide are 
raised, in the introduction to the Grundrisse.  They focus on the critique of false 
universals, drawn from Aristotle's opposition to this key element of  Platonism. 
In the Introduction to the Grundrisse, the foundation of Marx's social ontology  is 
located in the discussion of  production in  general. This essential mediating activity 
between the human species and nature gives the ontologically basic triple which 
can be reconceived as social matter (hyle). This provides the ontological basis for a 
wider understanding of the nature of social reality than can be achieved by the 
vulgar or the classical political economists. I then outline a key component of 
Marx's social ontology that is necessary to assert the existence of a theory of 
decay in Marx. This is, analogous to form, the subsumption of production under a 
dominant relation or category. In the standard case, of bourgeois society, Marx 
outlines the formal, and then the real subsumption of  labour under capital. This is 
the first, coming to be, instance of the relation between form and matter in the 
social world. 
The scope of  social ontology 
'the actual nature of the particular things that serve as paradigms'2  This is the 
phrase the Putnam contrasts to the empiricist account of the ontology of kinds. in 
the social world, employing such a perspective makes it possible to point to a 
radical dislocation between an empiricist method of enquiry and the nature of 
what is to be analysed.  But the ontology which operates as a critique of classical 
political economy is a social one.  The first question that arises is, what then, is 
meant by social ontology? Mter outlining an answer to this, it is possible to 
proceed to the ontology that Marx himself  uses and presupposes, and, as a distinct 
task, we can try to justify that ontology itself. 
For Arthur, social ontology refers to: 'That set of  fundamental categories through 
which the character of the social sphere is delimited, and the general framework 
for theory construction established' 3 Such a formula indicates that categorical 
inadequacy is an ontological fault and subtends my claim that the categoriallimits 
of the political economists signifies inadequacies that are ontological in status. 
Gould, whose vague 'metaphysical theory of the nature of social reality' does not 
help very much, glosses this with two meanings: 'the study of the nature of social 
2 Putnam, H., 'Meaning and Reference' in Schwartz, S. (ed.) Naming, Necessity and 
Natural Kinds p. 132. 
3 Arthur, Dialectics of  Labour p. 153. 93 
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reality [and as such] a branch of general ontology.' and 'ontology socialised - a 
study of reality that reflects on the social roots of the conceptions of this reality'4 
It  seems clear that the second meaning here is parasitic on the first, though in the 
critique of classical and vulgar political economy it is the second that dominates. 
Marx not only aims to uncover the failings in the ontology of the political 
economists, but also to explain these failings by reflecting on the social and 
political roots, such as the consolidation of bourgeois power by 1830, which 
ushered in vulgar economics.  It is, I think, important to emphasise that Marx's 
social ontology must face similar standards as any discrete metaphysical theory. 
Marx did not propose, and Marxist thought is not, some entity hermetically sealed 
off from the intellectual  standards  applicable in other areas  of thought. 
Opposition to such a conception of 'Marxism versus bourgeois philosophy' entails 
insisting that there are no general categorical boundaries between social and 
general ontology. 
Some scholars have questioned the worth of looking for something called an 
ontology in Marx.  5 Whether Marx sketched such a framework or not (and I will 
show that he did, particularly in the Introduction to the Grundrisse), all social 
theorists have implicit some idea of basic posits - some conception of what sort of 
things exist.  It is, however, necessary to explain the failure of Marx to produce a 
codified, formulaic document.  Meikle has suggested that the essentialist and 
dialectical categories of Marx were taken for  granted in his time.  6  The 
metaphysical categories that a theorist uses to underpin his understanding of the 
world are the elements of  theory most likely to be 'silent' and inexplicit within the 
work, because they are the elements that will appear most obvious.  Quine points 
out this feature of  ontology, suggesting that: 
characteristic of metaphysics, of at least of that part of metaphysics called 
ontology [is that] one who regards a statement on this subject as true at all 
must regard it as trivially true. One's ontology is basic to the conceptual 
scheme by which he interprets all experiences, even the most commonplace 
ones. Judged within some particular conceptual scheme - and how else is 
judgement possible? - an ontological statements goes  without saying, 
standing in need of  no separate  justification at all. 7 
4 Gould, C., Marx's Social Ontology: Individuality and Community in Marx's Theory 
of  Social Reality,  (Cambridge, Mass., 1978) p. xi. 
5  see, for example, Cowling, C.  M., 'Hegel, Feuerbach, and Marx', unpublished 
paper to the Political Studies Association, Annual Conference, (1992) p. 21. 
6 Meikle,Essentialism in the Thought of  Karl Marx, pp. 25-7. 
7 Quine, W. V. 0., From a  Logical Point of  View (Oxford, 1953) p. 10. 94 
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It is not necessary to go  as far as Quine, nor to share his own parsimonious 
ontological commitments in order to  appreciate that if Marx was to leave 
unwritten any work at all, the most promising candidate would be a worked out 
ontology. In fact, of course, he was to leave much more than this undone at the 
time of his death. Marx also clearly saw the Theses on Feuerbach as a settling of 
accounts with philosophy in general and metaphysics in particular. However, the 
continual turn to metaphysical discussion, especially in works that never reached 
publication in his life time, such as the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, 
and, much later, the Introduction to the Grundrisse, the Marginal Notes on Adolph 
Wagner and the notebooks now known as Theories of  Surplus Value suggests that 
the desire to settle accounts once and for all, was not satisfied.  More to the point, 
Marx was simply wrong to think that the end of German idealism had meant the 
end of considerations of ontology.  The task of redrawing Marx's ontology is, as a 
result, a task largely of  reconstructing what is implicit in the later works, centring 
on the lessons of the critique of classical political economy and its vulgar 
successor. 
To  summarise the conclusions of the previous chapter, the various political 
economists are criticised by Marx in three ways, but the critique implies a fourth 
level.  For Marx, classical political economy is ahistorical  in that it is not rooted in 
an account of historical development, individualist in that it generalises social 
phenomena from a supposed explanation of  the micro level behaviour of  individual 
capitalists and idealist in that it explains, for example, primitive accumulation in 
terms of  idealised natural tendencies such as diligence or laziness. But underlying 
and explaining these considerations is the ontological inadequacy of the political 
economists and the consequent partiality of  their method. 
Marx's critique of political economy is the obverse of the labour theory of value, 
such that an exposition of the value form is latent in the critique.  For Marx, the 
value form is pushed centre stage because of  its constitution by a particular form 
of human productive activity.  The distinctiveness of 'the various economic 
formations of  society' lies in 'the form in  which this surplus labour is pumped from 
the immediate producer, the worker.' 8  In the critique of  political economy, too, the 
central explanatory role of the value form  merely reflects the ontological 
foundations of human social activity, and, a fortiori,  capitalism as  a  social 
formation.  Equally, the critique's three elements have their analogues in the 
concrete social processes and relations that constitute the social whole which 
brings them into being.  The idealism  of political economy, raising an abstracted 
individual governed by idealised properties, reflects man's estrangement from 
8 Marx, Capital 1  , p. 325. 95 
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nature, and the replacement of sensuous, historical, mediating activity, by an 
occlusion of explanandum and explanans so that modelled  interactive behaviour is 
itself 'explained' by models  of individuals, or at its most crude, of the Indivnual 
Mill ,reveals that such an arbitrary starting point is typical of works of political 
economy: 
Geometry presupposes an arbitrary definition of a line, 'that which ha,s 
length but not breadth.' Just in the same manner does Political Economy 
presuppose an arbitrary definition of man, as a being who invariably does 
that by  which  he  may  gain  the  greatest  amount  of necessaries 
conveniences and luxuries with the smallest quantity of labour and physical 
self-denial with which they can be obtained in the existing state of 
knowledge. It is true that this definition of man is not formally prefixed to 
any work on Political Economy ... It is proper that what is assumed in every 
particular case should once for all be brought before the mind in its full 
extent, by being formally stated as a general maxim.  9 
Marx rejects the idealism contained in this account, characterised as it is by the 
construction of a false universal; this 'general maxim' of Mill. This rejection is a 
parallel procedure to the rejection of false Platonic universals in the Aristotelian 
tradition. 
The ahistoricism of the account provided by political economy maps to the 
alienation of  labour under capitalism - whereby labour is increasingly not of a time 
or place, but of a form and for a purpose, and yet that purpose is dislocated from 
the human needs of the social whole from which it emerges.  Labour is in a 
profound sense, ahistoric under capital since it  is not for or by any  individual in any 
determinate situation. Aside from its importance to the working out of the labour 
theory of  value, Marx's characterisation of  labour under bourgeois social relations 
as abstract is indicative of the nature of alienated labour under such relations. It  is 
abstract for the worker  as well as within the theoretical system. Marx comments  , 
that 'labour itself is objectless, is a reality only in the immediate vitality of the 
worker'10 
The obfuscations of the hidden hand mean that not even the capitalist who has a 
high degree of control over the labour process knows which segments of labour 
9 Mill J. S., 'Essay on the Definition  of Political ~conomy; .and the Method of 
Investigation proper to it' (first published in 1836 In J. S. MIll, Collected Works 
volume IV (Toronto and London 1967), p. 326. 
10 Marx, Grundrisse, p. 364. 96 
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fulfil which requirements and can provide no reply to questions such as 'will the 
products of my labour be used?'  'who will use them?' 'when and where will they be 
used?' and so on.  The central dialectic of capital, the contradiction between the 
use for which a  commodity is produced and the social form under which it is 
produced, means that the substance of that commodity;  labour, is labour in a 
void.  Lastly, the  individualism of the political economists reflects the self 
estrangement of man from man, the very real individualism that is reflected in 
ideological supports of  the bourgeois order. 
Ontology of social existence 
In Dialectics of  Labour: Marx's Relationship to Hegel C.J. Arthur argues that the 
category of productive activity is ontologically basic, from  a  reading of the 
Ecorwmic and Philosophical Manuscripts.  I aim to show that it is a more general 
organising principle in Marx's work and incidentally provides a  key to the 
continuity problem in Marx.l1 The central attention paid to productive activity is 
a  consistent theme in Marx not just in the Manuscripts  but also  in the 
methodological breakthroughs made late in 1857. Moreover it rests on the 
Aristotelian distinction between form and matter.  Marx's productivist view of 
man is the basis of his historical account of the development of social forms and 
their concomitant ideological supports.  It is traced by Carver, to his critical 
reading of Hegel's Phenomenology,  and to the Paris Manuscripts where Marx 
develops the idea that the human individual (the human being as species being) is 
essentially the producing individual: 
in creating a world of objects by his practical activity, n his work upon 
inorganic nature, man proves himself a conscious species being, ie,., ad  a 
being that treats the species as its own essential being, or that treats itself 
as a species being  .... It  is just in his work upon the objective world therefore, 
that man really proves himself  to be a species being 12 
Social man or, as Marx puts it in the early works, man as a conscious species 
being, is constituted through activity.  Such was Hegel's insight.  But what kind of 
activity?  Here Hegel's account is vitiated by his idealism.  He recognised the 
importance of  the self  production of  man, but at the same time his account, in the 
Phenomerwlogy, is one-sided, according to Marx: 
11 For an outline of the problems involved, see Cowling, C. M., 'The Case for Two 
Marxes Restated' in Cowling, C.  M., and Wilde, L.  (e~s.), ~Pfro~ches to  Marx 
(Milton Keynes, 1989) pp. 15-32. who argues that there IS a distinction  b~tween  a 
theory of  alienation in the early works and a theory of the mode of productIon n the 
mature works. 
12 Marx, 'Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts' in CW 3 pp. 276-7. 97 
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The outstanding achievement of  Hegel's Phiinomerwlogie  ... is thus first that 
Hegel conceives the self creation of man as a  process  ...  [but] The only 
labour which Hegel knows and recognises is abstractly mental labour  13 
The extension of Hegel's view, to cover the many sided nature of labour. becomes 
focussed in the category of  general production in the Introduction to the Grundrisse. 
Here Marx is at his most specific on the nature of social reality, in a passage 
worth repeating at length. The translation here draws on both the Nicolaus 
version and Carver's in Texts on Method; 
Whenever we speak of  production then, what is meant is always production 
at a definite stage of social development - production by social individuals 
(gesellschaftlicher Individuen). It  might seem, therefore that in order to talk 
about production [generally] at all we must either pursue the process of 
historic development through its different phases, or declare beforehand 
that we are dealing with a determinate epoch such as e.g. modern bourgeois 
production which is indeed our particular theme.  However, all epochs of 
production  have  certain  common  distinguishing  marks,  common 
determinations. Production in general is an abstraction but a rational 
abstraction insofar as it really brings out and fixes the common element 
(gemeinsame) and thus saves us repetition.  Still, this general [universal] 
category,  this  common  element  sifted  out by comparison,  is  itself 
segmented many times over and splits into different determinations. Some 
determinations  belong  to  all  epochs,  some  to  only  a  few.  [Some] 
determinations will be shared by the most modern epoch and the most 
ancient.  No production will be thinkable without them; however, even 
though the most developed languages have laws and characteristics in 
common with the least developed, nevertheless, just those things which 
determine their development, i.e. the elements which are not general and 
common,  must be  separated out from  the determinations  valid for 
production as such, [applicable to production generally] so that in their 
unity, - which arises already from the identity of the subject,  humanity 
(Subjekt, dieMenschheit)  and of the object, nature (Objekt, die Natur)  -
their essential difference is not forgotten.  The whole profundity of those 
modern economists who demonstrate the eternity and harmoniousness of 
the existing relations lies in this forgetting.14 
13 Marx, 'Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844' in CW 3 pp. 332-3. 
14 Marx, Grundrisse Nicolaus p. 85, Dietz Verlag p. 7 98 
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The overall contrast in this passage is between the general elements and the 
determinate elements of a  social entity.  The passage provides considerable 
support for and explication of the claim about Marx's ontology put forward by 
Arthur in Dialectics of  Labour.  It is not just true that a reading of the Economic 
and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844 reveals the fundamental existing matrix 
for Marx as the mediation of the humanity-nature couple by productive activity. 
The Grundrisse Introduction is also premissed on such a reading. 
Following the account in Grundrisse, Marx's view of human society at its most 
bare is as outlined in  Arthur's first matrix: 
PRODUCTIVE ACTMTY 
MAN  NATURE 
Marx explicitly refers to the two poles of this ontology as the subject and object 
and goes on to speak of  production itself as a subject under certain circumstances, 
though it is more characteristic to see the translation of the critical term 
bestimmungen  as mediation or determination. This matrix consists of the social 
matter (hyle) which is always enformed by a distinct set of social relations. It  is 
fundamental to Marx's concept of social existence.  Considered as a mediation 
between two poles, the matrix also provides one of the building blocks of Marx's 
method.  Meszaros indicates the unique value of  this 'monistic materialism': 
Only in Marx's monistic materialism can we find a coherent comprehension 
of 'objective totality' as 'sensuous reality' and a  correspondingly valid 
differentiation between subject and object,  thanks to his concept of 
mediation as ontologically fundamental productive activity, and thanks to 
his grasp of the specific, second order mediations through which the 
ontological foundation of human existence is alienated from man in the 
capitalist order of  society.  15 
But despite all this, Marx is clearly aware of the problems of being ahistorical 
himself and the continual need to relate production in general; what Carver 
somewhat confusingly calls 'production as a  logical universal' to its specific 
instantiations.  Marx fights against systematically founding his system on a 
logical universal16 both because of his antipathy to the ahistoricism of the 
15 Meszaros, 1.,  Marx's Theory of  Alienation (London, 1970) p. 87,  .. 
16  For an expansive, and perhaps over extended a.ccount of  Marx s opposItIon to 
false universals, see McCarthy, Marx and the Anclents, p. 223. 99 
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account of the political economists and his wider wish to avoid 'a general historico-
philosophical theory, the supreme virtue of which consists in being supra-
historical' 17 
It  is perhaps ironic that Marx is reluctant to take this step of  generating a general 
historico-philosophical theory' since such a task has been meat and drink  to many 
of his interpreters.18 But Marx is more cautious. Therefore he emphasises his own 
(Aristotelian) consideration, that the general determinations need to be worked out 
in their relationship to the specific forms of society. Nevertheless, he points out 
that production has more to it, as a category, than simply a particular: 
The relation of the general characteristics of  production at a given stage of 
social development to the particular forms of production is to be developed 
elsewhere  (later).  Lastly,  production also is  not only a  particular 
production. Rather it  is always a certain social body, a social subject, which 
is active in a greater or sparser totality of  branches of  production.  19 
The 'certain social subject' here refers to what Marx later explicates as the 
dominant or determinate form of  production. This is active not in every branch of 
production but only in the essential core. Thus a scientific presentation has to 
identify this core, and 0 theorise the type of  production within it. In  the analysis of 
specific social forms, human productive activity appears too general a notion to 
carry the explanatory weight with which it has been invested. Nonetheless, Marx 
does continually return to this theme, emphasising that production in general is 
an expression of  the immanent nature of humanity: not feudal man, or bourgeois 
man, but humanity as a whole. In this vein he speaks of the 'production process in 
general, such as is common to all social conditions, that is, without historic 
character, human if  you like.  '20 
The Introduction to the Grundrisse provides ample evidence of Aristotelian 
hylomorphism in Marx's social ontology, and this theoretical perspective informs 
his critique of political economy. But this analysis raises a question: 'Does the 
Grundrisse provide a reliable guide to Marx's conception of  social ontology?' 
17  Marx to the editorial board of Otechestvenniye Zapiski November 1877 in 
Selected Correspondence, p. 294.  . 
18 The obvious example of  this is Cohen's Karl Marx's TheoryofHzstory, though 
Cohen himself  is aware of  this caution in Marx. 
19 Marx, Grundrisse p. 86. 
20 Marx, Grundrisse, p. 320. The Status of  the Introduction to the Grundrisse 
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If substantial explanatory weight is to be placed on the Introduction to the 
Grundrisse in the reconstruction of  Marx's social ontology, then we need to secure 
the reliability of this text. Certain problems arise here, firstly some critics most 
notably Nicolaus in his foreword to the Grundrisse, have suggested that the 
introduction is 'a false start'  ... idealist and inferior 'as dialectics'21  to the starting 
point of  the Critique of  Political Economy and Capital 1 which both begin with the 
commodity.  More importantly, perhaps, Marx himself  reveals in the Preface to the 
Critique of  Political Economy: 
A general introduction, which I had drafted, is omitted, since on further 
reflection it seemed to me confusing to anticipate results which still have to 
be substantiated, and the reader who really wishes to follow me will have to 
decide to advance from the particular to the general.22 
It is worth noting that Marx's rethink here tends to elevate the 1859 Preface, 
foregrounding the famous formulae of historical materialism which have been so 
widely interpreted to the exclusion of much else in the cannon. But such elevation 
of the aphoristic and metaphorical Preface of 1859 is not warranted. Marx's 
reasons for omitting the introduction are not theoretical but presentational and 
political. 
It is well known that Marx in the Postface to the Second German Edition of 
Capital distinguishes between the method of presentation and the method of 
enqwry: 
the latter has to appropriate the material in detail, to analyse its different 
forms of  development and to track down their inner connections. only after 
this  work has been done  can the real movement be  appropriately 
presented.  23 
It is for presentational reasons rather than reasons to do with the method of 
enquiry that Marx discards the 1857 Grundrisse introduction and uses the 1859 
version instead. He is simply afraid of confusing his readers by presenting a too 
general and abstract account. But for those who wish to penetrate the detailed 
method of  enquiry, to appreciate the work transparently and not in its appearance 
as an 'a priori construction'24 then the Introduction to the Grundrisse is likely to be 
21 Nicolaus in  Marx, Grundrisse (foreword) p. 38. 
22 Marx, Preface to the Critique of  Political Economy (London, 1970) p. 19. 
23 Marx, Capital 1, p. 102. 
24 Marx, Capital 1  , p. 102. more help. Marx does write, after all, that investigation of 
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determinant, abstract general relations is the obviously scientifically 
correct method. The concrete is concrete because it is the concentration of 
many determinations, hence unity of the diverse. It  appears in the process 
of thinking, therefore, not as a point of departure, though it is the point of 
departure in reality and hence also the point of departure for observation 
and conception  ... along the second [path] the abstract determinations lead 
towards a reproduction of  the concrete by way of  thought.  '25 
This justification of using abstract determinations such as production as a 
starting point and proceeding to less abstract and more concrete determinations is 
couched in  theoretical terms and not in terms of presentation or accessibility. 
The second charge that Nicolaus lays in his 'false start' critique  of the passages 
dealing with production in general is that they employ an idealist category. Here 
Nicolaus is led astray  by his focus on the Hegelian influences on Marx's thought to 
the detriment of the Aristotelian ones. For Aristotle universals exist only when 
realised in particulars. Marx does write of production as an abstraction, but a 
rational abstraction (as opposed to the irrational abstractions of bourgeois 
ideology; Platonic universals such as Man, Freedom, and Justice), and rational 
because it picks out a really existing common element: 
To summarise: there are characteristics which all stages of production 
have in common, which are established as general ones by the mind; 
however, the so-called general conditions of all production are nothing more 
but these  abstract moments, with which no real historical stage of 
production can be grasped.26 
It is  certainly true that starting  Capital  with the  commodity form  has 
advantages, since that form comprises the unity of exchange value and use value. 
But what Marx is using there is a  concretisation of the form (production of 
exchange values, driven and determined by the law of value) which is imposed on 
biologically necessary, ontologically basic matter, human productive activity or 
the transformation of nature to satisfy human needs. The commodity, he believes, 
is the best way of  focussing and bringing out the tension between form and matter 
which he identifies as fundamental in 1857. Exchange value, specific to bourgeois 
Society, reflects its social form, and the imperative of production for profit, Use 
25 Marx, Grundrisse p. 10l. 
26 Marx, Grundrisse p. 88. 102 
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values as the material outcome of production reflect the matter of society, and 
are thus outside the immediate concerns of  political economy. 
In the Grundrisse introduction Marx scorns 'text book beginnings' since all they 
consist of  is 'the dialectical balancing of concepts rather than the 'real relations' . 
But this should not be allowed to overshadow the fact that he has, and has to 
have, a relatively abstract ontology which though laid out briefly in its most 
general form, is investigated  in its specific form: commodity production. Light is 
shed on these abstractions in the Introduction to the Grundrisse, which pace 
Nicolaus can be trusted to guide us towards an understanding of Marx's ontology 
and hence his method, and does not represent a false start. 
The ontology of  Capitalist production 
What is not given, in the account of production in general is, of course, the 
superimposition of the relation of capital onto this process. Marx points out that, 
just as matter only exists relative to form, so: 
all production is appropriation of  nature on the part of an individual within 
and through a specific form of society 27 
Under specific social forms, some qualities of human labour are suppressed and 
others are developed. In particular, Marx isolates the 'magical' property of labour 
that it resurrects its past products.  This is is 'none of the workers business'28 
under bourgeois relations, in this social form. And, says Marx plainly, this quality 
sets up a fundamental antithesis; one of  the very few occasions when he uses that 
term: 
This  appropriation,  by  means of which  living labour comes  makes 
instru ment and material in the productive process into the body of its soul 
and thereby resurrects them from the dead, does indeed stand in antithesis 
to the fact that labour itself  is objectless, is a reality only in the immediate 
vitality of the worker - and that the instrument and material, in capital 
exist as beings-for-themselves.29 
Marx is concerned  therefore  to contrast the qualities that are expressed in  ,  , 
production as such with those which are qualities of the form under which 
production takes place. Human social labour has an object, and a purpose, but 
labour under capitalist relations is objectless, labour becomes not something of 
27 Marx, Grundrisse, p. 87. 
28 Marx, Grundrisse, p. 364. 
29 Marx, Grundrisse, p. 364. 103 
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itself, but a means to, or 'moment of capital. This is critical. Production is natural 
and essential, but the nature of  production under capitalism is not; it is estranged 
and external to the individual human being under the dominant relation. Marx 
wants to move beyond the abstract determinations, in order to investigate the 
specific nature of one social organism and highlight the peculiar modifications of 
social matter when enformed in this way.  So while the matrix Humanity _ 
productive activity - nature, of  Marx's fundamental ontology has both textual and 
conceptual support, running from the early works through to the Introduction to 
the Grundrisse,  he is impatient with the task of 'establishing by the mind' an 
ontology, and anxious to move on to the specific determinations and forms of 
production under a  specific set of social relations which constitute capitalism. 
Once the move is made to these specific relations, the most well founded abstract 
determinations receive their 'full validity'. In this way Marx rehearses the 
Aristotelian point that such universals only exist when fully instantiated in a 
particular social form. 
the most abstract categories despite their validity - precisely because of 
their abstractness - for  all epochs,  are nevertheless, in the  specific 
character of this abstraction, themselves likewise a product of historic 
relations,  and possess their full validity only for  and within those 
relations.  '30 
So the basic matrix needs to be developed since production; the first'  abstraction' 
Marx deduces for its 'validity for all epochs' does not exist in and of itself but is 
organised under the category of social relations. At the same time Marx insist on 
the existence of a dominant relation: 
In all forms of society there is one specific kind of production which 
predominates over the rest, whose relations thus assign rank and influence 
to the others. 31 
This is like a 'general illumination which bathes all the other colours and modifies 
their particularity'; it is for Marx of enormous explanatory power, despite being 
ontologically parasitic on the primacy of  production as such.  We should therefore 
extend the matrix of human social existence to make it more concrete without 
making it any less general or essential by introducing first the social relations 'for 
and within which' human productivity occurs, and second noting that, for Marx, 
there is one dominant social relation. The mediating moment between man and 
30 Marx, Grundrisse p. 105. 
31 Marx. Grundrisse, pp. 106-7 104 
Chapter Six 
nature of productive activity therefore is constituted under the totality of social 
relations and chief amongst them the dominant relation. Outlining this dominant 
relation is the task of Capital, in which the dominant capital-labour relation is 
drawn through the development and maturity of a social organism. The ontological 
basis for this is contained in the Grundrisse. By the time Capital, comes to be 
written, Marx has largely moved away from ontology into political economy: the 
study of the specific social relations of capitalism, and the details of that study are 
beyond the scope of the present work.  Nonetheless, there are specifically 
ontological problems associated with the category of relations, and in particular 
with the idea of a dominant relation which 'assign[s] rank and influence to the 
others.' 
Gould's view and associated problems 
The issue of the ontological status of social relations is raised by a competing 
account of Marx's social ontology: that presented by Gould in her work Marx's 
Social Ontology: Individuality and Community in Marx's Theory of  Social Reality. 
Comparison of the account here and that account is therefore a useful task. 
Gould's initial thesis is that for Marx (and after Aristotle) the 'primary ontological 
subject is,  properly speaking, a  social individual' a  phrase with which she 
explicates the notion of '  individuals-in-relation'.  On this reading, ontological 
priority is accorded to concrete individuals whilst 'relations' are included in order to 
make such individuals comprehensible to the social theorist32. It  is, however, the 
couple individuals-in-relations which constitutes a social substance for Gould 
rather than the three part matrix humankind -productive activity -nature, albeit 
always structured by social relations. Gould therefore makes relations, not 
productive activity, ontologically primary, and eliminates nature as a causal 
element in social ontology 
But this sits uneasily with the remarks of Marx which suggest that activity, 
specifically productive and creative activity is transhistorically basic. Gould 
accepts, indeed, foregrounds the ontological nature of labour, but is reluctant to 
categorise labour as ontologically basic, in the same way and with the same 
status that individuals-in-relations have.  This is a consequence of what Gould 
specifies as the special nature of Marx's ontology. Unlike traditional ontologies it 
32 There is nothing wrong a priori with the technique of  s~~arating.  ontologic~ and 
explanatory priority. My objection to Gould is that there IS msufficlent  ~ea~  m her 
category of relations to perform the task of explanation adequatelY,~mce  .It d?es, 
not explain why  production relations should be thought to proVlde the ~ll~atlon 
to all the other social relations. But there is no objection to separatlng differ~nt 
forms of  priority. A key feature of the arguments for some f?rm of  methodologlc~ 
individualism is the assumption of a  necessary parallel~sm between what IS 
logically prior, or ontologically prior, and what is the approprIate explanans. 105 
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has no static content but is constantly changing.  Gould is unwilling to concede the 
existence of a conception of  such a fixed human nature in Marx: 
Marx goes beyond Hegel and Aristotle in the notion that the individual 
creates his or her own nature by his or her activity and that this is not a 
fixed nature or essence but rather one that is itself changing as a result of 
this activity 33 
The most general objection to this is that there is such a fixed nature or essence 
and it consists in precisely this activity. Whatever it is that human beings do, 
they do.  (This is something like Descartes argument for  the essentiality of 
thinking; whatever it is that I think, I think.) This 'doing' is inseparable from the 
existence of human life. Another way of putting this is to suggest that for Gould 
the human - activity relation is the relation between a thing and its properties, 
rather than a thing and its nature. It is therefore open to the Kripkean objection 
that an account of  properties does not provide a complete or adequate guide to the 
nature of a thing. On the interpretation above, the relation is more equal, and 
necessary, akin to the relation between body and Anima, in a living being. Neither 
element is reducible to a  contingent property of the other. To extend Marx's 
rejection of a fixed and static human essence (pace Feuerbach) into the claim that 
nothing but material individuals (explicable only with reference to relations) exists, 
misses Marx's clear understanding of the omnipresence of human productive 
activity as the agency which transforms the relations, which in turn explain 
concrete  action.  It  also  incidentally  gives  unwarranted  ground  to  the 
methodological individualists without putting up a fight. 
On the other hand to include human productive activity, and hence labour as an 
ontologically fundamental entity, and one which is ontologically prior to relations 
has consequences in explaining some of  the sophisticated distinctions in Marx that 
Gould brings out later in her work. Most importantly, Gould show that the formal 
and instrumental equality that exists in the bourgeois exchange relation is 
paralleled by an exploitative relation of domination in production where living 
labour is dominated by dead labour, in the form of capital. This feature of 
bourgeois society, frequently pointed out by Marx, is the main object of his 
injunction  to  penetrate  from  appearance  to  essence.  It has  important 
repercussions for the nature of a future communal system in that it points to the 
need to organise production on a democratic basis rather than to rest content with 
a (necessarily temporary) equality of  distribution. 
33  Gould, C., Marx's Social Ontology: Individuality and Community in Marx's 
Theory of  Social Reality (Cambridge, Mass., 1978).p. 40. 106 
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This is the implication of Marx's elucidation of the misleading appearance of the 
general exchange relations of capitalism. He argues that the apparent equality of 
exchange under capitalism is an illusory reflection of the capitalist relation 
underlying  it: 
in the circulation process in the market place, two equally matched 
commodity owners confront each other, and that they, like all other 
commodity owners are distinguishable only by the material content of their 
goods, by the specific use value of  the goods they desire to sell each other or, 
in other words, the original relation remains intact, but survives only as the 
illusory reflection of  the capitalist relation underlying it. 34 
The capitalist relation in production therefore is dominant over the apparently 
equal relation in exchange. There are pointers to the core of  Marx's ontology, here 
stemming from the manner in which he claims that one relation is 'dominant' over 
another. This is the sort of claim that is bound to generate charges of crude 
reductionism in many contemporary critics.  How is such an ontological step 
possible? Any explanation of this text needs to explain how it is that different 
relations can have the contradictory facets which are indicated.  There are two 
relations that Marx speaks of: the first is the pre-capitalist relation of equality of 
exchange. This is temporally original, ontologically superficial, epistemologically 
illusory, yet real. The capitalist relation, which is a relation of domination, is 
temporally limited to the capitalist mode of production, ontologically essential, 
epistemologically scientific, and also real. But the first relation is now just  the shell 
in which the second relation actually appears. 
Resolution of this issue becomes possible if  we see the matter of society  not just 
'kickable' individuals, or those individuals plus 'kickable' things but these two poles 
as actually related through human productive activity.  The form of society 
consists  of the mediated expressions of these ontological 'bricks'  and has 
explanatory primacy over the matter.  The identification of those entities and 
relations whose development gives the line of a particular mode of production, 
however occurs with reference to this prior understanding of  the ontology of social 
existence and the primacy of  productive activity within that. 
Thus, what makes the value form into the constitutive element of capitalism par 
excellence, and what makes it the entity whose development governs the existence 
or nature of that society, is its constitution by human productive activity. 
34 Marx, Results of  the immediate Process of  Production in Capital 1, pp. 1062-3 107 
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Specifically it is constituted by the form of human productive activity specific to 
that society: abstract social labour. This is why one relation, in the realm of 
production is more essential than another relation, in the realm of exchange. It  is 
simply because production itself  is more fundamental than exchange.  Marx has a 
hierarchy of relations dependent on their ontological sphere. Thus human 
productive activity bequeaths the relations governing it their fundamental 
importance. 
Despite her best intentions, in separating out human productive activity as 
simply a property of concrete human individuals rather than their very nature, 
Gould gives too much away to those who operate from a different epistemological 
and ontological  perspective.  It might seem churlish to  criticise  Gould's 
underestimation of the importance of labour in Marx's social ontology, since, in 
noting the dominant role of human productive activity in Marx's schema she 
outlines a labour theory of cause which, she suggests, is implicit in comments in 
the Grundrisse. It is important to state what may be at stake here. If such a 
theory succeeds it appears to  add weight to the traditional Marxist argument that 
it is labour that provides the substance to which exchangeable commodities are 
commensurable. I would want to sustain the traditional argument in the realm of 
political economy, but the labour theory of cause seems to me to be flawed. In 
particular it seems as if  Gould, under pressure from the widespread attacks on the 
labour theory of  value, restrains Marx's ontology in her attempt to defend it. This 
entails making labour not just the value producing element but also the only 
causal element in 'the working up of  a world of objects.' 
Gould on the 'Labour theory of  Cause' 
In her discussion of  the labour theory of  cause Gould claims that: 
on Marx's view only human agency, or what Marx calls labour is properly 
regarded as causal. The objective conditions for action are precisely that, 
namely conditions and not causes. Furthermore, they  become conditions for 
labouring activity only insofar as agents have to take them into account in 
order to realise their purposes.35 
This is a difficult position to sustain. If  it is Marx's, then so much the worse for 
Marx. But I hope to show that it is not and that some of Marx's insights into the 
nature of  the social world rely  on the sort of  considerations I will outline. 
Let us begin with the distinction Gould draws between causes and conditions.  On 
35 Gould, Marx's Social Ontology, p. 81. 108 
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this account, human labour is the unique causal agency and the outside world 
simply provides the conditions under which events take place. There are two 
counter examples to this. First it implies that before human history began, 
nothing took place. It certainly may be a  Marxist contention that nothing 
interesting happened until Homo erectus  stood  erect,  though  even this  is 
disputable. It may also be the case that it required a knowing agent to observe the 
external world in order to grant it any significance and this is implied by the 
mediation of the man-nature relation by human activity. But to suggest that the 
unknowable is also nonexistent seems to be an unwarranted conflation of ontology 
and epistemology. 
The second problem with Gould's account of the nature of social reality lies in the 
exclusion of  the non human world from the basic entities of social reality. Perhaps 
the most objective set of conditions, which human technology looks unlikely ever 
to bring under its control is the set of  meteorological conditions. Yet Gould seems 
to be committed to saying that, for example, thunderstorms cannot 'properly (be) 
regarded as causal', and that statements such as 'the rain caused the landslide', 
are somehow improper. But such a causal statement seems to have the same if 
not more force as the oft repeated statement of electoral folklore that 'the rain 
caused the landslide victory'. Intuitively, the first case seems a straightforward 
explanation specifying in sufficient detail the mechanism underlying a particular 
event. In the second and more social case, the folklore is usually corroborated by a 
description of  the coinciding class bias of  both voting habits and car ownership so 
that parties 'of the bourgeoisie' are supposed to do better in elections when it rains. 
Thus as a condition that is taken into account by human agents, the rain enters 
into a causal explanation, as a condition That sort of explanation appears to need 
just such corroboration because, in this instance, the intervention of the non-
human world appears as a condition and not as a cause. But the overall adequacy 
of the explanation does not appear to be problematic in the first case. It  is difficult 
to avoid concluding that Gould has detected a distinction without a difference, 
between conditions and causes. 
What Gould seems to be pursuing is an argument in which non-human causal 
chains only impinge on human interaction when they interact with those actions, 
and then they can be characterised as 'objective conditions' rather than parts of 
causal chains.  These objective conditions, for Gould are 'conditions for labouring 
activity only insofar as agents have to take them into account in order to realise 
their purposes.'  It may be that there is a continuum from causing X to being an 
objective condition for X, depending on what description we take ofX. But Gould's 
schema rules out in advance the possibility that any thing other than human 109 
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agency can be causal. Further more, the suggestion that the contribution of the 
non human world, whether it be causal or conditional is dependent on 'agents 
hav[ing] to take them into account' seems perilously close to the Humean 
insistence that necessity only exists in the mind, and not in objects. On a realist 
assumption of the objective existence of  modalities of causality and necessity, it is 
clearly problematic. 
Furthermore, it is certainly Marx's view, at least early on, that nature is a part of 
human activity: 
Just as plants, animals, stone, air light etc constitute theoretically a part of 
human consciousness, partly as objects of natural science, party as objects 
of art - his spiritual inorganic nature, spiritual nourishment which he must 
first prepare to make palatable and digestible - so  also in the realm of 
practice they constitute a part of life and human activity. The universality 
of man appears in practice precisely in the universality which makes all 
nature his inorganic body36 
Interpreters of Marx may have had a technocratic and domineering attitude to 
nature, and may be susceptible to a critique influenced by environmentalism. But 
it is not clear that Marx is open to the same attack.  This is especially the case if 
we adopt a conception of  humanity interacting productively with nature as argued 
above. 
The formal and real subsumption of  labour under capital 
Marx gives a clear account of the imposition of specific social relations on the 
social matrix outlined above. In a paper which makes use of recently released 
original  source material from  MEGA,  White notes the importance of the 
Schellingian notion of subsumption in the transition from the earliest work in 
Marx's critique of  political economy to Capital itself. This refers to; 
the progressive reconstruction of all previously existing society and 
economic forms on the capitalist model, or what Marx termed a  form 
'adequate' to Capital. The Hegelian term implied that as it circulated capital 
would progressively become more rational by eliminating any element 
which was at odds with its own essence or nature. Marx's implication was 
that in this respect capital would act like a Hegelian Concept.37 
36 Marx,  'Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844' CW 3 p. 275. 
37 White J., 'Marx: From The Critique Of  Political Economy to Capital', Studies in 
Marxism  1 (1994), p. 91. 110 
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But, White argues, the Hegelian parallel is not exact because while the Hegelian 
concept becomes adequate to itself, Marx wants a term to describe the process 
wherein the concept makes something else adequate to itself.  Consequently, it is 
perhaps easier to encapsulate this process as the progressive and dynamic 
enforming of alien matter. For Marx, it was not only economic phenomena that 
were subsumed under Capital but  'many things are subsumed under capital 
which do not seem to belong to it conceptually' That is, some things relatively 
remote from capital and neither 'posited by it' or 'presupposed by it', could be 
subsumed under it.  38.  The process of subsumption of matter under form is also 
characteristic of Feudalism, according to an untranslated fragment of the 
notebooks for  Capital since 'even relations which are very remote from the 
essence offeudalism take on a feudal expression'39 
The subsumption of labour under capital works both intensively and extensively. 
It extends by overcoming non-capitalist communities and transferring their 
members into proletarians and capitalists. It changes the meaning of the 
productive process, intensively, by bring more and more spheres of productive 
activity under the sway of capital.  In the 'Results of  the immediate process of 
production', the only surviving fully translated part of the third draft of the critique 
of political economy which Marx began in 1863, he distinguishes between the 
formal and real subsumption of labour under capital. The first, formal step is 
defined as 'the takeover by capital of a mode of labour developed before the 
emergence of capitalist relations.'40 Capital takes over the feudal labour process, 
although: 
this change does not in itself  imply a fundamental change in the real nature 
of  the labour process, the actual process of production. On the contrary, the 
fact is that capital subsumes the labour process as it finds it, that is to say, 
it takes over an existing labour process, developed by different and more 
archaic modes of  production. 41 
The formal subsumption has both similarities and differences to the real 
subsumption of  labour under capital. The relative and formal freedom of capitalist 
social relations vis a vis feudal relations is a feature of  both the formal and the real 
sUbsumption of labour:  'a mode of compulsion not based on personal relations of 
domination and dependency, but simply on differing economic functions - this is 
38  Marx, Grundrisse, p. 513. 
39 MEGA 1113.6., p. 2180, cited in White Glasgow 1994 
40 'Results of  the immediate Process of  Production' in Capital 1, p.1021. 
41 'Results of  the immediate Process of  Production' in Capital 1, p.1021. common to both.' 42 
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But there is a crucial difference, in that under the formal subsumption of labour 
under capital the only method of  increasing the production of surplus value is by 
increasing absolute, rather than relative surplus value, by lengthening the 
working day. The power of capital is thus of  restricted penetration since it has not 
yet reached the heart of the social entity - the productive process. In contrast the 
real subsumption of labour under capital stems from large scale industry and a 
transformation of the labour process permits the widespread pursuit of relative 
surplus value: 
The real subsumption of  labour under capital is developed in all the forms 
evolved by relative as opposed to absolute surplus value.  43 
As the dominant capitalist relation finds fertile soil for its development in the 
productive process, so the productive process itself subtends the dominant social 
relation: 
On the one hand, capitalist production now establishes itself as a mode of 
production sui generis  and brings into being a  new mode  of material 
production. On the other hand the latter itself forms the basis to the 
development of capitalist relations whose  adequate form,  therefore, 
presupposes a definite stage in the evolution of the productive forces of 
labour 44 
It  is the harmoniousness of  the relation between the productive process on the one 
hand and the form under which it takes place on the other, which generates the 
development of a specifically capitalist mode of production.  Equally, it is the 
potential contradiction between these two; the organs and the skeletal structure 
of the capitalist organism, which poses problems for the entity, in Marx's theory. 
For the subsumption of labour under capital has its opposite: the process by 
which capital loses its grip, and the spheres of activity which it had dominated 
become increasingly 'other' to it. This is parallel to the process of decay of the 
capitalist social organism. 
42 'Results of  the immediate Process of  Production' in  Capital 1, p. 102l. 
43 'Results of the immediate Process of  Production' in  Capital 1, p.  1021 
44 'Results of  the immediate Process of  Production' in Capital 1 ,p. 1035. Introduction 
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In his critique of the classical political economists, Marx is at pains to show that 
much of  their account is derived from a belief  in natural economic laws, such as, in 
the case of Ricardo, the natural law of diminishing returns and the Malthusian 
population principle.  The driving assumption behind such views is that the social 
form of capitalism is universal and permanent, since the properties of capitalist 
society are taken to be the properties of all societies. Against the classical school, 
Marx takes it to be a social organism with a finite (but not necessarily specifiable) 
life span. When he argues in such a manner, Marx restates ancient beliefs about 
the transitory nature of existence and the eternal nature of change.  In particular, 
there are strong parallels between Marx's account of the decline and eventual fall 
of capitalism, and the Aristotelian message that all sublunary entities come to be 
and pass away. These parallels are often only implicit, but sometimes, and 
especially in the Grundrisse,  they are manifest and explicit. Even when only 
implicit, they are sufficiently striking to allow us to recognise that Marx's account 
of the crisis ridden and ultimately doomed perspective for capitalism, overlooked 
by his protagonists, is but a variant of the Aristotelian theory of passing away or 
phtlwra. These parallels will form the basis of this chapter, which makes the case 
that Marx employs ontological categories particularly suited to explaining the 
decay of social forms. 
Because it is rooted in his ontology, the notion of decay in his work is not simply a 
useful analogy with the organic world or, as in Elster's characterisation of his 
analysis of  crisis, a 'visionary image of  the decline and fall of the capitalist mode of 
production'l but an exposition of his Aristotelian social ontology. Understanding 
Marx's thinking in this manner also undermines Elster's claim that Marx was so 
certain of the downfall of capitalism and its replacement that he did not provide 
satisfactory arguments for it: 'If  his theory fails to persuade us, it is no doubt 
because he himself was so persuaded of the necessity of communism that he did 
not feel an argument was needed.'2 So Marx's account is the product of his mind 
set, rather than of a rigorous argument. This is an overly harsh verdict on Marx's 
actual practice, but, even if it was accurate, we might want to know what it was 
that provides Marx with this persuasive mind set, and whether it is indeed a 
psychological surrogate for an argument. As we have already seen, what counts 
as a persuasive argument is not ontology independent, since criteria of plausibility 
depend on what questions are posed, and the posing of questions is bound up with 
lEister, Making Sense of  Marx, p. 156. 
2 Elster, Making Sense of  Marx, p. 513. 113 
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ontologIcal commItments. If  the crItique that Marx provides of the classical 
political economists is, from one angle, a clash of two incompatible assumptions; 
the  permanence  of capitalism on the  one  hand  and the certainty of its 
replacement on the other, then it is worth investigating just what ontological 
commitments are bound up in such opposing  views. The grounding of Marx's 
assumption was his Aristotelian understanding of the  principle that every 
sublunary being is necessarily destined to pass away. This perspective can be 
assessed, but only if  we follow the line of  thought that leads to it. 
Aristotle on phthora 
In Classical Greek philosophy, phthora is the end of the process of kinesis,3  and 
so it is the correlative of  genesis; coming to be. In the case of the Parminidean on 
(the one) or the Platonic eide (forms), we are dealing with conceptions of beings 
that have no kinesis. As a result, neither in the case ofParmenidean on nor for the 
Platonic eide  can there be  either genesis  nor phthora.  But Aristotle was 
unsympathetic to both the Parmenidean position and to Plato's eide  and so, 
against them, he provides an account of decay, or phthora as the counterpart of 
genesis.4  This account occurs in many of his works, most obviously in On 
Generation and Decay but also in the biological treatises and in the Meteorology. 
Aristotle begins On Generation and Decay by distinguishing his position from two 
earlier views of  genesis andphthora, that of  the Monists, in particular Parmenides, 
and that of the Atomists, in particular Democritus.  The Monists, hold that there 
is only the on (the one) and that this suffers no quantitative change. This is 
because that which is, cannot not be, and that which is not, cannot be (and cannot 
be  known). They are therefore impelled to  reduce genesis  and phthora  to 
qualitative change in a single substance.5 
The Atomists, hold a variant of the principle of the Pluralists, that genesis and 
phthora are different from changes of  quality, and explain them by the association 
3 kinesis is normally translated as motion, movement, or change. Parmenides 
attacked all forms of change because he denied the possibility of the void, and so 
seems to deprive body of a place into which to move. 
4  There is some question over the best translation of  phthora; whether it should be 
rendered as  passing-away, corruption or decay. The last two have more of the 
organic connotation often associated with phthora, but the first better captures 
the specifically philosophical meaning of substantial change into  non-be~ng. 
However  it is odd to translate nominal words in Greek by verbal forms SInce 
Greek la~k the multiplicity of  nominal verbs that English pos~esses. Therefore it 
seems appropriate to try to mimic the Greek form when nommals are ~sed. For 
further  comments  see  Williams,  C.  J.  F.,  Aristotle's  D.e  Genera~lone and 
Corruptione (Oxford, 1982), p. ix-x.: 'Greek no more than English h.as a SIngle w~rd 
to express the concept ceasing to be. It is its possession of a SIngle .word, \l.e. 
genesis, J.P.) which English lacks, for coming to be which creates philosophIcal 
problems.' (p. x). 
5 Aristotle, On Generation and  Decay, 1. 1. 114 
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and segregation of atoms.  6 In  Aristotle's theory, genesis and phthora are forms of 
substantial change; coming to be, and passing away simpliciter,  rather than 
coming to be something, and so they are distinguished from accidental  change, 
against Parmenides. But, against Democritus, they are also distinguished from 
incremental changes through aggregation and segregation: 
Nevertheless, coming to be simpliciter ie. absolutely, is not defined by 
aggregation and segregation as  some  say, nor is change in what is 
continuous the same as alteration ...  coming to be and ceasing to be 
simpliciter, occur, not in virtue of aggregation but when something changes 
from this whole to that whole.7 
However, this holist account of  genesis and phthora is more than a rehash of the 
distinction between substantial and accidental change, since it is specifically 
designed to provide an account of the way in which entities decay, rather than 
merely fitting them into philosophical categories. It  is an exposition of the internal 
decay of an entity, which comes into play when the cause of maintenance in an 
entity is weak or absent. Just what this cause of maintenance in an entity is, will 
differ along the same cleavage as the important Aristotelian distinction between 
organisms and artifacts. The line demarcating artifacts and organisms is between 
those entities whose source of  maintenance is internal, and those whose source is 
external. Whilst a chair is put together by a carpenter, using tools and glue, living 
organisms are kept whole from an internal source, as Aristotle pointed out in his 
disagreement with Empedocles in On the Soul. Empedocles suggested that growth 
in plants was to be explained by two opposite natural tendencies; the roots 
travelled downwards because of the natural tendency of earth to travel downward 
and the upward branching was caused by the similar natural tendency of fire to 
move upwards. Why, asks Aristotle is the plant not ripped apart by these two 
opposing tendencies?: 
We must ask what is the force that holds together the earth and the fire 
which tend to travel in contrary  directions; if there is no counteracting 
force, they will be torn asunder; if there is, this must be the soul and the 
cause of  nutrition and growth.  8 
The soul, on this account, is the unifying and cohesive element that enables the 
organism to persist over time. But the presence in natural entities of an internal 
cause of maintenance does not mean that such entities will last for ever. On the 
6 Aristotle, On Generation and Decay 1. 2. 
7 Aristotle, On Generation and  Decay 317a  18. 
8 Aristotle, On the Soul 415b 23 - 416a  9. contrary, all natural bodies are finite and short lived: 
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for there is an order controlling all things and every time i.e. every life is 
measured by a period. Not all of  them, however are measured by the same 
period but some by a smaller and others by a larger one; for to some of them 
the period which is their measure is a year, while to some it is longer and to 
others shorter.  9 
When their time is up, these natural things cease to be, in one of two ways. They 
can be destroyed by an external agent, or they can pass away through the 
breakdown of the internal  mechanism that secures their persistence. The first 
sort of passing away, is less intrinsically interesting than the second since it is not 
in keeping with the essential nature of the organism. In fact,  the violent 
destruction of an organism is sometimes argued to be an archetype of accidental 
change and is thus, on an Aristotelian reading, inexplicable, since no knowledge is 
possible of what takes place by accident. Instead, knowledge is confined to what 
happens always or for the most part. More interesting is the manner of the 
ceasing to be of all natural things that do not come to a violent end. This is what 
Aristotle means by phthora. It is the non-accidental way in which an entity 
changes 'from this whole to that whole': 
Putresence is the end of all these things, that is of all natural objects, 
except such as are destroyed by violence: you can burn, for instance, flesh 
bone, or anything else but the natural course of their destruction ends in 
putrefaction. Hence things that putrefy begin by being moist and end by 
being dry. For the moist and the dry were their matter and the operation of 
the active qualities caused the dry  to be determined by the moist.10 
But there is a paradox involved in this account, as Clark points out;  11 although 
decay is part of the natural scheme of things, it is not, in itself, a natural 
phenomenon; 'all weakness in animals, such as old age and decay is unnatural.'12 
On one hand, Aristotle sees the endless cycle of generation and decay as natural, 
on the other hand, he sees the growth into its highest form  as the natural 
development of an organism, and phthora, as a denial of  this growth, as unnatural. 
The paradox can be resolved by looking at two senses of  '  natural'. First, the sense 
in which what is natural, is what is an inevitable part of the natural world, and 
9 Aristotle  On Generation and  Decay 336b 11f., see also Metaphysics XIV 1093a 
4ft'., On t~  Heavens  279a 23ff., and Generation of Animals 777b 16ff. 
10 Aristotle, Meteorowgy 379a 5. 
11 Clark, S. L. R., Aristotle's Man (Oxford, 1975) p. 165. 
12  Aristotle, On the Heavens 288b 15f. 116 
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second, the sense that takes the most natural form of the organism in question to 
be its mature form, or its best form; the most adequate form for fulfillin  'ts tela  g 1  S. 
In this sense, a healthy, fit, adult is the most natural form of human being, rather 
than a corpse, since that is no form of the organism at all. A corpse is, in fact. not 
a man since it lacks the integrating life provided by the soul. Aristotle uses this 
second sense when he argues against Democritus' atomism, in the Parts of 
Animals: 
Does then, configuration and colour constitute the essence of the various 
animals and of  their several parts? For if  so, what Democritus says will be 
correct. For such appears to be his notion. At any rate he says that it is 
evident to everyone what form it is that makes the man, seeing that he is 
recognisable by his shape and colour. And yet a dead body has exactly the 
same configuration as a living one; but for all that is not a man.13 
One way of clearing the paradox is to argue that decay is natural with respect to 
the matter kata ten hulen, but unnatural with regard to the form kata to eidos,14 
and this solution to the question over the naturalness of phthora also gives us 
clues as to what sort of  process Aristotle thinks it  is. Since all sensible entities are 
considered by Aristotle to be hylomorphic; composed of both matter and form, and 
phthora is a process that occurs internally; within entities, it makes sense to 
suggest that it is likely to involve this very contrast between matter and form. 
And this is, indeed, what Aristotle suggests. For him, phthora  is the process by 
which matter exerts itself over, and triumphs over the form.  So,  when the 
determining form of an entity fails to exert itself over the determined matter, its 
natural life span is coming to an end, so that 'Destruction supervenes when the 
determined gets the better of  the determining by the help of the environment.'15 
The normal direction of determination is one in which form determines matter. 
Conceptually, this notion is fairly straight  forward, by analogy with the imposition 
of a form over formless matter by some external agent; as, for instance, when a 
sculptor turns stone into a statue. In that case, the form of the statue determines 
which material elements of the marble block stay together, and which are 
discarded, no longer part of  the statue itself. The idea of the form in the sculptor's 
mind enables him to organise and construct relations between different parts of 
the material stuff which makes up the statue. In the case of natural organisms, 
the process is, in some respects, similar but the external agent is removed and the 
form  directly organises the matter. Phthora, however, is a  consequence of a 
13 Aristotle, Parts of  Animals 640b 130 ff. 
14 Clarke, Aristotle's Man p. 166. 
15Aristotle, Meteorology 379a 11ff. reversal of  this normal directionality. 
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This case of matter determining and, eventually, eroding form, is less immediately 
comprehensible.  Why should it be that matter interferes with form to the 
eventual necessary destruction of that form?  Aristotle's answer consists in 
pointing out that entities come into being out of material that is 'contrary' to the 
form,  since 'everything that comes to be, comes into being from its contrary and 
passes away likewise into a  substrate by the action of the contrary into the 
contrary.'16 This is the case, despite the Aristotelian observation that form is the 
very aspect of the entity that marks it out as this thing. 
Entities are formed out of the material substrate and return back to it, as matter 
is enformed and then loses its form. But phtlwra differs from coming to be, 
because it is not an action of the entity but rather something to be suffered, since 
it does not necessarily involve movement or action from an external agent: 
In time, all things come into being and pass away ... nothing comes into 
being without itself moving somehow and acting but a  thing can be 
destroyed even if  it does not move at all.17 
Why does Aristotle argue that this reduction into its material components is a 
necessary feature of the life of entities? The case of natural organisms is the 
clearest example of this tendency in Aristotle thought, and the objection that he 
makes to Empedocles' account of the nature of plants provides a clue. Whilst 
Aristotle objects that the account offered by Empedocles fails to explain why the 
plant does not fly apart, and amends this account by positing the unifying 
capacity of the soul, it would presumably be true to argue that in the absence of 
the soul, such destruction would, indeed, take place. It  is when the unifying of  the 
diverse elements fails, that the organic entity decays, since the elements which go 
to form the entity each have their 'proper place' and the unifying form must 
eventually fail to constrain theses elements: 
The incapacities of  animals, age, decay, and the like are all unnatural due, it 
seems, to the fact that the whole animal complex is made up of material 
which differ in respect of  their proper places, and no single part occupies its 
own place. If, therefore, that which is primary contains nothing unnatural, 
being simple and unmixed and in its proper place and having no contrary, 
then it has no place for incapacity, nor, consequently for retardation or, 
16 Aristotle, On the Heavens 270a 23f. 
17 Aristotle, Physics  IV, 222b 19f. since acceleration involves retardation, for acceleration.  IS 
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The matter that goes up to make an organism then, is neutral; 'simple and 
unmixed' in a way that the unified organism is not. When a unified organism 
imposes form on this matter, the material is dislocated; removed from its proper 
place, and this sets up the dynamic tension that will eventually lead to the decay 
of the whole organism. In the end, the organism is bound to die, because of the 
nature of  the matter from which it  is composed. This is what D. Williams calls 
the obscure but important Aristotelian suggestion  ... that matter is , as it 
were, a  real entity but a  negative entity, like a  negative charge or a 
negative number, which neutralises and obliterates, saps and subtracts 
from, a local quota of  form. 19 
So the notion of  phtJwra rests on the tension between matter and form, and the 
lack of congruity between them. It stems from the multiplicity of elements that go 
to make up the unified being. 
There is an exceptional case in the general account of organic hylomorphism 
where form and matter are not congruous from the very beginning of the entity. 
This  exception to the normal  course  of things  is  how  Aristotle  explains 
monstrosities or freaks of nature. These are the results when the formal nature 
has not mastered the material nature. Nevertheless, the assertion of matter over 
form in this case still permits even the monstrosities to be conceived of as in some 
sense natural. 
whenever things occur contrary to the established order but still always in 
a  certain way and not at random, the results seems to be less of a 
monstrosity because even that which is contrary to nature is in a certain 
sense according to nature, whenever, that is, the formal nature has not 
mastered the material nature.20 
This exceptional case is however, coherent with the general account of coming to 
be and passing away as the enforming of  matter, and the subsequent throwing off 
of the form. The case of a monstrosity is a special case only in that the form fails 
fully to appropriate the matter. 
18 Aristotle, On the Heavens 288b 15f. 
19 Williams, D. C., 'Form and Matter, If Philosophical Review  67 (1958) 499-521, 
p.502. 
20 Aristotle, On the Generation of  Animals 770b 16f. 119 
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Generation and Decay needs to be considered. He argues that, since the heavenly 
bodies are in eternal motion, the sun approaches and move away from any fixed 
pint on the earth's surface, and it is this that produces eternal generation, but this 
motion of the sun must be divided into two if it is to explain both genesis and 
phthorci. Aristotle points to an explanation of these two phenomenon by virtue of 
the two halves of  the motion of  the sun in an ellipse. Successive approaches of the 
sun cause the development  of organisms  to  their mature form,  whereas 
successive retreats cause them to decay. This movement sets a limit on the life of 
animals, and explains their successive maturity and decline. In  Marx's discussion 
of the decay of  social organisms, this role of  the sun approaching and retreating is 
played by production and consumption, so that in more than one way is it true 
that,as Marx puts it in the German Ideology:  'In direct contrast to German 
philosophy which descends from heaven to earth, here it is a matter of ascending 
from earth to heaven.'21 
It is important to note that Aristotle's account of the subversive effect that 
matter has upon form is outlined in the biological treatises, and the metaphysics, 
rather than in his Politics or Ethics. For the picture is somewhat different there. 
Aristotle's account of  the state is indeed both organic and hylomorphic, but it does 
not involve a positing of  phthorci.  In fact, the opposite tends to be true, as Barker 
indicates in his commentary on the Politics: 
Generally it may be answered,  Aristotle does assume congruity [between 
matter and form (J.P.)]: the end for the sake of which movement arises 
finds a necessary material suited to itself and to movement towards itself. 
But it  is not always so: a matter may exist that is not congruent with form, 
and that matter may limit the extent to which movement attains its form. 
In politics, the primary matter may be so rude, that the movement from it 
never reaches a constitution, but stops at a tribal state; or again, it may be 
less rude, but yet so imperfect, that the movement, while attaining a 
constitution, attains a 'perverted' constitution.22 
Aristotle's assumption of congruity in the Politics is at least a partial explanation 
of certain aspects of his political thought; the justification of slavery and the 
attitude that he takes to women, for example. It is one source of the relatively 
conservative nature of his political thought. But the opposite assumption, of 
dis congruity, in his writings on the metaphysics of organisms is at least equally 
significant, and it is this assumption that is implicated in later developments of 
21 Marx, K, The German Ideology in  CW 5, p. 36. 
22 Barker, E., The Political Thought of  Plato and Aristotle (London, 1906) p. 220. 120 
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the hy omorp  c conception of orgamc socIal entities that is present in Marx. In 
this way, the Critique of  Hegel's Doctrine of  the State is a surrogate for a critique of 
Aristotle's Politics, where the same assumptions of the congruity of essence and 
existence are expressed.  For Aristotle and Hegel, the state acts as a terminus for 
the human struggle to be free, but for Marx, the contradiction between form and 
matter requires a different model of freedom, conceived as the realisation of the 
human essence through the transformation of the limiting conditions imposed by 
the external world. That transformation of the social form that governs social 
matter, only arises on the assumption of discongruity in the first place. Here, 
Marx uses Aristotle against himself, implicitly posing the account of phtlwra 
against the static conservatism of the Politics. 
Marx's Conception of the Decay of Social Organisms 
It will be readily admitted that Marx saw bourgeois society as a temporary 
phenomenon; and that it would cease to be. But is there any evidence that he 
employed the Aristotelian account of phthora in outlining its process of ceasing to 
be? 
First, it might be helpful to indicate what sort of questions this perspective is 
directed at. Did Marx consider bourgeois society to be analogous to an organism? 
Was he aware of the notion of  phthora that Aristotle and the ancients employed? 
Did he distinguish between form and matter in a quasi-Aristotelian way?  and 
finally,  does his actual prognosis for capitalism marry up to the Aristotelian 
account of  phthora? If, as I shall show, the answer to these questions is a virtually 
unqualified affirmative, then the substantive thesis that Marx borrows the 
outlines of  his social ontology from Aristotle will emerge strengthened. 
The attraction of Marx for organic terminology is manifested throughout his 
works. Phenomena are constantly described as 'unripe' or 'ripe', 'healthy or 'rotten' 
and such terms as 'womb', 'gestation' and 'senescence' recur throughout the early 
works and in what Engels called the 'thick books' of political economy.  The 
Critique of  Hegel's Philosophy of  Right enthusiastically endorses the idea that 
social structures should be viewed as organisms or organic wholes, and often 
describes them in this way. But it is particularly in the Grundrisse that Marx's 
continual turn to organic terminology is at its most prevalent and he manifests his 
commitment to an organic mode of explanation explicitly and systematically. His 
account of the totality of the bourgeois system is an account of the inter-linking 
elements of an organic whole, and a reiteration of the Schellingian process of 
subsumption, which he uses in the account of  the real and formal subsumption of 
labour under capital. It is, as in the Aristotelian account of genesis, the notion of 121 
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the su sumIng of disparate moments; under one overall principle that makes a 
system complete: 
While  in  the  completed  bourgeois  system  every economic  relation 
presupposes every other in its bourgeois form, and everything posited is 
thus also a presupposition, this is the case with any organic system. This 
organic system itself,  as a  totality, has its presuppositions,  and its 
development to its totality consists precisely in subordinating all elements 
of society to itself, or in creating out of it  the organs which it still lacks. This 
is historically how it becomes a totality.23 
In  this dimension of  totality, and its consequent conceptualisation as an organism, 
the bourgeois system differs from preceding forms;  as is plain from  Marx's 
analysis of  pre-capitalist social forms. 24 The key process in this is the separation 
of labour from its conditions of production, which makes the bourgeois system 
more complete, and more comprehensively organic than previously existing 
systems. For Marx, capitalism was an organic form of society par  excellence. 
Phthora in  the Grundrisse 
Marx was familiar with the Aristotelian texts that contain references to the 
processes  of passing away,  since  he cites many of them in his  Doctoral 
Dissertation and in the notebooks on the philosophy of Epicurus. What is more, he 
discusses phthora in detail in the Grundrisse, where he uses the notion of the 
tension between matter and form to explain the special qualities of labour that lie 
at the heart of  his exposition of the labour theory of value in Capital. This mode of 
explanation works at both a micro level, where it refers to the need for a principle 
of maintenance in the products of past human labour, and on the macro level, 
where Marx conceives of  the capitalist organism as positing its own limits through 
the eventual restriction of production which constitutes the decay of that 
organism. 
In Capital  Marx begins his exposition with simple commodity production and 
embarks on a search for the value adding element in capitalist production, going 
through a conceptual strip-tease before fixing on labour as this special commodity. 
It  is the special qualities of  labour, he argues, that allows the transition from  M-
C-M to M-C-M', that is fundamental to the structuring of the capitalist social 
form.  This is because of the special qualities that labour possesses as a value 
adding element in the production process. But the way in which Marx encountered 
these special qualities of labour, is not necessarily parallel to his exposition of 
23 Marx,  Grundrisse  p. 278. 
24 See Marx,  Grundrisse  p.471-514. 122 
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where he distinguishes, as we have seen between the mode of presentation and the 
mode of  inquiry. In fact, Marx is already confident that he has found this value 
adding element, having investigated the ontological nature of labour in the 
Grundrisse. 
So  the account of the special qualities of labour that Marx lays out in the 
Grundrisse provides the foundation for the account of commodity production in 
Capital.  One section from Notebook Three in particular, gives  a  profound 
understanding of what it was that Marx saw as so special about the nature of 
labour and its role in the simple productive process, but it is out of place, because 
of the slightly disorganised way that the Grundrisse presents work in progress. 
Marx reminds us, and himself, that the discussion he presents of the special 
quality of  labour should have been incorporated into the discussion of  production in 
general that he outlines in the 1857 Introduction, noting that: '(all this belongs 
already in the first chapter on production in general.),25 From this point of view, 
the distinctive approach to the account of the general productive process indicates 
the posits and constraints which flow  from the combination of an unstated 
ontology derived from Aristotle and a critique of classical political economy. 
So  the account of the special qualities of labour that Marx lays out in the 
Grundrisse provides the foundation for the account of commodity production in 
Capital.  One section from Notebook Three in particular, gives  a  profound 
understanding of what it was that Marx saw as so special about the nature of 
labour and its role in the simple productive process, but it is out of  place, because 
of the slightly disorganised way that the Grundrisse presents work in progress. 
Marx reminds us, and himself, that the discussion he presents of the special 
quality of  labour should have been incorporated into the discussion of production in 
general that he outlines in the 1857 Introduction, noting that: '(all this belongs 
already in the first chapter on production in general.)'  26 From this point of view, 
the distinctive approach to the  account of the general productive process 
indicates the posits and constraints which flow  from the combination of an 
unstated ontology derived from Aristotle and a  critique of classical political 
economy. 
The basic model of the simple production process that Marx has in mind, is of the 
manipulation of raw materials with tools, working up objects until they are of an 
appropriate form for consumption that satisfies human needs. Marx looks at this 
25 Marx, Grundrisse p. 360. 
26 Marx, Grundrisse p.360. 123 
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process In detaIl, and stage by stage. In particular, he freezes it at an intermediate 
point to look at partially worked up objects, and to investigate their constitution 
and prospects. Partially worked up objects, beyond mere raw materials, but not 
yet consumable use values, present a number of problems. They would appear to 
have value by virtue of the past labour that has been employed in them. But this 
itself is problematic: 'objectified labour time exists in a one-side, objective form, in 
which as a mere thing it is at the prey of chemical decayetc.'27  The process of 
phthora threatens these objects; they are liable to decay, in which the past labour 
used up in them is wasted. Recalling that decay is a result of the tension between 
matter and form, and reminding himself of some Aristotelian metaphysics at the 
same time, Marx analyses these partially worked up objects as follows: 
There is an indifference on the part of the substance [Stoff]  toward the 
form,  which develops out of merely objectified labour time, in whose 
objective existence labour has become the merely vanished, external form of 
its natural substance,  existing merely in the external form  of the 
substantial [das Stoffliche](eg. the form of the table for wood, of the form of 
the cylinder for iron); no immanent law of  reproduction maintains this form 
in the way in which the tree for example maintains its form as  a tree (wood 
maintains itself in the specific form of the tree because this form is a form 
of the wood while the form of the table is accidental for wood and not the 
intrinsic form of its substance): it exists only as a form external to the 
substance, or it exists only as a  substance [stofflich] The dissolution to 
which its substance is prey  therefore dissolves the form as well.28 
Because artifacts are unlike the wood that composes trees, they are sUQject to 
decay, and the dead labour that would give them value is vulnerable to the same 
processes. Because there is no immanent law that unifies the form and matter 
contained in these objects, they are caught in a half way house between being 
products and raw materials. As such they are unpreserved, and deficient in use 
value.  In the absence of  labour, 'the use value of cotton and twist, material and 
form would be botched; it  would be destroyed instead of  produced.  '29 
27 Marx, Grundrisse  p. 360. 
28 Marx, Grondrisse p. 360. Note that both Nicolaus and McLellan translate Stoff 
and its variants in this passage as substance, rather than matter or stuff, 
although the German word allows both translations. The fre9uent ~ccurrence of 
the term is marked; cf.  Dietz Verlag edition p. 266. The philosophl~al. co~tra~t 
though, might be rendered clearer by using the latter term: The distinction IS 
important, because matter is a mass noun and does not permIt a plur~,  whe~eas 
substance does. Hence 'a matter' is incomprehensible, but 'a substance IS straIght 
forward  .. 
29 Marx, Grundrisse p. 361. 12-± 
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ThIs contrast,  etween the relations between form and matter that apply to 
artifacts and the different relations that apply to natural organisms, is drawn 
straight from Aristotle.  30 The key distinction that Marx makes, between artifacts 
and organisms, and the categories that he employs; form, matter, and immanent 
law are deeply implicated in Aristotle's metaphysics. Marx's problem: how to 
make sense of the preservation of value in the partially worked up objects of the 
labour process, only makes sense on the basis of the Aristotelian distinction 
between natural organisms and artifacts, and this distinction is fundamentally 
between two different types of relation between matter and form. His search for 
something to take the pace of the immanent law of reproduction that organisms 
contain within themselves, is a search for an activity or principle that fills out an 
Aristotelian category. The importance of  the distinction in Aristotle can hardly be 
overestimated. Perhaps the most clear exposition of the distinction comes from 
the second book of  the Physics: 
Of things that exist, some exist by nature, some from other causes. "By 
nature" the animals and their parts exist and the plants and the simple 
bodies (earth, fire, air and water) -for we say that these things and the like 
exist "by nature.  " 
All the things mentioned present a feature in which they differ from things 
which are not constituted by nature. Each of them has within itself a 
principle of motion and of stationariness (in respect of place, or of growth 
and decrease, or by way of alteration). On the other hand a bed and a coat 
and anything else of that sort, qua receiving these designations -i.e. in so 
far as they are products of art -have no innate impulse to change.31 
What is missing from artifacts is, then, just this principle of preservation and 
change; of growth and decrease, that organisms possess, of their nature, simply 
because they are constituted by nature. The special quality of labour, on which 
Marx sets so much store, is precisely that it fills this role.  In order to bring 
partially worked up objects into being as objects with a use value, they need to be 
posited as moments of living labour. It is living labour, an irreducibly teleological 
30 Gould argues that the distinctive form of  labour in this respect is an example ?f 
the Hegelian notion of determinate negation: that a given stage or. moment IS 
negated by being preserved in a new or higher form (~uld,  Marx 's ~ocwl  Ontology 
p.57). But this is a  second order concept, answerIng the questIon of how the 
previous stage is preserved, not why it is in need of preservation. The reason for 
introducing this special quality of  labour is that it is necessa:y for Marx to fill the 
role played by the soul as the unifying activity in organIsms that ~taves off 
phthora  and so it relies on the Aristotelian distinction between artifacts and 
organis~s. Subsuming the two different sources of unification under the c~tego~ 
of determinate negation conflates this distinction which Marx clearly specIfies In 
this section of  the Grundrisse. 
31 Aristotle, Physics 192b  8-18. 125 
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process, that comes to the rescue by preservIng these artifact that would 
otherwise decay: 
The transformation of the material by living labour, by the realisation of 
living labour in the material - a  transformation which,  as purpose, 
determines labour and is its purposeful activation ... thus preserves the 
material in a  definite form,  and subjugates the transformation of the 
material to the purpose of labour. Labour is the form giving fire;  it is the 
transitoriness of things, their temporality, as their formation by living 
labour time'32 
'Labour is the form giving fire': with this expression, Marx isolates the special 
quality of labour that he is after. Labour plays the role of  the form giving, unifying 
element that both preserves the value that inheres in the objects and advances 
them towards the stage where they can become objects of consumption. One way 
Marx describes this ontological process is particularly instructive: he states that 
when the products of dead labour are posited as conditions of living labour, they 
are themselves 'reanimated':33 from  dead objects  they are resurrected,  by 
becoming the objects of  living labour. The parallels with Aristotle's account of the 
soul are obvious: just as the soul animates the body of man (thus the Latin title of 
Aristotle's work: De Anima), labour is the unifying, revivifying activity that brings 
objects back into the organically conceived production process. It  enables these 
objects to be enformed into consumable items. At this point, the objects are 
decomposed, and the cycle can begin again. Even this process of consumption is 
described in Aristotelian terms; as the suspension of form: 
In each of these subsequent processes, the material has obtained a more 
useful form, a form making it more appropriate for consumption; until it 
has obtained at the end the form in which it can directly become an object 
of consumption, when therefore, the consumption of the material and the 
suspension of its form satisfies a human need, and its transformation is the 
same as its use.34 
The labour then, that works up the object, is also the mechanism by which the 
objects of  production become objects of consumption. This is the mechanism by 
which production and consumption in the simple labour process are made to 
correspond; not, it should be noticed, through the influence of Say's law or any of 
the market mechanisms posited by the Classical school. 
32 Marx, Grundrisse p. 360-1, (my italics). 
33  Marx, Grundrisse  p.360. 
34 Marx, Grundrisse  p. 361. 126 
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Aristotelian  terminology is applied throughout the discussion of production in 
general and its nature, although it is true that Marx's use of terms such as form, 
substance, matter and decay are here applied to middle sized material objects. 
Nevertheless the analysis undertaken is both valuable in itself and prefigures the 
wider picture of  the  phthora of  social forms which I shall examine later. 
Marx is concerned with phthora in two senses. First he seems to have in mind the 
purely chemical degeneration of objects, through such processes as rust, rot and 
so on. This is a matter of time and various physical processes acting on material 
objects. It refers to the decay of objects as objects, and is generated by their 
particular material existence. This is, of course, an important and irreducible part 
of  every day human existence.  But there is a second sense in which Marx is 
concerned about the process: the decay of objects as use values. His central 
example is of the working up of cotton into twist, (the twine or thread into which 
cotton is spun), cloth and then garments. The degradation which encroaches on 
each stage of the process is not just physical and thus specific to the article under 
consideration but endemic to the productive process. It can only stem from the 
need to keep production of use values going, in order to satisfy human needs and 
thus shows the inter relatedness of the man - productive activity - nature triple. 
Humans are constantly producing: this is the basic existent, not just because 
objects decay but because humans need to constantly consume in order to stay 
alive, and therefore need to produce use values for consumption. Only when dead 
labour is posited as the object of  living labour can it survive against the biological 
needs of human kind. It is as if consumption is a constant drain - a constant 
source of decay in the second, metaphysical sense, which means production which 
does not deliver the goods; consumption goods, is 'dead' labour. 
without further labour the use value of cotton and twist, material and form 
would be botched; it would be destroyed instead of produced. Material as 
well as form,  substance like form,  are preserved by further labour -
preserved as use value, until they obtain the form of use value as such, 
whose use is consumption.35 
When Marx argues that it is the preservation of use values, and not just the 
creation of use values that requires the input of labour, he necessarily posits the 
existence of a tendency to decay. It is important to notice for Marx that this is all 
inherent in the simple production process: 
35 Marx, Grundrisse p. 361. 127 
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This preservation of labour as product - of the use value of the product of 
labour by its becoming the raw material of new labour, being again posited 
as material objectivity of purposeful living labour. - is given in the simple 
production process.36 
But when we come to consumption the picture is not much better. Having been 
formed and reformed the object is realised in consumption. It gains determinate 
existence. But the realisation of  the commodity is also its destruction, its return to 
its elements, its loss of form, its decomposition. Back in the Introduction to the 
Grundrisse Marx enhances the point that 'The product only obtains its "last finish" 
in consumption. A railway on which no trains run, hence which is not used up, 
consumed, is a rail  way only  potentially, and not in  reality.'37 
In this case the moment of actualisation - the moment of consumption - is also 
moment of decomposition as it is in the return of the commodity to its material 
basis that the final finish is given. 'Only by decomposing the product does 
consumption give the product the finishing touch.'38 
The Aristotelian chain of  coming-to-be and passing-away is thus exemplified in the 
production process of the Grundrisse. The labour of  man is an unending Herculean 
labour: that is one reason why labour in the sense of  general productive activity is 
at the core of Marx's social ontology. If  production is left half done, the use values 
wither, but even if  the working up offorms reaches its apex, it  is only for the final 
form to be destroyed. There is, in these two ways a constant draining away of form 
from the objects of production, which is as constant as the gravitational pull on 
the rocks of Hercules. This in turn necessitates the continuous cycle of production 
itself  revealing the magical properties;  'the form giving fire', which can resist this 
force.  At the level of the whole social organism, the implication is that in the 
absence of productive activity, the whole social loses its form. 
While this set of problems is posed in the discussion of production in general, it is 
still necessary to work out what happens at the level of the enformed capitalist 
organism.Here Marx points out that the special quality of  labour; that it preserves 
use values, is hidden from our immediate gaze, by the second order mediations 
that structure the ontologically basic triple at this level; under the social form of 
capital, labour is not recognised on this qualitative dimension; this special quality 
is, and Marx argues that it has to be, annexed to capital. This occurs because the 
36 Marx, Grundrisse  p. 362. 
37 Marx, Grundrisse, p. 91.
1potentially' is in  Greek in the original 
38 Marx, Grundrisse  p. 91. 128 
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quantity of living labour, but not for any of its unique qualities; including the 
quality of  preserving the labour that  is already objectified. 
Marx's account of the dialectic between labour and capital rests on the separation 
of labour from raw materials, and tools, but, in the production process, even the 
production process under capital, this separation is temporarily removed, 
('suspended') as labour uses tools to work on raw materials.  But, under the 
domination of capital, this ongoing labour is incorporated into capital, in the 
respect that it has this quality of  preserving old values. This quality is part of the 
natural way in  which labour operates in the simple production process, and hence 
part of the use value of  labour, but the use value of  labour belongs to the capitalist 
so that labour's 'living quality of preserving objectified labour time, by using it as 
the objective condition of living labour in the production process is none of  the 
worker's business. '39 The worker simply has nothing to do with this special quality 
that labour possesses: s/he is alienated from it. While this quality resides in the 
structuring  of a  natural  process,  since  production  always  involves  the 
preservation of the substance of past labour, under the reign of capital, this 'form 
giving fire' is annexed to capital: 
'The process of the realisation of capital proceeds by means of and within 
the simple production process, by  putting living labour into its natural 
relation with its moments of material being. But to the extent that labour 
steps into this relation, this relation exists not for itself, but for capital; 
labour itself  has already become a moment of capital.  '40 
The crucial modification that occurs when the production process is mediated 
under capital then is not the appearance or disappearance of this special quality; 
the ability of labour to stave off phthoni.  This is part of the simple production 
process, and a natural quality of labour.  In this respect, the natural quality of 
labour is an aspect of the matter of any social entity. What does change though, is 
the question of  how this quality  is to be realised; under the social form of capital, it 
is activated only at the whim of capital. Labour, including its special quality, is 
governed by the form of  capital, unleashed at its whim, and restrained by its fiat. 
It is restrained when it is not in the interests of capital to unleash this natural 
property of  labour: 
ego in times of stagnation of trade etc. the mills are shut down, then it can 
indeed be seen that the machinery rusts away and that the yarn is useless 
39 Marx, Grundrisse p. 364 (my italics). 
40 Marx, Grundrisse p. 364. 129 
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ballast and rots, as soon as their connection with living labour ceases.41 
Marx has moved from the terrain of the micro level account of the simple 
production process to a discussion that implicitly involves the level of the social 
whole;  a discussion of crisis. Aristotelianism enters here, since what a crisis 
consists in, is the suspension of  labour, conceived in the manner outlined above as 
the form giving fire and the activity that staves of the process of  phthora. When 
labour is constrained, the decay process kicks in once again, and the production 
and reproduction of  human social existence under capital is attenuated. This is the 
consequence when the capitalist social form generates overproduction and thus 
stalls the production process itself, leading to the decay of the whole social 
organism, as its matter; the productive process itself, begins to determine the 
form: the capitalist social relations that govern it. Marx's understanding of the 
specific principles that are involved in Aristotle's concept of phthora are applied 
not only in the account of the special nature of labour as the principle of 
maintenance of the use values of past productive activity on a micro level, but 
also in his account of  how capitalism itself  declines. 
Phthora  in the Account of  Capitalism 
Marx's account of capitalist crisis is perhaps the most obvious manifestation of 
the way in which his ontological assumptions clash with those of Ricardo and 
Sismondi.  But what is  seldom  noticed  is  that his  account  of 'the  great 
thunderstorms which increasingly threaten [capital] as the foundation of society 
and of production itself42  is premissed on an Aristotelian understanding of 
hylomorphic organicism.  McCarthy suggests that the 'parallels to Marx's method 
in  Capital are too strong to be dismissed'43 , but it is more than that; Marx takes 
Ricardo, Sismondi and MacCulloch to task, in a critique that owes its roots directly 
to an understanding of  Aristotelian hylomorphism. 
Ricardo and his school, Marx argues 'never understood the really modem crises'44 
and at root this is because he 'conceived production as directly identical with the 
self realisation of capital' and is hence heedless of the barriers thrown up to 
capitalism. Instead, Ricardo expects capital to overcome the barriers to its 
expansion and sees this overcoming as proceeding from the essence of capital 
itself. He is therefore one sided in his account, better grasping the positive essence 
of capital than Sismondi, but failing to see the tension between matter and form, 
between social production and private accumulation that spells doom for the rule 
41 Marx, Grundrisse p. 365. 
42 Marx, Grundrisse, p. 411. 
43 McCarthy, Marx and the Ancients, p. 117. 
44 Marx, Grundrisse, p. 411. of capital. 
130 
Chapter Seven 
When Marx comes to deal with the Swiss, Simonde de Sismondi, he encounters an 
author who has made a decisive break with the orthodox doctrine of the classics. 
In particular,  Sismondi rejected the  classical theory of markets,  and the 
assumption of  identity between demand and supply.  This assumption had meant 
that, for  Say and Ricardo, the only possibility of crisis came from  external  , 
contingent circumstances, and not from the dis  congruity of the system itself. The 
Russian author Rubin,  one of the best commentators  on Marx's  political 
economy,argued that the  classical theory 'was  blind to  the fundamental 
contradictions of capitalist economy, depicting it instead as a  unified whole 
distinguished by a perfectly mutual adjustment and harmonious development of 
all its parts.  '45 
Sismondi, on the other hand, does appreciate that capital throws up barriers and 
has an intuition that they will bring its downfall. Because of this, Sismondi has 
better grasped 'the limited nature of  production based on capital, its negative one-
sidedness'. His solution though, reveals that  he has not fully understood the nature 
of the entity in question. It is to 'put up barriers to production, from the outside, 
through custom, law, etc.,' These took three forms: First, he aimed to restrain the 
declining standards of living of the workers, by proposing the right of workers to 
form combinations, a prohibition on child labour, a mandatory rest day on Sunday, 
and a requirement that capitalist entrepreneurs  were to provide upkeep to their 
workers during times of sickness and unemployment. Secondly, he hoped to 
sustain his preferred form of  production modelled on the patriarchal peasant and 
handicraft economies of  his native Switzerland, a preservation that brought with 
it political and social advantages since 'a numerous class of peasant proprietors 
provides a guarantee for the maintenance of the existing order.'46  Thirdly, he 
aimed to limit the volume of  industrial production through the slower introduction 
of machinery, arguing, in a romantic fashion, that 'distress has reached such 
depths that one could begin to regret the progress of a civilisation which ... has 
only multiplied poverty.  '47 
For Marx such measures are not condemned primarily because they have a 
reactionary political content, <though some of them clearly do) but because they 
are themselves doomed to fail.  Such 'external and artificial barriers' would 
45 Rubin., 1. 1., A History of  Economic Tlwught (London,1979) p. 338-9. 
46 Sismondi, S., Nouveau Principes d 'Economie Politique Vol. I, cited in Rubin, A 
History of  Economic Thought p. 344.  .'  . 
47 Sismondi, Nouveau Principes Vol.ll (1819 edition) p. 328, CIted m RubIn. A 
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necessarily be demolIshed by capItal. 48  Their weakness lies in precisely the 
features that Marx isolates; their externality and artificiality can be no threat to a 
natural and internally regulating social organism which will overcome such 
barriers. It is as futile to pin hope on such measures as it is to hope indefinitely to 
postpone the death of an organism through external interference.49  The 
conception that Marx works on here is of a  social organism whose matter is 
incongruous with its form; if  we either assume congruity, or hope to overcome the 
incongruity from outside, we misunderstand the system. 
Sismondi is an interesting example partly  because he also relies on an Aristotelian 
reading of economics, condemning the way that the classical economists had 
turned political economy into chrematistike.  This is Aristotle's term for  the 
unnatural science of  increasing wealth for its own sake. While Marx built upon this 
aspect of  Aristotle's work, it clearly does not provide the only basis for his critique 
of the classical economists and Sismondi, since Sismondi himself shares that 
Aristotelian slant. Instead it is necessary to move beyond what Aristotle says on 
the subject of  economics to look at his wider physical and metaphysical postulates 
and the way that organic hylomorphism underpins Marx's mode of analysis. 
Marx's critique of MacCulloch is also illuminating; MacCulloch simply assumes 
away the problem of the tension between production under capital and production 
in general with which Marx grapples. He does this by reducing the former to the 
latter: 
In order to rescue production based on capital, ... all its specific qualities are 
ignored and their specific character as forms  omitted, and capital is 
conceived as its inverse, as simple production for immediate use value. 
Totally abstracts away the essential relations. In fact,  in order to cleanse 
it  of  contradictions, it  is virtually dropped and negated.  50 
The essential relations of production based on capital are the opposite of simple 
production for immediate use value: on the one hand is the essence of capital 
governed production, on the other is the transhistorical production in general one is 
transhistorical and the other is historically specific and the two are in tension; the 
48 Marx, Grundrisse  p.411.  . 
49 Was Marx right about this? It is only possible here t~ sketch a ve!y partial 
response, but in Britain it must certainly  be arguable; CapItal has certaInly r.olled 
over many of  the rights to combination in the last fifteen ~~ars, through a senes of 
laws restricting Trade Union action, and has mov~  decISIvely, and successfully, 
against the idea of a rest day on Sunday, at least In the cons~er  goods  sec~r. 
This has involved it in conflicts which see the shop workers umon USDA  W allled 
with the Christian Keep Sunday Special campaign. 
50 Marx, Grundrisse, p. 411. 132 
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second IS dislocated by the form of the first. Production in general h  °ts  as, as 1 
natural and essential goal, the production of  use values; whereas production under 
capital demands production for the accumulation of capital. The only way that 
MacCulloch can cleanse capital of  its contradictions is to pretend that it is, in fact, 
its opposite. Naturally, this does not mean that production of use value does not 
take place, under the rule of capital, but that this enformed matter is in tension 
with its form. The Aristotelian implication is clear. MacCulloch is condemned by 
Marx for resolving the tension between form and matter simply by intellectual 
fiat, by removing form in thought. 
Marx's account of the relation between capital and production reflects the usual 
apparent schizophrenia with respect to capitalism that Marx often displays. On 
one hand he praises the way that 'production founded on capital' creates universal 
industriousness, freeing up the fixity that characterises pre-capitalist social 
relations, expanding human horizons and having 'a great civilising influence'. It  is 
not too confining to Marx's thought to see this as a parallel to Aristotle's double 
understanding of the natural status of  phthora, discussed above. It is the case 
that Marx admires capitalism in its youth, but that, as the organism grows old 
and tired,  there is  also present the assumption that it will  cease  to  be. 
Nevertheless, in its very quest for  universalising, capital creates its own 
finiteness; capital poses limits as things to be overcome, and its self perception is 
universalistic: 
The universality to which it continually strives encounters barriers in its 
own nature, which will, at a certain stage of its development, allow it to be 
recognised  as being itself the greatest barrier to this tendency, and hence 
will drive towards its own suspension.  51 
Marx then describes the limits of capital which 
coincide with the nature of capital, with the essential character of its very 
concept 1) necessary labour as limit on the exchange value of living labour 
capacity 2) surplus value as the limit on surplus labour time, and in regard 
to relative surplus time as barrier to the development of the forces  of 
production 3) transformation into money exchange value as such as the 
limit of production 4) the restriction of the production of use values by 
exchange value' 
In all these cases it is the restriction on production that is the most essential 
barrier thrown up to the expansion of  capital. Once again Marx rehearses the view 
51 Marx, Grundrisse, p. 409-10. 133 
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that is the unifying principle of the capitalist mode of  production. Living labour i~ 
what makes the organism live: 
To  approach the matter more closely: First of all, there is a limit not 
inherent to production generally, but to production founded on capital. This 
limit is double, or rather the same regarded from two directions. It  is enough 
here to demonstrate that capital contains a  particular restriction of 
production - which contradicts its general tendency to drive beyond every 
barrier to production - in order to have uncovered the foundation  of 
overproduction, the fundamental contradiction of developed capital; in order 
to have uncovered more generally, the fact that capital is not,  as the 
economists believe, the absolute form for the development of the productive 
forces  - not the absolute form for that, nor the form  of wealth which 
absolutely coincides with the development of the forces of production ... 
These inherent limits have to coincide with the nature of capital, with the 
essential character of its very concept.  52 
In  Capital, Marx is more directly concerned with the falling rate of profit which he 
sees as the mechanism by which Capitalism meets its end,But even here, what is 
enmeshed in the theory is the dominance of dead labour over living labour, and 
thus a feature of his Aristotelianism. 
Marx's conviction that capitalism was not a permanent feature of human life is 
expressed in all his works on political economy. However, this conviction is 
expressive of ontological commitments and these are at their clearest in the 
Grundrisse. Elster has argued that Marx's account of the crises that capitalism 
undergoes are largely vacuous because it lacks micro foundations.  I have argued 
that those micro foundations do exist, and they are contained in the analytical 
principles that Marx borrows from Aristotle and applies to middle sized organisms; 
these he says, necessarily decay unless continually worked up, given form and 
preserved, and only labour can do this. What is more, at the level of social 
organisms, similar principles apply, and the relations between form and matter 
are not stable or unilinear. This is what the political economists miss, and why 
their explanation are inadequate.  Both sets of analysis rely on the distinction 
between form and matter, and the dynamic relations between the two, but they 
can also be construed as micro and macro explanations of the same phenomenon; 
the decay of  a social organism.  Ifhowever, such explanations are ruled out by fiat, 
then new ontological commitments and explanatory models must be employed. I 
now turn to one example: the sort of methodological individualism proposed by 
52 Marx, Grundrisse, p. 415. Elster and other Analytical Marxists. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
MARXISM AND METHODOLOGICAL INDIVIDUALISM 
one should not ask if  the soul and the body are one, any more than one should ask of 
the wax and the shape or in  general of  the matter of  anything and that of  which it is 
the matter. 1 
Introduction 
It has already been argued that questions of ontological commitment have 
political and ideological implications, since the choice of ontology has a  deep 
bearing on the selection of  the questions that are asked in social theory, and what 
counts as  plausible answers to those questions. Nowhere is this more clear than 
in the debates over methodological individualism (hereafter MI).  The partially 
obscured political and ideological issues that emerge in the debates over MI go to 
the core of the 'crisis of  Marxism' and entail the question of whether, and to what 
extent a Marxian methodology is implicated in the practice of Stalinism. 
The most important and serious charge against Marx, is that his holistic method 
is implicated in the authoritarian practices pursued by regimes that acted in his 
name. Critics who take this line diagnose holism as the central error in Marx's 
account of the nature of capitalist society. This holism, it is alleged, suppresses, or 
at least permits the suppression of  the rights and autonomy of the individual, both 
theoretically and practically. This is Marx's greatest fault,  for  which the 
prescription is a dose of individualism in many varying forms; economic, ethical, 
and most seriously for present purposes, methodological. 
Methodological individualism is prescribed for two  reasons, apparently mutually 
incompatible.  Either MI is set against the holistic method of Marx and 
consequently its political forms toutcourt. This is the argument pursued by Popper 
and Hayek. In the hands of Jon Elster, however, MI is designated the role of 
rescuing the ethically and intellectually acceptable elements of Marxism; what 
(little) there is that is alive in Marx, in an operation that allows us to 'make sense' 
of him. Arguably, however, both positions could be conflated after analysis. What 
both sets of critics have in common is that the view that Marx's method is 
mistaken and dangerous, and they therefore advocate its replacement by an 
individualist methodology.  Furthermore, seldom do  they acknowledge the 
possibility of  distinguishing between ontological and explanatory priority in social 
theory or the possibility that methodological considerations are preceded by 
ontological ones.  To put it another way, what is missing from the debate is the 
1 Aristotle, On the Soul, 1412b 6-8. 136 
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back drop consideration that what there is, comes before what explains what. 
In this chapter I argue that what motivates Marx in his complex methodological 
stance is not a psychological predilection to authoritarianism, speculation, or 
holism. Rather, Marx's methodology is premissed on an Aristotelian ontology. It  is 
only recently that such an ontology has been widely discussed in the literature of 
analytical philosophy but such discussion allows us to see its power and range. 
The discussions of  Aristotle's metaphysics, recent neo-Aristotelianism and Marx's 
social ontology, have laid the foundation for an investigation of the claims of the 
methodological individualists. This chapter will therefore offer a synthesis of these 
elements  into  an investigation of the  claim that Marx's  methodological 
commitments prefigure in some way the practice of totalitarianism. 
But first it is necessary to be clear about what this claim amounts to.  The 
technique pursued is first to outline the commitments involved in MI, to examine 
its ontological presuppositions. Secondly I will look at the interpretation of Marx 
offered by Elster, who himself  espouses MI.  In accordance with the aim and as is 
customary in the extensive literature, I distinguish between the prior ontological 
view associated with MI  of metaphysical individualism and different versions of 
the explanatory claims involved in MI. I then reintroduce a distinction, and an idea 
drawn from Aristotelian and neo-Aristotelian metaphysics; the distinction 
between form and matter, and the idea of substance sortals with characteristic 
careers. Retranslating the distinction between structure and agency, individuals 
and social relations into one between form and matter, and the interplay between 
them, stresses the Aristotelian element in social theory and, unsurprisingly in 
view of his intellectual history, simultaneously expresses the spirit of what Marx 
has to say on these issues. 
What is necessary for the existence of a  social entity is not necessarily what 
explains its behaviour, just as matter in Aristotelian metaphysics does not 
entirely fulfil the explanatory role in the changing entities that populate the world. 
Despite the view that matter is, in some sense, all there is, since form is not some 
entity added to matter, but just the organisation of matter into a substance, form 
enters into explanation at every point, until the entity goes through a process of 
phthora and form breaks down as a source of explanation.  But MI expresses an 
unwillingness to consider social forms  as causally effective  and so  makes 
problematic the ontological background to  the explanatory claims  of the 
individualists. Developing this distinction between ontological and explanatory 
priority indicates that the claims of MI either reduce to trivial statements about 
the  components  of society with  little  or  no  explanatory  power  or  are straightforwardly  false. 
Anti-individualism: The Charge against Marx 
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The critics of  Marx who advocate the adoption ofMI claim that Marx is guilty of a 
creeping totalitarianism in his espousal of methodological collectivism. Elster, for 
example argues that what makes dropping methodological collectivism and its 
corollary, a speculative theory of history, important for  Marxism (as opposed to 
Marx interpretation), is the supposed political implications. The main objection to 
speculative theories of  history is not their intellectual faults: these 
are of  little import compared to the political disasters they can inspire  ... as 
philosophy of history that allows one to regard pre-communist individuals 
as so many sheep for the slaughter.2 
Likewise for the critics of the forties and fifties, such as Hayek, Watkins, and 
Popper, who were writing in an intellectual atmosphere dominated by the Cold 
War.  The individualistic programmes ofPopper3  and Hayek4 were animated by 
hostility to what they saw as the 'totalitarianism' of  left and right. Responding to 
the brutalities of the great 'collectivist,' Stalin, they aimed to condemn all sorts of 
methodological holism as precursors to  a  political practice that sacrificed 
individuals. This is most thoroughly  worked through in  Popper's opposition to Marx 
and Marxism, and particularly succinct in the claim of Watkins that MI is a 
practice that: 
encourages innocent explanations but forbids sinister explanations of the 
widespread existence of  a disposition among members of a social group.5 
It is therefore somewhat surprising to find theorists who see themselves as 
sympathetic to Marx proclaiming their allegiance to this methodological approach. 
MI Marxism takes a slightly different tack from the MI critics of Marx by arguing 
that what can be saved in Marxism is not a  method, but rather a  series of 
insights, and that the political problems faced by Marxism minus MI necessitate 
redrawing it with this new, neutral methodological weapon. So MI is proposed as a 
kill or cure solution to the chronic ailment of  Marxism. 
2 Elster, Making Sense of  Marx pp. 117-118. 
3 Popper, K, The Open Society and its Enemies (London, 1945). 
4 Hayek, F. A., The Road to Serfdom (London,1944) and Hayek, F. A., 
Individualism:true or  false? (Oxford, 1946).  .  .  ,. 
5Watkins,J. W. N., 'Methodological Individualism and  SO~lal  TendenCIes In 
Brodbeck (ed.) Readings in the Philosophy of  the Social SClences (New York, 
Macmillan, 1968), p. 274. 138 
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?n~  .prob~ema~i.c issue,  here,  is the status  of the problems  cited by  the 
mdiVlduahst crItics: the arena of  the charge of anti-individualism is political but it 
is intended to be rectified by a methodological shift. But  for Marx, his methodology 
was deduced from his conception of the world, of what sort of things existed in it 
and what sort of  connections there were between these things: 
in the first place [De prime abord] I do not start out from concepts, hence I 
do not start out from the 'concept of  value', and do not have 'to divide' these 
in any way. What I start out from is the simplest social form in which the 
labour product is presented in in contemporary society manifests itself and 
this is the 'commodity'. I analyse it, and right from the beginning in  the form 
in which it appears 6 
Methodology was deduced from ontology, and was not an independent level of 
discourse,  which could be manipulated at will.  To  change Marx's  holistic 
methodology, without examining his ontological commitments contradicts his own 
understanding of the relationship between ontology and methodology.  Such a 
manoeuvre also introduces an empiricist bias of epistemology; how  we  gain 
knowledge of the social world, over ontology; just what it is that the social world 
contains. Correspondingly, the first task in an assessment of the claims of the 
advocates of MI has to be to clarify the relationship between ontology and 
epistemology and the priority of ontology, and then to assess whether the ontology 
has the methodological, and political and ideological consequences that it is 
claimed to have. It will also be possible to examine the ontological commitments 
which are exposed by the methodological allegiances of  the critics. 
The second constraint on an analysis has to be an understanding of and sympathy 
for the historical framework within which Marx is writing. I will argue that this 
needs to go beyond the simple constraint of what Marx actually said, since he 
conceived of his own published works as forming a whole. Even if  we eventually 
demur from this judgement, it  impels us to look first for congruities and syntheses 
of ideas that make sense, rather than to look for what appear to be contradictions; 
which may often turn out just to be paradoxes. 
Finally, it is worth flagging up an alternative to the interpretation examined here; 
that Marx has some direct responsibility for  the practices of the orthodox 
communist movement in the twentieth century. The alternative consists not just 
of a refutation of such a  connection and responsibility and in the intuitively 
plausible notion that  that it was not Marx who is to blame for Stalinism, but 
6 Marx, K, Marginal notes on Adolph Wagner  in Carver, T., (ed.) Texts on Method 
p. 198. Stalin. 
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The Three Associated Claims of  MI 
Any assessment of MI and its relationship to Marx and Marxism must be clear 
about the nature and status of the doctrine itself. I therefore distinguish between 
first, the analytic truth, second the ontological position, and third the explanatory 
claim of the MI approach. This process of distinguishing is important, because 
both advocates and opponents of the approach are often unclear about its status, 
so that the acceptability  of one part of the individualist programme is taken to 
carry over into other theoretically discrete areas. 
So first I consider the analytical proposition which Lukes7  calls 'Truistic Social 
Atomism'  as  what we  can take  as  the  analytically true  commitment of 
individualism: 
Societies consist of people. Groups consist of people. Institutions consist of 
people plus rules and roles. Rules are followed (or alternatively not followed) 
by people and roles are filled by people. Also there are traditions, customs, 
ideologies, kinship systems, languages: theses are ways people act think 
and talk. 8 
Secondly there lies at the heart of the MI project a metaphysical claim, the 
ontological claim, that societies consists only of individuals and not (also) of 
irreducible social, holistic, unobservable entities. There are some good reasons for 
adopting this position: the demands of Ockham's razor for ontological parsimony, 
and the apparently hard headed insistence on only the observable as existential. 
But what we admit into an ontology depends on what we mean by ontologically 
basic. This is a question discussed above, and in particular, attention was drawn 
to the discussion of  the ontological status of  forms and relations. 
The  third and most  commonly encountered version of MI  consists  of its 
explanatory claim: 
the observable individuals that make up societies, groups, institutions, 
rules, roles, social relationships, and forms of  behaviour are the only sort of 
entities that should enter into an an explanatory account of them and that 
7 Lukes, S. 'Methodological Individualism Reconsidered' in  The Bri~is  h Jou mal of 
Sociology,  19, 1968, pp. 119-29. Reprinted in Emmet, D., and Macmtyre, A. 
Sociological Theory and Philosophical Analysis (ed.) London, 1970.  . 
8 Lukes, 'Methodological Individualism Reconsidered' in Emmet and MaCIntyre, 
Sociological Theory and Philosophical Analysis, p. 77. 140 
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no holistic, unobservable existents should enter into th  I  .  e exp anatory cham. 
For Elster, the main theorist to be considered here  the  .  I'  f  .  ,  maIn calm 0  MI IS 
explanatory, consisting in 
the doctrine that all social phenomena - their structure and their change-
are in principle explicable in ways that only involve individuals - their 
properties, their goals, their beliefs and their actions 9 
On the basis of  the argument that explanatory claims depend on their plausibility 
on the ontological claims that underpin them, the discussion of the explanatory 
claim is reserved until after the ontological claim has been dealt with. 
The Analytic Claim 
Arguably, the first proponents of MI slid from an obvious analytic point about 
groups -that they are made up of  individuals -to an explanatory strategy in which 
all (or for Watkins all'rock-bottom'lO) explanations had to be rooted in individuals 
(and for Popper, the 'logic of their situation'). So first I consider the analytical 
proposition which Lukes outlines; what he calls 'Truistic Social Atomism'. 
This analytical truth is often referred to in order to make MI palatable. But it is 
not up to the job. The claim is analytically true; that is to say, true by virtue of the 
meanings of the words used. Clearly, if  this claim is all there is to MI, it is trivially 
true, as is the case with analytical truths generally. The point here is that nothing 
follows from an analytical truth about either the components of the social world 
and their reducibility or otherwise and, especially,  nothing about the preferred 
explanatory strategy in social theory. Its use in giving plausibility to the claims of 
MI to provide the best possible form of explanation in the social sciences is 
dependent on the  assumption that the observable individuals that make up 
societies, groups, institutions rules, roles, social relationships, and forms  of 
behaviour are the  only sort of entities that should enter into an an explanatory 
account of them and that no holistic, unobservable existents should enter into the 
explanatory chain. On this line of  argument, the analytical proposition is supposed 
to lend support to MI construed as an explanatory approach, outlining criteria of 
a good explanation and advocating methodological criteria of the best  explanations 
possible in social theory. But to deduce this from an analytic truth is to make a 
9  Elster, Making Sense of  Marx, p. 5. It is worth noting at this stage, t~~t Elster 
excludes relations from his definition of the possible explanatory entItIes to be 
included in  MI. 
10 Watkins, J. W. N., 'Historical explanation in the Social Sciences',  reprinted in J. 
O'Neill (ed.), Modes of  Individualism and Collectivism, (London, 1973), p. 168. 141 
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category error, since modes of explanation presuppose certain ontological 
commitme~ts which cannot be resolved by analytical fiat. This has been argued 
above. WhIlst we can accept (as uninformative) the analytic p  °to  .  °  roposl lon, It IS 
nevertheless necessary to address the usually unacknowledged  metaphysics of 
the advocates of MI. 
Metaphysical Holism 
The ontological claim is that societies consists only of individuals and not (also) of 
irreducibly social, holistic, unobservable entities. The obvious candidates for such 
entities are social substances, composed of matter and form.  The criteria for 
substantiveness were outlined in Chapter Three: individuation: to qualify as a 
substance an entity has to possess 'thisness', and non-parasitism: a substance is 
an entity that has an independent existence. So substances are ontologically 
basic; the basic forms of being; in the sense first that they are particular of 
existents, and second that they are the existents that all else is dependent on, but 
are themselves dependent on no other thing. 
If  we examine the two components of substances; form and matter in the social 
sphere, it becomes clear that neither individually will satisfy these criteria. For a 
relatively uncontroversial substance such as Germany, we can abstract out the 
national form and the individuals who make up the matter of Germany: the 
Germans. But the set of German people is not a reduction of Germany, since it is a 
set and sets notoriously do not have the identity preserving characteristic through 
change that a nation does; Germany remains the same nation, while one German 
dies  and another is born. Furthermore, even couched as a  counterfactual 
conditional, the result is the same; Germany would have remained the same 
Germany if  it had been that there was an incremental change in its membership, 
even if  that incremental change had not taken place. MI Marxists deny that they 
are reducing to the idealised Individual, in Robinsonade manner: rather, they are 
reducing to individuals. The idealised Individual, whilst a fiction, is a sortal, viewed 
on a social level, whereas individuals, again viewed from a social perspective, is 
not. But individuals do not possess the first criteria of Aristotle's demand for 
substantiveness that they posses a  criterion of individuation. An individual 
obviously does, but 'individuals' are an aggregate or set and sets, notoriously, do 
not possess identity through change in their membership. When theorists who 
propose MI say that all explanation has to be couched at the level of 'individuals', 
they immediately beg the question of which 'individuals', exactly? A number of 
possible answers may be offered, all individuals, which does not get very far since 
no explanation in terms of all existing individuals is credible.  It  may be said that 
we  only explain through the socially relevant individuals, smuggling social 142 
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properties back  in. The term 'individuals' functions like a mass noun, and not like a 
sortal; in this way individuals behave logically like Aristotelian matter. it is in fact, 
useful to see how well the parallel between individuals and matter works, both to 
justify the programme argued for in this thesis and to undermine the programme 
offered by Elster. 
How do forms fare when matched against the criteria of substantiveness? They 
clearly satisfy the first criterion, they do not, however, seem to exemplify non-
parasitism, since they do depend on the individuals that make them up. It is 
however, plausible to argue that they do not consist of the particular individuals 
who make them up, since they could remain the same through identity preserving 
changes in the matter that forms their constituents. 
Clearly in order to get to a useful notion of social substance we  require both 
matter and form, since neither satisfies the criteria of substantiveness on their 
own. That is to say, we need both an account of the  individuals who make up a 
social whole and of the nature of that social whole itself, and neither is entirely 
reducible to the other. Arguably Elster covertly recognises this: when he admits 
irreducible social relations later in  Making Sense of  Marx.  11 
Social existents and their relations 
It will be helpful now to outline a catalogue of  social existents whose irreducibility 
might be doubted by advocates of MI; or in other words, to outline the sorts of 
contentious entities we are concerned with. These are (exhaustively) social 
substances, social types, social processes, social states, social events, social 
forms,  and social matter.  Examples of each might be as follows:  of  social 
substances; Glasgow, (but not its territory), or the National Union of Miners; of 
social types; Capitalism, or Bureaucracy; of  social properties; employer, or 
research student;  of social  processes;  the decline  of the Roman  Empire, 
accumulation of capital, or the decay of capitalism; of social states; the sexual 
division of labour, or class antagonism; and of social events; the fall of the Berlin 
Wall, or the assassination of  President Kennedy. 12 
There is an important further qualification that needs to be added to the concept 
of social types. This term, more usually associated with Weber, does however 
express something of what Marx means when he refers to a society as capitalist. 
He takes it that he is referring to a group of real relationships that constitute the 
mechanisms that explain the operation of the society. In  contrast, for Weber, ideal 
11 Elster Making Sense of  Marx  pp. 94-95.  .. 
12 This is an amended version of  the typology in Ruben MetaphyslCSofthe SocUll 
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types are one sided exaggerations, constructed by the social scientist to form  a 
conceptual whole, and to generate useful hypotheses about the social world. In 
other words, for Marx types are reflective of the real mecham·sm  .  . ty  s In a SOCle  , 
whereas for Weber, ideal types are conceptual abstractions. 
Social matter and social form fit in, as we have seen by being component elements 
of social substances. Social forms  have the peculiar property that they are 
immaterial but spatially located. 
To further expand on this typology we need to examine the relations between each 
of these elements. In terms of the relations of priority between them social 
substances and social types on the Marx rather than the Weberian reading of 
them involve social forms and sub-forms. Social forms  are either imposed or 
immanent;13 immanent if  they are implicitin the matter they enform, imposed if 
they are alien to the matter they enform. Admitting social types into a social 
ontology entails rejecting methodological individualism because of the failure of 
reductive materialism to cope with the type token distinction, that is, because 
types, which are explanatory, are differently instantiated. 
Social properties present a pivotal area in the discussion ofMI and Marxism, since 
they include as a subset, the  category of relations, which reflects back on the 
existence of social wholes. Some properties, such as being red, are not relational, 
but most, and the most interesting properties cannot exist in a universe in which 
there is only one thing and that thing is the predicate of the property in question. 
That is to say: 
A property P is non relational iff it is logically possible for there to be a 
universe in which there is some object 0  and 0  is P, and no other object 
exists.  14 
Social properties are therefore all relational and constitute and are derived from 
forms and sub forms. Social substances and social types consist of groups, not 
sets of relations, though; identity of a  form is preserved through a  range of 
changes in social relations. This allows us to map out the terrain of social theory 
13 cf. Elster's distinction between teleology (the intentional acti?ns o~  social 
agents) and teleonomy(objective teleology): in 'Marxism, Fun?tio~allS~ and Game 
Theory'  in Theory and Society  11 (1982) pp. 453-82. The di~tInction  mm:o~s.  that 
of imposed and immanent form but - in empiricist style - r~Jects the  poss~bility of 
immanent form and Marx's philosophical anthropolo~  ~hich  subten~s his  . 
version of  this distinction. This motivates Elster's rejection of Marx's speculative 
theory of  history' Elster Making Sense of  Marx pp. 108-109 
14 Ruben Metaphysics of  the Social World  p. 24. 144 
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Itself, smce  SOCIal theory asks what range of social relation  .  h  . ".  s can a SOCIety c  ange 
through, while stIll beIng classifiable as a particular type of  . ty  Th  .  SOCIe.  ese SOCIal 
relations  these relations are neither entirely external15  nor internal16  Social 
theory asks 'what relations are internal and what relations are external?' This 
question poses a demand for criteria of individuation both over time and between 
discrete causally potent entities, satisfied by: 
Social processes are the characteristic modes of  behaviour of social forms and the 
individuating characteristic of social forms. 
Social states are (partial) snapshots of social types  and social substances'  , 
explanatory priority resides in the latter, if at all,  since what exists at one 
temporal point is dependent on what exists over time 
Social events are (partial) snapshot of social processes; explanatory priority 
resides in the latter, if  at all.  If  they are not accidents. But, on the Aristotelian 
conception, both social states and social events are explicable only if they come 
about through necessity and not through accident 
Social matter consists of the always enformed (by imposition, or immanently), 
ahistorical, material constituents of  the social world. Matter is ontologically prior, 
but explanatorily secondary, to social forms. 
The best examples of social substances are proper names such as Glasgow. This 
is because proper names act as rigid designators, as Kripke argues. On this 
argument we can ask what Nixon would have done, counterfactually, under 
certain circumstances, but not what Nixon would have been like if he had had 
different parents, since if  he had had different parents he would not have been 
Nixon. Treating proper names as rigid designators allows a distinction between the 
essential and the inessential characteristics of  the entities so named 
The same considerations can be applied to social substances. It is intuitively 
reasonable to say that Glasgow could be moved, spatially, in certain directions. It 
may not be obvious what is the single essential attribute of Glasgow or the nest of 
essential attributes of Glasgow; whether the City Chambers would have to be 
moved brick by brick, and so on. Nevertheless it is certainly conceivable (and so 
logically possible) that we could say, after a certain period of time over which this 
operation was carried out, pointing to a certain section of the Clyde; that was 
where Glasgow used to be,  and now that it has moved North. What this entails is 
15 as they are for Hobbes or, arguably, for Elster 
16 as they are for OIlman, Lukacs, but not Rader's Hegel 145 
Chapter Eight 
that its present spatial location is not essential to Glasgow being Glasgow. 
Recent history provides us with a real world example of this sort of phenomenon in 
the case of Germany. This is an example of a social substance that was split and 
then unified. Some answers can be given to questions about identity here: Did 
Germany cease to be simpliciter in 1945-8 and then come to be again in 1991? 
Clearly our intuitive reply would be to deny this and assert instead that Germany 
was split, and then reunited. But the notion of reuniting what was once split is 
particularly difficult to retranslate into individual terms. 
It is in the case of substantial change that the reduction to a micro story is least 
obviously applicable and, of course, Marx is interested most in the substantial 
changes.  Substantial  sorts of questions ask, what does  the unification of 
Germany amount to? What (substance) was re-unified? The answer cannot be a 
set of people, indicating that we have to describe the event under the right 
description if it is to be explained. Reunification presupposes a  prior unity; 
indicating the only thing that reunification can be applied to is a thing that was 
once  split and now is whole. It follows from the meaning of the words, that 
whatever aggregates can do, they cannot be unified, or reunified. 
The explanatory claim 
The explanatory claim made by MI is eroded by the sorts of considerations about 
metaphysical individualism discussed above. But even on its own terms it faces 
problems, first in its empiricist emphasis on the directly observable, and second in 
its attempt to reduce social properties into individual ones: the first claim is made 
most  strongly by Hayek,  and the  second  is  considered  and  attacked by 
Mandelbaum. 
The central claim of MI, as opposed to the ontological claim of metaphysical 
individualism, is couched at the level of explanation. We have already seen that 
Elster describes it in this way. Hayek, however insists that this does not entail a 
denial of  the very existence of  societies. According to Hayek, 'true individualism' is 
primarily a theory of society, an attempt to understand the forces which 
determine the social life or man  ... This should by itself  be sufficient to refute 
the silliest of  the common misunderstandings: the belief that individualism 
postulates (or bases its arguments on the assumption of) the existence of 
isolated or self-contained individuals, instead of starting from men whose 
whole nature is determined by their existence in society,!7 
17 Hayek, F. A.,  Individualism and the Economic Order  (London, 1949) p.6. 146 
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For Hayek, social wholes are no more than the sum of the individuals who 
comprise them, and since only these elements of wholes can be clearly perceived, 
social analysts must begin with them. Thus it is the observability of individuals 
that makes them explanatorily primary. 
Hayek's central claim is that individuals are more easily observable than 
collectivities. This is not at all obvious since, as Lukes points out, as for example 
the operation of a court is directly observable (though not at least in principle 
directly explicable) whereas the intentions of a social agent are not. This is not 
surprising in view of the difficulty of  escaping from such societal facts, as argued 
in response to the earlier advocates of MI by Mandelbaum. 
Furthermore, Hayek's claim that MI expresses the simplest (that is, most easily 
understood) aspects of social life is equally open to counter-example. It is 
comparatively easy to understand a  court's operation, whereas the complex 
motivations of a criminal are more problematic. Again,  even if  it were true that 
individuals could exist independently of institutions, the interesting features of 
social life often stem from the relation of individuals to collectivities. Thus we can 
only speak of soldiers because we can speak of armies.  In this sense,  an 
explanatory rather than an ontological sense, the significance of an individual is 
parasitic on collectivities. Thus Elster makes constant reference to workers, in a 
way that recognises some individuals are placed differently to, and differently 
significant from other individuals. An individual is a member of a class, of a gender 
group, and of an age group, as well as of many other structurally determined 
collectivities. 
For Hayek, social wholes are no more than the sum of the individuals who 
comprise them, and since only these elements of wholes can be clearly perceived, 
social analysts must begin with them, for: 
words like government or trade or army or knowledge do not stand for single 
observable things but for  structures of  relationships which can be 
described only in terms of schematic representations of 'theory' of the 
persistent system of relationships between the ever-changing elements. 
These 'wholes', in other words, do not exist for us apart from the theory by 
which we constitute them, apart from the mental technique by which we 
reconstruct the connections between the observed elements
18 
18  Hayek, F. A., 'Scientism and the study of Society' in O'Neill (ed.) Modes of 
Individualism and Collectivism (London, 1973), p. 60. 147 
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This argument of  Hayek prefigures Kitching's point19 about the idea of production 
being primary in Marxist theory.  Production in Marx,  particularly in the 
Introduction to the  Grundrisse, figures as the irreducible actiVl'ty ofh  '  uman speCIes 
existence; the basis of the existence of a social whole, and the immanent form of a 
future post capitalist society. But, just as Kitching makes the founding of social 
existence on production into something subjective, so Hayek reduces social wholes 
to features of an inquirer's dispositions, rather than considering them as some 
ontological feature of the world. The approach is strongly reminiscent of the 
discussion of primary and secondary qualities in the debates  of classical 
empiricism,  which  was  itself premissed  on  the  rejection  of Aristotelian 
metaphysics. On the interpretation argued for in this thesis, Hayek's distinction 
between observable individual level elements and the unobservable holistic 
concepts that enter in at a theoretical level is not so much wrong as inadequate. 
The inadequacy arises first because we only observe empirical individuals by 
capturing them under a previously existing, theoretically significant designation, 
since it would be impossible to name a new, bare particular. Instead what we 
observe is an entity behaving in a specific kind of  way and theoretically assimilate 
the individual to a kind. Through this epistemological process we are able to 
identify it as such and such an entity, for example, a human individual rather than 
just a body.  Is there any reason to suggest that precisely the same procedure is 
applicable to social wholes? To raise the question suggests something of the 
arbitrariness involved in prohibiting explanation couched at one particular level 
and insisting on its reduction to other lower levels; the arbitrariness involved in 
stopping at the level of individuals, rather than going down to the cells or atoms 
that compose them. Instead the epistemological task of identifying social 
phenomena as types of phenomena depends on capturing them as powerful 
entities. In the social world, we identify a  group,  a  class, an institution by 
observing the way in which it behaves, and therefore identifying it as a certain 
kind of group, class, or institution with certain powers and capacities that are 
conferrable on its members. A capitalist, regardless of his or her intentions, is only 
able to act as a capitalist because of the existence of a class of capitalists, in turn 
dependent on the existence of  capital and its presupposition, labour. In  denying the 
objective existence of social wholes Hayek is logically forced to deny their causal 
efficacy,  and to reverse the epistemological process of identifying entities 
according to type. Instead he views social types, which are social wholes,  as 
mental constructs in the mind of the observer. As a result, although he avoids the 
more crude manifestations of individualism Hayek nevertheless denies that any 
phenomena are irreducibly social. His method is individualist because it starts 
with individual units of  investigation. Mandelbaum and the societal facts argument 
148 
Chapter Eight 
In the course of outlining his anti-reductionist position, Mandelbaum makes an 
analogy with epiphenomenalist philosophy of  mind,  20 in which brain states are a 
necessary condition for mental states (and a particular brain state is a necessary 
condition for a particular mental state) and so mental states are parasitic on 
brain states, but not reducible to them. In the same way for Mandelbaum, societal 
facts; that is: 'any facts concerning the forms of organisation present in a 
society,'21 are parasitic on the existence of the individuals that, in an analytic 
sense, compose that society. Whether Mandelbaum is right about the existence of 
societal facts, he does open space for consideration of the explanatory primacy of 
features of  the world that are ontologically parasitic on other features of the world. 
It  just does not follow that because X depends for its existence on Y that X cannot 
therefore explain the nature ofY. To suggest that it does is to introduce a bias of 
explanatory reduction. 
Because of the arbitrariness of this prescription, not only is there disagreement 
about it there is no obvious reason why the ontological claim should be true. 
However, it may still be true, and Mandelbaum seeks to show that it is not. He 
wants to show that: 
concepts involving status and role cannot themselves be reduced to a 
conjunction of statements in which these or other societal concepts do not 
appear.22 
There are three bases of  this claim: first that an explanation of social action is not 
possible by observation on one occasion alone: a Martian could not understand the 
process of withdrawing money from a bank unless it was explained that it was 
necessary to have previously deposited money, and that a withdrawal slip could 
not be handed to just anyone for the desired effect. This example of Mandelbaum's 
indicates  that  recurrent observation is necessary to make social explanation 
possible but this seems to be more a heuristic device than a methodological one: 
that is, he would claim that recurrent observation may suggest an explanation 
which may be wrong, whereas a  methodological approach which focuses  on 
societal facts entails the correct explanation in terms of roles, status and so on. 
Although a recurrently observing Martian may recognise recurring features of an 
act he may still select the wrong ones since he only observes correlations and not 
20  Mandelbaum, M., 'Societal Facts' in British Journal of  Sociology  1955 pp. 305 -
317. 
21 Mandelbaum, 'Societal Facts' p. 307. 
22 Mandelbaum, 'Societal Facts' p. 309. 149 
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explanations. For example he may believe that the issue of mon"  d b  ey IS cause  y 
receiving a green slip and not a red one. In short, at most he can know how to get 
money and not why he gets it, and, explanations consist in giving answers to why-
questions. What the Martian needs is an understanding of the nature of a bank 
clerk qua bank clerk; of  the nature of a bank clerk's role. Behaviour of individuals 
including the bank clerk is only explainable in terms of roles and an understanding 
of those roles by  those who interact  with the individuals who fill out those roles: 
Each of them no less than I ... will only behave in this certain way because 
each recognises the teller of the bank to have a certain function. Thus the 
institutional aspect is not reducible to the behaviour of other people apart 
from the social agent in question.23 
Finally, the role of the bank clerk is not reducible to his observed behaviour 
towards others, because his behaviour is conditioned by his social role: he will not 
give you money at a party. Such an approach is plausible and that it throws much 
light on the debate. Furthermore, the denial of the ontological claim means that 
the social wholes that give rise to social roles are admissible into an ontology. Then 
the explanatory power of  MI is weakened since it leaves something 'untranslated' 
and  unexplained. 
The consequence of this analysis is that individual level predicates have built into 
them salient features of the relevant social context. Indeed this is conceded by 
Elster who introduces social relations in the discussion of game theory, arguing 
that: 
in the analysis of society one cannot ...  begin by describing isolated 
individuals and then go  on to define the comparative relations between 
them, since an (interactional relation) must be present form the outset. In 
the study of society, relations are prior to predicates. An empiricist 
"  '"t 24  methodology of  social science rests on the OPPOSIte prIorI y. 
It  is difficult to see how this account could be squared with the definition of MI 
offered by Elster and cited above. In fact, it is a methodological principle that 
many social holists would be happy with as a description of  their own position. The 
assessment of  Elster's highly critical work on Marx, therefore has to move on from 
simply outlining the deficiencies of MI as a research programme to look at the 
overall conception of analytical Marxism which structures Elster's approach. 
23 Mandelbaum, 'Societal Facts' p. 308. 
24 Elster, Making Sense of  Marx, p. 94-5. Analytical Marxism 
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Jon Elster's book Making Sense of  Marx , published in 1985  was wI'd  1  'd  ,  e y receIve  as 
signifying the full articulation of  Analytical Marxism as a new paradigm for  social 
theory. This paradigm is normally characterised by what it is, rather than what it 
is not, but the positive characteristics of the school  are balanced by assumptions 
out of sympathy with Marx's overall project, and silences and dismissals of 
aspects of that project. Indeed, one of the most critical of these dismissals in 
Elster's work, though less apparent in Cohen, is of the claim that Marx had an 
overall systematising framework that generated substantial theses at all. What 
unites the analytical Marxists is not altogether clear at first sight. All reject the 
labour theory of  value in its standard form, but even this is a necessary but not a 
sufficient condition for inclusion within the limits of the paradigm. More important 
both to the self image of the practitioners of Analytical Marxism, and to an 
objective characterisation of the approach, are matters of intellectual tone and 
perspective. Correspondingly an outline of the school has more to do with these 
properties of approach rather than  the acceptance or rejection of particular 
substantive theses, with the caveat mentioned about system building to be 
considered below. This is betokened by the expressed affinity to Anglo American 
analytical philosophy and instanced in the search for inconsistencies in the entire 
set of writings by Marx. Despite the vagueness of this characterisation, it will be 
argued that the tone and perspective of Analytical Marxism sets up problems 
that it cannot overcome. 
Generally, then, an analytical approach is characterised by the making of nice 
distinctions clearly outlined, and the 'disambiguating' of historical statements that 
are taken to be, and sometimes are ambiguous. Crucially the ambiguity in Marx 
texts is seen by Elster to stem from  a  dualism in modes  of  explanation. 
Specifically, at the heart of  Elster's book is his view that Marx is terribly confused 
in his choice of method and he condemns, as indicative of this, 'Marx's constant 
tendency to fuse or confuse, philosophy of  history and historical analysis.'25 
Working from this position, Elster is quick to level the charge of inconsistency at 
Marx, through a  comparison of the explicit or implicit contents of diverse 
statements. Embedded in this approach is a view that statements can stand on 
their own without needing to be read in  sympathy to the tradition from which they 
come (Elster has little sympathy with that tradition) or with weighting and 
attention to status. There is very little attention paid in Making Sense of  Marx to 
questions of intellectual history. Correspondingly, letters never intended for 
25 Elster Making Sense of Marx  p.437. 151 
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pubhc  atIon  , preparatory notebooks, polemical interventl'ons  su  '  f h"  ,  mmanes 0  IS 
own intellectual development by Marx, which mayor may not be an accurate 
indication of how his thought developed, and the fully worked u  'd  d  p, reVIse  , an 
completed first volume of Capital are all treated as an equally useful source for 
passages that can be tested against one another for their consistency,  In his 
critique of Marx's view of religion, for  example, Elster cites texts from  the 
Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, the Deutsche-Brusseler-Zeitung in 1847, 
the Contribution to the Critique of  Political Economy, the Grundrisse, Capital 1, 
Capital 3 and the third volume of Theories of  Surplus Value. Such texts not only 
span three decades, but are drawn from  sources  widely ranging in their 
representative status for a commentary on the core of Marx's thought, however 
that core is depicted. 
It  is not surprising that from such an enormous resource, plenty of inconsistencies 
may be discovered. In this light, Cohen's constraint, which Elster also accepts, 
that his interpretation be consonant with 'what Marx actually said' is an evasion 
of the requirement to work out which of Marx's works are the most central to his 
system.  This is a  concern Marx himself shared, and he bequeathed later 
commentators some guidelines. Writing to Engels in 1865,  Marx asserts that 
whatever shortcomings [my writings] may have, they have the advantage 
of forming an artistic entity*, and that can  be achieved only through my 
method of  never letting them into print until I have them before me in their 
entirety. This is impossible by the Jacob Grimm method which is altogether 
more suitable for writings which are not dialectically structured.'26 
This should caution us against taking the set of Marx works as one vast text to be 
tested for inconsistencies, and sensitise us to the task of discriminating the Marx 
canon from the Marx corpus. The way to do this is to be sensitive to questions of 
intellectual history, the development of themes within Marx, and to what is 
central and what  is peripheral in  his work. 
It is perhaps not surprising that Elster is insensitive to the varying degrees of 
polish, importance and depth in Marx's work.  The implications of Marx's remark 
are that commentators should seek out the artistic whole, and evaluate texts on 
the basis of  their proximity to the centre of  that whole. This suggests some weakly 
formulated conception of  working out Marx's system, or world view, in order to pick 
out which texts are more or less canonical. But, as an approach, Analytical 
26 Marx to Engels 31st July 1865 in Raddatz, F. J. (ed.) and Osers, E., (trans.) The 
Marx Engels Correspondence: the Personal Letters 1844-177 p. 112 *other 
translations have 'whole' here. 152 
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MarXIsm IS  unsympathetIc to the building of systems  either  h'l  h'  1  .  .  '  P  1 osop  lca, or 
theoretIcal In a more general way. This perspective itself is characteristic of the 
caution over system building of analytical philosophy more generally. What is 
more, those who are sympathetic to this system building, or theory building view 
of social theory, and to Marx's attempt to build one such theory find th  1  ,  emse ves, 
somewhat arbitrarily left without the reconstructive tools to do the job. 
One sometimes has the feeling that Elster has not only pointed out flaws in the 
Marx 'house',  and used those flaws to  knock it down, but that he stands back, 
daring commentators to rebuild it, but not allowing them any 'cement' to do so. 
Another way of putting this is to suggest that Marx's work must be judged not 
only on the basis of certain methodological or epistemological assumptions but 
also through a cognizance of the ontological commitments that Marx himself held, 
and by  due consideration towards these. 
Elster and Marx's dualism in the philosophy of  history 
On Elster's view much of Marx's work is fatally spoilt by his 'inherent lack of 
intellectual discipline' and by its source in a 'strangely disembodied' speculative, 
functionalist philosophy of  history drawn from Hegel. But at other times, Elster's 
Marx can be insightful. This happens when he abandons speculation for the 
techniques associated with methodological individualism. Thus Making Sense of 
Marx is really a book with two different purposes. The first is indicated by the title; 
to make sense of Marx's nonsense by showing what is coherent and what is 
confused in the whole of Marx's disparate and enormous writings by cross 
checking for consistency and by applying Elster's preferred methodological 
techniques The second is to vindicate these techniques through their application 
to the problems Marx himself  approached. 
Despite the fact that Elster's work is structured by his account of the failings of 
Marx in methodology and similar failings in the philosophy of history, he gives a 
rather brief account of each. The methodological approach is asserted in an 
introductory chapter and when he focusses directly on the philosophy of history it 
is to give a statement of  his own position and and a handful of examples which are 
alleged to bear out his claims. Looking at the general claim on the history of 
philosophy first: According to Elster, Marx is 'imprisoned in a half way house, 
between a fully religious and a fully secular view of  history', where he stays with, 
and largely thanks to the influence of, Hege1. 27  The religious component of this 
view has its roots in  Leibniz's 'secular theodicy', which was dependent on the view 
27 This view clearly has affinities with conventional interpretations of Marx such 
as those provided by Kolakowski and Popper 153 
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that history has both a  goal and a  creator. As  Hegel's phil  h  f h"  ..  .  .  osop  y  0  lstOry 
partakes In this but alms to give the theodicy a secular twl·St l·t ,.  'T  IS nonsense.  0 
the extent that Marx indulges in the same idea that history has a goal but fails to 
indicate the intentional agent whose intentions are guided by that goal, his own 
programm  e and method exhibit the same vacuousness and incoherence. 
In the earlier discussions contained in Theory and Society Elster draws out a 
distinction  between objective and subjective teleology in social reasoning, and in 
the same manner accepts the second; the teleology involved in the intentional acts 
of individuals and rejects the latter. This distinction rests however, on the wider 
distinction between which actors in the social world can be considered to be 
subjects.  Thus functionalist  accounts of the state, of classes,  and of the 
development of man conceived as a  species are outlawed on the basis of the 
theoretically unstable nature, collapsible and likely to collapse in the absence of 
micro foundations, or on the basis of the vacuousness of the claims that these 
sorts of entities are subjects. Only intentional teleology is permitted, and all 
holistic explanation is conceived of as  a temporary, shorthand explanation until a 
'micro-story' can be written which provides a rock bottom explanation. In the light 
of the methodological imperative to avoid false explanations, by shortening the 
time lag between explanans and explanandum, this amounts to a requirement for 
day to  day explanations of historical events rather than an over  arching 
theoretical interpretation whose referents are supra-individual social wholes. In 
particular explanations that refer to the needs of the system are seen to be, at 
best over-generalised accounts and at worst, wishful thinking. 
But the Aristotelian ontology that Marx used works on a different conception of 
teleology,  according to which substantial entities have natures which they 
express, and according to which they can be judged to be more or less adequate 
examples of  the sort of  thing that they are. This conclusion is drawn from both the 
account Wiggins gives of  the nomological nature of natural kinds and the sorts of 
considerations about individuation that are bound up in it. On this view,  a 
teleological conception of  the social world is required, firstly to identify the entities 
that exist in that world, through the process of sweeping back from observed 
behaviour to discover the essential qualities of the furniture of the social world. 
Not only does this picture fit with the conception of human potentiality that Marx 
elucidates in the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, but it also explains the 
conceptions of the production of commodities, subject to decay when not worked 
up or consumed that Mao: outlines in the Grundrisse. In this sense the associated 
categories of potential, actual, form, matter, essence and appearance make up a 
thread which runs through the Marx corpus. 154 
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One example of this is the conception Marx has of capiOtal as  °  I  I  °  a SOCIa  re ation A5 
we saw above, in the context of a discussion of the distinction between the formal 
and material properties of  the social world, Marx argues that capital is not a thing, 
but: 
it is a definite social relation of  production pertaining to a definite historical 
social formation, which is simply takes the form of a thing and gives this 
thing a specific social character. Capital is not the sum of the material and 
produced means of production. Capital is the means of production as 
transformed into capital, these being no more capital than gold or silver are 
money. 28 
What therefore counts  as capital depends on how  the means of production 
behaves, and is irreducible to the properties of the 'bare' means of production 
considered outside of their specific historical social form.  Capital therefore is 
identified by various different characteristic forms of behaviour which the means 
of production exhibit only under these over  arching social forms. Subsumed under 
capitalist relations, the means of production are considered as  capital. Bare 
means of production contain the potential to be capital and that potential is 
actualised as the means of  production are first formally and then really made to fit 
with the dominant social relations, whose emergence is conditional on the 
emergence of landless labourers and so on. Once they are so  subsumed, they 
behave in certain specific and theoretically specifiable ways. It is unnecessary 
then to vindicate the ontological and epistemological procedures involved here on 
the basis that Marx accurately drew out the ways in which capital would actually 
behave; in terms of the tendency of  the rate of  profit to fall and so on. Rather, this 
is a secondary problem, with its own difficulties, at some distance from capturing 
the nature of the entity: thing or relation, which the word capital picks out. In 
writing a history of capital rather than a history of the technical development of 
production  techniques,  Marx  exhibits  his  commitment  to  a  historical, 
supraindividual ontology in which capital exists as a distinct category. This sense 
in which Marx has a historical and not a supra historical ontology cannot be 
captured by a method that takes as its building blocks bare individuals. The 
removal of conceptions of social forms which make the furniture of the world into 
constructs specific to particular epochs leaves out the very forms of behaviour 
which go on to make means of  production capital. 
28 Marx, Capital 3 trans. D. Fernbach, intro. E. Mandel (Harmondsworth. 1981) 
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Elster considers such investigations into the inner necessity of political economic 
categories  as  a  'quasi-deductive  method';  which  (after,  but  without 
acknowledgement to, Bohm-Bawerk in Karl Marx and the Close of  his System) he 
calls dialectical deduction. On this he pours scorn - it is 'barely intelligible', 
'dazzlingly obscure' and a 'conceptual sleight of hand'29 and at the root of this 
characterisation is his rejection of  Aristotelian potentialities which was first raised 
in  Logic and Society: 
I do not advocate an Aristotelian conception of potentialities; possibilities 
are not shadowy entities that hover between non existence and existence 
and exercise some kind of causal influence on the actual. Possible worlds 
are not out there awaiting further inspection.30 
His gloss is that instead of using dialectical deduction to explain the emergence of 
the reinvestment motive in early capitalism we must look at the motives of 
individual economic agents. But this begs the question: why did those economic 
agents have those motives? Any explanation of motivation in Marx studies has to 
be cognisant of what Marx says about the socially determined nature of the 
interests that agents bring to the market place,  as argued above, and thus the 
ways in which wider social forces, entities, and processes set up or close down on 
the  courses  of action that individuals  can take.  Such explanations  are, 
necessarily, supra individual. 
Theodicy and methodology in social theory 
If  we return to the intellectual concerns of Elster's account of Marx's theory of 
history, it  can be shown that the broad treatment of  its roots in Hegel and Leibniz 
does not warrant the strength of the methodological commitments that Elster 
traces through his reading of  particular issue, since it amounts to a conflation of 
several separable issues. There are, for  example, some obvious  problems in 
imputing to Marx a similar sort of speculative theory to Leibniz, apart from 
simply showing that particular views of history were reflective of different 
historical  conditions.  For there is  certainly a  case  to  be  made that the 
Enlightenment thinkers associated with the atomistic view that counters those of 
Hegel, Leibniz and Marx, were equally likely to run to God for justification of their 
social and political viewpoints: 
For Locke, individual rights were a matter of each persons being the 
km  hi  d  rt  f God which meant that 'we were made to last  wor  ans  p an  prope  y 0 
29 Elster Making Sense of  Marx pp. 37-39 
30 Elster Logic and Society p. 7 156 
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durmg His not one another's pleasure'. Each was responsible for himself 
and his destiny in a way that no given social relation could mediate and this 
was the basis of  the requirement of  individual consent to be governed, which 
when elaborated across a whole society added up to the a theory of the 
social contract. Locke's radical position was that [governing arrangements 
against the will of people] did violence to the status of the individual as 
God's property by treating him as though his own responsibility for himself 
did not matter  .....  Whether anything like the Lockean view can work once 
God is removed from the picture is another question.  31 
The greatest social atomist of them all, Thomas Hobbes, who points us towards 
consideration of 'men as if but even now sprung out of the earth, and suddenly 
like mushrooms, come to full maturity, without all kinds of engagement each 
other.'32 is often interpreted in a secular way, but is revealed in a recent study as a 
profoundly religious thinker  .33 
Is Elster then partaking of  a religious philosophy of History in his imprecations for 
a (Calvinist?) methodological individualism? The charge would be an outrageous 
conflation of secular social  methodological and ontological positions and the 
religiosity that formed the back drop to the intellectual life of the late sixteenth 
and early seventeenth century. Both a broadly drawn teleological view of history, 
and a broadly drawn focus on the individual,  served to indicate the repository of 
God's will in competing theological conceptions of man's place in the world.  To 
project such concerns into Elster's position would be to do  him as great an 
injustice as he does to Marx. Instead of  such swipes it is more useful to look at the 
focal point of dispute between Elster and an Aristotelian Marx: the notions of the 
clash between human potential and the social form as the motor of history. Does 
this involve a theodicy? 
Two controversies reported above will make it clearer; First, referring back to the 
discussion of Marx's doctoral dissertation, gives an indication of the extent to 
which Marx's thought was radical, human centred and teleological form the very 
first.  These features are prominent for example in the argument over the 
existence of heavenly bodies, its 'I hate the pack of Gods'  animus, and the 
31 Waldron, J., By the Roots review of  the Anatomy of  anti-liberalism by Stephen 
Homes in London Review of  Books ( February 1995. 
32 Hobbes, T., in The English Works of  Thomas Hobbes ed. Sir  William (London, 
1839)  ii, p. 103  Z"  d 
33 Martinich, A. P., The Two Gods of  Leviathan; Thomas Hobbes on Re zgwn an 
Politics Cambridge 1992 reviewed in History of  Political Thought 1992 pp. 329 -
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EpIcurean, teleologIc~, demal of the existence of the heavenly bodies to satisfy the 
needs of  the self  COnsCIOUS human subject. 
Second it is clearly true that in Marx there exists the idea that there is a collective 
actor; humanity, conceived of as a species. This idea takes its strength from the 
considerations over identifying natural kinds that was discussed in an earlier 
chapter. To identify a thing as belonging to a species is to identify it as behaving in 
certain law like ways, not to separate a species member and then to see how it 
behaves. On the Aristotelian model that Marx worked with, there is an imperative 
to look at species behaviour, before considering the behaviour of the particular, 
and of course, Marx's concern is with the human species  and the types of 
behaviour that it gets Up to. Consideration of types is the driving concern of social 
holism and the methodological holism (which it must be  said, need not be 
teleological) against which Elster inveighs. Types of  behaviour can have different 
material and historical instantiations so reference has to be  made in their 
explanation to the general and formal features of the situations in which they 
occur. 
Elster's reconstruction of  Marx's philosophical anthropology 
Elster is comprehensively dismissive of Marx's work on the nature of man and 
regards it as one of  the areas of  his thought that is in large part hopelessly vitiated 
by his teleological conception of history. Thus his ideas on Man and nature are 
'rambling and incoherent, or inherentlytrivial.'34 He outlines the status of some of 
Marx's theories as 'appearing to be speculative philosophy of a kind that is now 
discredited.' and adds that 'some belong to the Aristotelian tradition within moral 
philosophy which tries to derive statements about the good life for man from an 
analysis of human nature.' Like many others, including those commentators who 
notice the ancient origins of Marx's thought, he does not consider the possibility 
that these  two  features  might be  related by their shared metaphysical 
foundations. The existence of such a link though, is clear, and absence of its 
working through should warn us against interpretations that acknowledge an 
Aristotelian basis for Marx's discrete moral view and do  not carryover the 
discussion into the wider ramifications of that view for the metaphysics of his 
wider social view. 
I argued above that humanity engaging in productive and creative human activity 
in relation to the natural world was the basis of Marx's social ontology. But this 
social matter has imposed on it a  social form which is alien to it. The form 
contains the principle of persistence of the whole while the matter contains its 
34  Elster, Making Sense of  Marx ,p. 55 158 
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principle of change. This sets up a dynamic tension between the potential matter 
of society concreted in  alienated, abstract labour and the formal and real 
domination of the productive process established by the forcible imposition of 
capitalist social relations on that matter. The requirements of unity (that allows 
us to speak of capitalist society as an organised whole) generate this ever present 
tension. That tension is both exacerbated by and reflected in the possibility of and 
potential for a  different set of social relations. On this interpretation Marx's 
Aristotelian ethic and his Aristotelian ontology are united as a coherent social 
ontology. how does this match up to Elster's explanation? There are terminological 
problems; Elster rejects the idea that there is a coherent way in which Marx's 
thought can be described as materialist. Further more, he argues with Cohen that 
the appropriate antonym to matter is social rather than mental, or, we might add, 
formal.  Since he also has rejected an Aristotelian picture of potentialities (see 
above) it is not likely that he could incorporate the conception of humans as 
potential matter without dropping the commitment to MI. 
In his account of alienation then, Elster pursues a rigid distinction between 
objective and subjective alienation and is critical of Wood who draws together the 
two phenomena.35  Elster accepts the possibility of the existence of objective 
alienation but comments: 
we may be able to single out some feature of capitalism by virtue of which 
it ought to be abolished, and to offer an argument that a society is possible 
in which that feature is not found. Yet this offers no answer to the question 
of  how the abolition is to occur, and what causal role the feature will have in 
the abolition if it occurs. If  we condemn it capitalism by virtue of a purely 
objective alienation there is no reason to expect it to set up pressure on 
social arrangements ...  Marx entertained a  speculative philosophy of 
history that authorised him to neglect this difficulty or at least to give it 
less attention than it  required.  36 
Two comments are worth making. If  Marx 's work amounted to selecting a feature 
of capitalism by virtue of which it ought to be abolished, then it would have 
amounted to very much less than, and be considerably shorter than, it is. He does 
'.  al  h'  b  hich 'ob·i ective alienation is  In fact give an account of the caus  mec  amsm  y w  " 
to be abolished'in his account of  and personal intervention in political activity. The 
point is better inverted: such accounts and such activity would not make sense 
unless there was some sort of driving force in a very general sense that gave them 
35 Elster, Making Sense of  Marx pp. 74-75. 
36 Elster, Making Sense of  Marx p. 76 some chance of success. 
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But the deeper problem in Elster's analysis is the distinction between objective 
and subjective alienation that he draws. Alienation after all, is primarily the 
alienation of human productive activity and that activity has an irreducibly 
subjective content since it is intentional: since man differs from the spider in 
directing an image of the web before he constructs the web there is no possibility 
of him being forever unconscious of the limits placed on intentional activity. 
Human productive activity poiesis which is the ontological condition of existence is 
essentially subjective 
In this vein it is critically inadequate to go through Making Sense of  Marx pointing 
out where Elster misreads Marx. More important is to look at the techniques that 
Elster himself uses and to ask whether they are appropriate to the task of Marx 
interpretation; or to assess the second part of the Elster project before looking at 
the first. I have argued above for the importance of getting Marx's ontological 
commitments right, and it is thus equally valid to ask about the same ontological 
commitments in the work of those who seek to analyse him. It  might be objected 
that ontological commitments are too  slippery to provide the basis for a serious 
critique of  Elster's interpretation of Marx, and this would seem to be reinforced by 
the fact that he himself does not elaborate an ontology; his critique of Marx is 
sustained at an epistemological and methodological level, and not an ontological 
one. Is it then, a distortion of Elster to direct fire at what is at best only half 
explicit in his work? The reasons for having an ontological focus are, in short, that 
ontological positions throw up different epistemological questions. Methodological 
individualism has at  least two ontological commitments embedded in it; that there 
are no supraindividual entities that are causally effective, and that reducing the 
time lag is essential for generating the best explanations. this second relies on a 
Humean account of causation that foregrounds  temporal contiguity as  a 
desideratum of explanation. As argued above, it is a question of ontological choice 
that, at least in part determines what sort of questions we should ask of a theory, 
what sort of substantive theses count as a good answer, and consequently, what 
methodological approach is appropriate to that theory. 
Elster does not entirely exclude the notion of  social contradiction however and he 
discusses two types of social contradiction discussed in Logic and Society, 
counterfinality and sub-optimality. Counterfinality is the idea that uncoordinated 
actions may come to grief through the mechanism of unintended consequences. 
By contrast, sub-optimality involves the intentional productio.n of sub-.optimal 
consequences by social actors, and here the  paradigm is the pnsoners dilemma. In Radical Philosophy, Joseph McCamey says that: 
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The contrast lies in the fact that, while sub-optimality is a game theoretic 
notion presupposing strategic rationality on the part of the players, counter 
finality can arise only at a pre-strategic, pre-game theoretic stage. This 
stage is for Elster the true home of Marx's methodological expertise.37 
But in an earlier piece in Inquiry38 Elster suggests that the divide between 
counter finality and sub-optimality is the divide between traditional and modern 
societies, a contention that has the unfortunate consequence that Marx's chief 
theoretical advance is useless for understanding capitalism: 
While  Marx's  methodological  contribution  may  be  of use  to  the 
anthropologist or ancient historian, it can have little to offer the student of 
capitalism39 
If  it is accepted, as has been argued, that different explanatory strategies are 
applicable at different times within the development of one specified social entity, 
because of its development through different phases, then even more so  will 
explanatory strategies differ across historical epochs, so there can be no objection 
to Elster's strategy on that basis. But it is a little perverse that Marx's central 
insight appears to be inapplicable to his central theoretical object; capitalism. 
Elster's Marx is a man who got things very, very wrong, and his body of work 
would then be in a worse state than even Elster seems to think here about the 
different explanatory strategies offered in different social epochs. 
Elster, Marx, and Stalin 
The teleological conception of  history that is the besetting sin of Elster's Marx is 
alleged to be deeply implicated in the practice of Stalinism. It  is worth looking 
closely at how Elster attempts to carry this off.  He says that Marx in his own 
words felt forced to: 
say to the workers and the petty bourgeois: it is better to suffer in modern 
bourgeois society which by its industry creates the material means for the 
foundation of a new society that will liberate you all than to revert to a 
bygone form of society which, on the pretext of saving your classes thrust 
37 McCarney, J., 'Analytical Marxism: a new Paradigm?' in Radical Philosophy 43 
38 Elster, Inquiry 23 pp. 216-7  , .  .  . 
39 McCarney, J., 'Analytical Marxism: a new Paradigm? m Radzcal Phllosophy 43 the entire nation back into mediaeval barbarism.4o 
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Elster's gloss on this passage is that if  you 'substitute the peasantry for the petty 
bourgeoisie, and primitive socialist accumulation for modem bourgeois society, 
and you have the classic justification for Stalinism' 41 So the liquidation of the 
Kulaks, the show trials, the Gulags and all the panoply of Stalinist repression are 
traceable from Marx's speculative philosophy of history. 
Such an account makes one want to pause for breath. One problem with it is that 
it seems to violate Elster's own methodological positions, since the substitutions 
involved are of classes as collectivities  actors and social forms,  the sort of 
collective entities that Elster's methodological individualism rules out of court. 
This is perhaps the root of his formalistic substitution. If  classes, as such, do not 
really exist in a way that is reducible to individual actors, then we  are more 
entitled to play fast and loose with them, substituting different collectivities and 
social forms here and there and seeing what happens. If  talk of classes and social 
forms is only shorthand, simplifications designed for pragmatic instrumental 
political effect then we need not be too careful about their use. If  however, we 
follow Marx in saying that the peasantry and the petty bourgeoisie are not the 
same sorts of thing, and neither are primitive socialist accumulation and modern 
bourgeois  society, that they are processes and substances with their own 
characteristic forms of behaviour, then Marx can hardly be blamed for producing 
statements which can have their entire meaning changed by a little judicious 
substitution.  It is worth adding that, in contrast to the political practitioners of 
Stalinism, Marx was not in a position to do any more than persuade this audience 
that a course of action was in their interests, and that Stalinism worked slightly 
differently: just a little more emphasis was placed on coercion. 
Siding with the opponents of those who propose the adoption of MI into debates 
about Marx and Marxism is not a very surprising manoeuvre. What is significant 
is the way in which this position is argued. In this chapter I have examined the 
case  put forward  by Elster, in order to  show  some  of its metaphysical 
shortcomings, and it is on the ontological plane that the correspondence to the 
hard core of Marx's project is to be discovered. It is not the case, as Lukacs has 
famously argued that orthodoxy in Marxism consist only in matters of method; 
there are substantive positions which also are an essential part of the Marxian 
perspective. But there are ontological positions involved too,  and these are 
displaced by MI. In different hands, MI offers a kill (Popper, Hayek and Watkins) 
40 Marx Neue Rheinische Zeitung 22.1.1849, cited in  Elster Making Sense of  Marx 
pp.  116-117 
41 Elster: Making Sense of  Marx p. 117 162 
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or cure (Elster and Roemer) solution to what a diagnosis as the problems within 
Marxism.  The earlier theorists have the advantage of thorough going political and 
ideological opposition to Marxism. It is tempting to argue, somewhat cheekily to 
the Elster wing of the MI offensive; that the cure may work at the expense of the 
death of the patient. 
There are other areas where ontological problems have led to political ones. One 
such forms the subject of the last chapter which looks at Lukacs' Social Ontology 
of  Being. CHAPTER NINE 
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MARXISM AND TOTALITY: LUKAcs' SOCIAL ONTOLOGY 
Introduction 
One token of the relative lack of attention to questions of ontology amongst those 
interested in the high theory of  Marx (compared to, for example, Marx's economics, 
or his theory of history) is the lack of attention paid to the work of Georg Lukacs 
on this subject. Lukacs has a plausible claim to be the most celebrated and well 
known of Marxist philosophers this century, and yet his last major work Zur 
Ontologie des Gesellschaftlichen Seins (The Ontology of  Social Beingl ), has been 
chronically under researched. It has not been published in a  full  English 
translation, perhaps because when it has been examined the assessments have 
usually been critical. But some of  these criticisms are misplaced. In attempting to 
articulate a reaction to, and auto-critique of his earlier idealism, as  expressed in 
History  and  Class  Consciousness,  Lukacs grapples with the interpretative 
possibilities brought out by Marx's relationship to Hegel and the revolutionary 
intellectual innovations that came from Marx's integration of Hegelian ideas. In 
the course of  this he outlines a conception of Marx's own position that ends up, in 
some respects, not very far removed from the interpretation of Marx outlined 
above.2 Nonetheless, Lukacs' study has not been the object of sustained critical 
reVIew. 
In the following  treatment,  however,  a  critical distance  from  Lukacs  is 
constructed,  distinguishing Marx's Aristotelian social ontology from the version 
provided by Lukacs. The argument proceeds in a similar manner to the previous 
chapter, outlining the divergences between Marx's view, as here interpreted, and 
the  rewriting of Marx's central assumptions  implicit in the reconstruction 
attempted by Elster. The examination of Elster's account is much the easier task, 
since it is largely sufficient to bring to light Marx's own commitments and 
intellectual history and then to compare these commitments and history to those 
of the analytical Marxists, in order to show the radical discontinuity and 
discongruence between the two. By contrast, Lukacs tends to fall on the right side 
1 Lukacs, G., The Ontology of  Social Being  (London, 1978) translated by David 
Fernbach in three volumes: 1. Hegel, 2. Marx, 3. Labour. 
2 Only three chapters of  the work have been produced in  transla~on,  ~~ug~  they 
represent the most significant parts of the complete w?rk. ~~t  IS mISSIng  ~s th~ 
first two sections of  Part One, on Neopositivism and eXlstentIalism, and on Nik?lru 
Hartmann, respectively, and the last three sec~ons of Part two, on Reproduction, 
Ideology and Aliena  tion. There is however, qUIte  e~ough reproduced to  allo~. a 
critical judgement to be made. Here I follow Parkinson who suggests that In 
discussing these chapters we may be confident, that we shall mee~ the central 
ideas of the Ontology of Social Existence' Parkinson, G.H.R., Lukacs  (London. 
1977) 164 
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in many of the serious methodological debates over Mar Fl'  ...  '.  .  x.  or examp e,  In 
~pe~I~yIng. hiS. own ontologIcal  pO~ItIons, Lukacs' opposition to methodological 
mdiVldualism IS complete, and admirably straightforward. 
Nonetheless, I want to argue that his reading is still inadequate and  fails to 
reproduce the dynamism and realism that exist in the conception of social 
ontology used by Marx. The Hegelian influence is manifested in the language and 
concepts favoured as propadeutic devices in the Ontology which stand in clear 
contrast to the almost complete absence or dismissal of such terminology in the 
work of the analytical Marxists. This renders Lukacs' work, especially the first 
volume, somewhat impenetrable, although it simultaneously reorientates the 
discussion in something like the right direction. But at root the problems in the 
design and practice of  his work stem from Lukacs failure  to integrate Aristotelian 
ontological lessons into his redrawing of  Marx's ontology fully and adequately. This 
has the unfortunate politico-theoretic consequence of exacerbating the tendency 
to over-totalisation in Marxist writing. This failing on a philosophical level was 
intermingled with a  political and ideological commitment: Lukacs uncritical 
acceptance of  the doctrine of  socialism in one country. 
Lukacs'  Ontology of  Social Being 
Lukacs' concentration on ontology dates from the end of 19643 and lasted up to his 
death in 1972. It emerged from his desire to  follow the Specificity of  the Aesthetic 
with a comprehensive account of ethics from a Marxist standpoint. However, he 
rapidly became convinced that such an ethics would be an impossible project 
without an ontology with which to pin it down; a conviction  summed up in  his 
aphorism: 'no ethics without ontology' and his belief in 'the impossibility of positing 
an ethics without also positing a world-situation'4. 
The work is divided into two halves, each of four chapters; the Present Situation, a 
survey of philosophical schools which looks at Neopositivism and Existentialism, 
and the work of Nikolai Hartmann, before going on to discuss first Hegel and then 
Marx.  The second section is headed The Most Important Problems, the first of 
which is Labour but which also goes on to cover Reproduction, Ideas and Ideology, 
and Alienation. The Ontology  as a  whole offers an account of Marx's social 
ontology and its roots in Hegel and Aristotle. Because of its recognition of these 
intellectual roots it gives an account which is more well founded than the minimal 
account of  Marx's social ontology offered by Elster, since it proceeds from a clearer 
3 See the letters to Ernst Fischer of  May 101960 and the notes 'Kleine Not~zen 
zur Ethik' 67, cited in  Tertulian, 'Lukacs' Ontology'. in Rockmore et ale Lukacs 
Today: Essays in Marxist Philosophy (Lancaster  ,1988). 
4 cited in  Tertulian, N., 'Lukacs' Ontology' 165 
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relationship to, and understanding of the philosophical traditions implicated in 
Marx's own account. But this is more than a comparison on the sam  1  .  e pane, SInce 
the approach to historical questions in the interpretation of Marx differs 
considerably. 
Perhaps the most important methodological divide between Lukacs and the 
methodological individualist Marxists such as Elster, lies in Lukacs acceptance of 
the Hegelian idea that there are no 'bare' philosophical concepts, rather, that such 
concepts gain meanings from their particular historical use.  The implication of 
this is that there are no firm divisions between a discipline called philosophy and 
another called the history of  philosophy, and that, to the extent that such divisions 
are constructed, both areas are spoiled. Thus to do work in philosophy is to do 
work in the history of  philosophy at the same time. Marx's categories are not the 
product of a virgin birth, to be taken simply at face value, but resonate with the 
meaning and use imparted to them from the classical world,  amongst other 
influences. This is something the analytical Marxists have very largely missed, 
because of the analytical demand to dissect the language used by philosophers 
into simple statements. Lukacs, to his credit, is so imbued with this dialectical 
consideration of philosophical terms that he barely considers the alternatives to 
an account of the development of conceptual ideas, as well as of their content. 
In the conversations that Lukacs took part in with Holz, Kofler, and Abendroth, 
he argues for an ontological focus because: 
if  I want to understand phenomena genetically, then the path of ontology is 
completely unavoidable, and the problem is to pick out, in the midst of 
many contingencies which accompany the genesis of any phenomenon, the 
typical moments, those necessary for the process itself. That is certainly 
the basic reason why I regard the ontological question as the essential one; 
from an ontological pint of  view, the precise boundaries drawn between the 
sciences playa secondary role.5 
Not only is the Marxian imperative to understand phenomena genetically  a 
determinant of an ontological focus,  but Lukacs derives the categories  of 
obligation (Sollen) and value (Wert) from his discussion of labour as the definitive 
element social ontology. A full account of these concepts would be found in the 
Ethics  Lukacs never lived to write. But there can be little doubt that the 
..  .  f S  . lB' g  uives the basis for their  diSCUSSIon  of labour In the Ontology 0  OCl,a  el,n  ~A 
derivation. Within his social ontology, teleology is the essence of labour, and this 
5 Pinkus, T., (ed.), Conversations with Lukacs (London, 1974) p. 16 166 
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positing of an end which makes sense of  the activity involved in labour bridges the 
gap between 'is' and 'ought', by discriminating between means and alternatives 
that would be better, or worse, at bringing the posited end about. Lukacs argues 
that: 
the immediate determining moment of every action that is intended as a 
realisation must be obligation, since every step of the realisation is 
determined by whether and how it  furthers the achievement of the goal. 6 
So ought is  deduced from is, at least in the sphere of means, as opposed to ends. 
There are certain things we ought, and ought not, to do in realising a specified goal, 
and so  the category of obligation,  so  essential to ethics, is derived from 
consideration of the foundation of social practice: labour.  By structuring his 
thought in this way, Lukacs showed that, in his view, the relationship between 
political  economy  and  ethics  was  mediated through  a  social  ontology. 7 
Consequently Lukacs' position fits ill with the separation of a political economy 
based on labour on one side and on the other, the discrete inquiry into ethics that 
is a characteristic of the recent interest in Marx's thought.  What is more, in his 
discussion of the Introduction to the Grundrisse Lukacs clearly places labour as 
the central category of his social ontology, going so far as to say that 'It is a 
commonplace that the Marxist ontology of social being assigns priority to 
production'8 
For Lukacs, whilst labour is the irreducible model for all social practice,  it also 
constitutes the defining element that make the social sphere social at all: 
with labour ... in comparison with the preceding forms of  being, the inorganic 
and the organic we have a qualitatively new category in the ontology of 
social being. In nature there are only actualities, and an uninterrupted 
change in  their existing concrete forms. It  is precisely the Marxian theory of 
labour as the sole existing form of a teleologically produced existence that 
6 Lukacs, G., The Ontology of  Social Being 3.  Labour p. 82 cited in Parkinson p. 
194. 
7 This fits easily with the conceptions drawn up earlier in  ~s  thesis that m.ake the 
same connection; of social matter as potential matter, In th~ form of ahena~d 
labour, that is in conflict with the form given br the  ~01~llnant se~ of.  socI~1 
relations under which the constitutive productIve  aC~Ivity of .capitalism  ~: 
subsumed On this model the unleashing of  human potential, conceived as ~arx  ~ 
ethical gO~ is integrated with the account of the crisis ri~de~ and co~tradictory 
,  d hi  ..  f  Italism are Integrated  nature of capitalism. Marx's ethic an  s critique 0  cap  h 
through the model of Aristotelian hylomorp~sm, ~d  so ontology becomes t  e 
essential underpinning to ethical, as well as SOCIal enqwry. 
8 Lukacs, G., The Ontology of  Social Being p. 59 Marx founds for the first time the specificity of  social being.9 
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Whilst there is some truth in this depiction of Marx's structuring  ts  d .  concep  ,an  it 
in line with the overall Aristotelian conception of Marx  Luka'c  rth I  ,  s neve  e ess 
rejects what he sees as over-strained attempts to assimilate the entire scope of 
ontology to Aristotle, and incorporates a critique of Aristotle into the Ontology. 
Lukacs' critique of  Aristotelian teleology 
While he incorporates the Aristotelian category of dunamis into his social 
ontology, Lukacs is critical of any attempts to work with a non-human teleology, 
seeing such attempts as theological, and he is critical of Aristotle and Hegel in so 
far as they do just this. Indeed the history of philosophy is  pushed, rather 
schematically,  into three camps; the theological  exponents of a  universal 
teleology, the  denial of teleology by pre-Marxist materialists and the successful 
resolution of  the conflict between teleology and causality by Marx himself; 
Every philosophy with a  theological orientation needs to  proclaim the 
superiority of teleology over causality in order to bring its god into mental 
agreement with the cosmos and the world of man. Even if  god simply winds 
up the clock to set the system  in motion, this hierarchy of creator and 
creation is unavoidable, and with it  the associated priority of the teleological 
positing. Every  pre-Marxist materialism, ...  denying the transcendent 
creation of the world had also to challenge the possibility of a  really 
effective teleology. .  .. But once teleology is recognised, as by Marx, as a 
really effective  category, exclusive to  labour,  the  concrete  real  and 
necessary coexistence of  causality and teleology inexorably follows. 10 
Lukacs shows here that he shares the standard view of the place of teleology in 
Aristotle's system; as an over  arching cosmological principle.  It functions as a 
principle that always entails the existence of a subjective agent in order to  set the 
teleological process in motion. As a result of this reading,  Lukacs condemns the 
way that: 
the teleological positing is not confined to labour,  (or in the expanded but 
justifiable sense to human practice in general) but is rather erected into a 
h  .,  .  to  ersistent relationship  general cosmological category, t  us gIVIng flse  a p 
of competition,  an irresolvable antimony between causality and teleology 
such as has marked the entire history of philosophy  ... Aristotle's  ... system 
9 Lukacs, G., The Ontology of  Social Being 3, Labour p. 20 
10 Lukacs, G., The Ontology of  Social Being 3, Labour p. 9-10. 168 
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ascribes a decisive role to an objective teleology of reality  H  I  ...  ege ... made 
teleology into the motor of history and hence of his total world view. This 
antithesis pervades the entire history of thought and the religions, from the 
beginning of  philosophy through to Leibniz's pre-established harm  11  ony. 
and asserts, by way of contrast, the programmatic claim that·  , 
it is clear from Marx's attitude toward Darwin and self evident for anyone 
familiar with his thought that Marx denied the existence of any kind of 
teleology outside of  labour (human practice)12 
This claim is, of course, highly contestable. It has been shown that Marx's thought 
is imbued with teleological accounts that go well beyond the scope of single acts of 
labour;13 what Meikle, Elster and Cohen would disagree about is not whether these 
accounts are present in Marx but whether they are sustainable and intellectually 
respectable. Why then did Lukacs take such a  peculiar line in denying the 
presence of  wide ranging teleological explanations in Marx? 
The answer lies in his wish to avoid committing Marx to the use of teleology as a 
universal cosmological principle, and the belief that this was just how teleology 
functioned in  Aristotle. This indeed was the standard interpretation and Lukacs' 
understanding of this feature of Aristotle's thought clearly has its roots in his 
study of  Hartmann, whom he admires as the only non Marxist philosopher to take 
dialectics  seriously.  Lukacs  takes from  Hartmann the interpretation of 
Aristotle's teleology as a universal cosmological principle, structuring a world 
which is only subject to disturbance as an afterthought. Hartmann had argued 
that: 
there are also external conditions which can hinder realisation ... [of final 
ends] They constitute a sort of  foreign body within Aristotle's world picture, 
an imperfection, something 'fortuitous', whose origins cannot be indicated 
through any of  the officially authorised channels.  14 
But is it the case that for Aristotle teleology is erected into a general cosmological 
category? It is certainly true that the Scholastic, Christian and anti-scientific 
thinkers in the Aristotelian tradition held such a point of  view, but this is perhaps 
11 Lukacs, G., The Ontology of  Social Being; 3, Labour p. 4. 
12 Lukacs, G., The Ontology of  Social Being 3, ~abour p. 8.  . 
13 See, in  their own ways, Meikle, Essentialism In the Thou~ht  of  Karl Marx, Elster, 
Making Sense of  Marx; and Cohen, Karl Marx's Theory of  HlSix?ry  .  . 
14  Hartmann, N., KleinereSchriften IT (Berlin, 1957), p. 86, CIted m WIeland. 169 
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attributable to what Wieland calls 'their blind and often naive tru t .  th·  s  In au  onty 
which shaped their wholesale rejection of the new scientific outlook.' 15  But 
Hartmann's conflation of  this position with that of Aristotle is flawed. As Wieland 
argues in 'The Problem of Teleology'16,  Hartmann's view of  teleology as the 
universal and supreme principle of  Aristotle's Physics is mistaken. 
In contrast, Wieland asserts that, far from being purpose providing a universal 
principle, with chance as a foreign body, 'the fact is that Aristotle's theory of 
teleology cannot be understood properly unless it is taken to presuppose his doctrine 
of  chance. '17  On this interpretation, chance is depicted as indicative of an 'as if 
teleology, in that an event that occurred by chance  could have occurred  for the 
sake of an end. Aristotle argues that chance is the cause only of what nature too 
could be the cause: 'Spontaneity and chance are causes of effects which though 
they might result from intelligence or nature, have in fact been caused by 
something incidentally'18 
Far from being a theologically inspired and universal principle, Aristotle's concept 
of teleology functions as a way of investigating the existents in a relatively well 
ordered world. Wieland offers a new interpretation of Aristotle in which natural 
teleology does not follow from the existence of God (or vice versa: the Argument 
from Design) but rather consists of a way of making sense of the natural world 
and the way in which we refer to it: 
when we speak of art and nature we employ the same linguistic structures, 
without thereby having the right to transfer the whole  content of 
characterisations made in one sphere to the other. In both cases we make 
assertions  about changes primarily from  the point of view  of their 
outcomes. When Aristotle argues his doctrine of natural teleology, he is only 
drawing the consequences of  this fact; if  we want to do justice to the order in 
nature we have to consider its processes from the point of view of their 
results in science too,  and we can only reason from  results to their 
necessary conditions, for the opposite way does not lead to any fruitful 
conclusions:  chance  and  goal-directedness  constitute  exhaustive 
alternatives. Thus Aristotle's doctrine of  teleology is grounded in experience 
throughout and aims only at serving the interpretation of experience: a 
15 Wieland, W., 'The Problem of  Teleology' , in  Articles on Aristotle vol. One ed. 
Barnes Schofield and Sorabji, (London, 1975), p. 256. 
16 Wieland, W., 'The Problem of  Teleology' 
17 Wieland, W.,'The Problem of  Teleology'  p. 143. 
18 Aristotle, Physics 198a 5-7 170 
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theological foundation for teleology is no longer a prerequisite.  19 
Aristotle's teleology is not the unfolding of a grand plan of an unm  d  b  ove  mover,  ut 
a methodological device founded on the retrospective nature of explanation. The 
fact that the two options for explanation are chance and goal directedness means 
that any explanation of a relatively well ordered system has to start from the fact 
of its relatively well orderedness. In social theory, the need for  teleological 
explanations is a product of the regularities that are observable in social systems; 
the need to do justice to the relatively well ordered nature of the social world. This 
licences us to explain them as social systems of a specific sort, and to perform the 
same act of retrojection from consequences to necessary conditions. Teleology 
functions here not as a universal cosmological principle but as a way of explaining 
the nature of  social existence, and a methodological approach which, pace Lukacs, 
Marx clearly employed. 
It is striking that Lukacs finds the same catalogue of sins committed in the 
philosophical past as Elster. For Elster, Marx's work is vitiated by a speculative 
theory of history, a  theodicy without a  God,  drawn by Marx from Hegel and 
Leibniz. This which implicates him in Stalinism, by considering pre-communist 
human beings as so many lambs, condemned by a speculative theory of history, 
to the slaughter.  Elster argues that Marx commits this sin of incorporating a 
theodicy into his thought; Lukacs, grandly, though slightly incoherently, that he 
liberates the history of philosophy (no less) from it. Lukacs of,  course, would 
exempt Marx from the accusation of complicity in Stalinism, but his work still 
exhibits confusion on the methodological issues in social theory, because there is a 
tension in his thought over the place that should be given to human intentionality 
in the explanation of  action. The logic of  his position on teleology should lead his to 
reject a teleological explanation of  supra-individual collectivities, but he tends not 
to demand micro explanations, instead asserting the explanatory importance of 
the totality. 
There are two distinct issues involved here. Whether Marx incorporates a 'blind' 
teleology into his thought is an interpretative question, and most of the evidence 
points to Elster being right against Lukacs. Marx's work is teleological, and so 
much the better for it. Whether blind teleology is speculative and theological is the 
substantive issue. Both Elster and Lukacs agree that it is. But this question 
demands a more thorough assessment of just what it is that  the  teleology in 
Aristotle's metaphysics amounts to. 
19 Wieland, 'The Problem of  Teleology' p. 160. 171 
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Lukacs asserts that the characteristically Arist tel'  d  '  "  0  Ian rno  e of explanatIon: 
teleology, IS  appropriate to the social sphere but not to th  '  ,  .  ,  e inorgamc or orgaruc 
world that (ontologIcally as well as historically) prec d  't In  ,  .  e  es 1  .  contrast, many 
SOCIal theorists are much happier to allow teleology m' to th  '  ld  ,  e orgaruc wor  ,w  here 
the eXistence of feedback mechanisms within bI'oloaical  '  d 
0'"  orgarusms ten  s  to 
guarantee  explanations  of phenomena that occur  'for  the  sake or other 
phenomena. The thrust of Elster's attack is to  oppose any attempt to import 
such explanations into the large scale phenomena of the social world. The social 
world, is, as we have seen, sometimes analogised to the organic world just  in order 
that teleological explanations may be given plausibility. Lukacs and Elster differ  , 
in this social arena, such that Elster is the more consistent theorist. For both 
writers, teleology is  dependent on conscious intention and thus confined to the 
sphere of human practice. They differ in that Elster insists on methodological 
individualism whereas Lukacs sees social mechanisms as acting behind the backs 
of individuals and grants macro social phenomena a sui  generis existence. Citing 
Hegel's Phenomenology in support, he argues that: 
social being - whatever it may be in itself - does actually have an existence 
which is independent of  the individual consciousness of particular men, and 
has a high level of autonomously determining and determined dynamic in 
relation to the individual  ...  Rence it is entirely justifiable from the stand-
point of an ontology of social being, to ascribe to this totality, this dynamic 
and contradictory relationship of  individual acts, a being suigeneris20 
The claim made here is challenging and unequivocal, making a grander claim than 
most anti-reductionist social theorists would be happy with, and the entire 
account appears to run both close to Marx's view and strongly against the 
positions taken by methodological individualist Marxists such as Elster. But there 
are strains in Lukacs' ontology at this point. On one hand he argues that labour is 
a teleological project and the model for human social practice because it involves 
this intentional element; on the other hand, he insists on the suigeneris nature of 
social being and its independence from the individual consciousness and intentions 
of men. The question then arises of  whether it  is possible to resolve this tension in 
Lukacs Ontology. The stakes are raised if  we recognise that, on the face of it, in 
giving the central ontological role to labour, the Ontology is close to Marx's own 
account. 
T 
1_  th'  1  'th  there are social processes that are irreducible to  o mal\..e  e Issue c ear; el  er 
th 
.  t  ti  al  ti  f'  diVI'duals  or there are not Lukacs holds that there are:  em en  on  ac  ons 0 m,  . 
20 Lukacs, G., The Ontology of  Social Being ;1, Hegel's True and his False Ontology 
p.25 172 
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Elster holds that there are not. But given that these soc'al  ' 
1  processes are soclal 
they are to be explained, according to Lukacs  teleoloaicall  B  t Luk'  1"  ,  "  "  ,~....  y.  u  acs,  Ike 
Elster, rejects 'bhnd or objective teleology in his insI'stence  th  'al  I  '  on  e SOCI  wor d as 
the exclusi~e realm of  te~eological explanation, against Aristotle and Hegel. If  this 
aspect of hIS  approach IS  emphasised the position of Luka'cs  0  I  t'  ,  ,  n exp ana lOn IS 
inclined to collapse into that of Elster, with whom he would have little sympathy, 
and less apparent substantive agreement. If  the sui  generis nature of the social 
totality is emphasised, then they appear at opposite poles, What unites them is a 
hostility to pre-Enlightenment forms of teleology as speculative and theological. 
We  have already seen this in Elster's work where it acts as a motive for  the 
adoption for methodological individualism. In Lukacs, the dismissal of Aristotle's 
wider metaphysics leads to irresolvable tensions in the form  of a  dualistic 
ontology. 
Elster distinguishes between subjective and objective teleology; the first applies to 
the micro-level explanation of intentional actions, the latter, illicitly, to the 
explanation of  holistic phenomena in the social world. Lukacs by contrast, argues 
that teleological explanation derives from the intentional nature of human labour, 
but human labour is the model for all other social practices and so the social 
sphere is  amenable to  teleological  explanation.  This  social  sphere where 
teleological explanation is applicable is very wide, embracing holistic phenomena 
which are suigeneris, against methodological individualism and go on behind the 
backs of conscious individuals. 
Aristotle applies teleological reasoning to the natural as well as the social world, 
but in a different form. The teleological explanation of the growth of a tree does not 
demand the existence of a consciousness that makes the tree grow in a specific 
way;  it rather  demands  that we  understand that species  of tree  have 
characteristic modes of behaviour, by which they are identified as that particular 
sort of tree. What is problematic for Lukacs is that, if  there is some scope some 
scope for blind teleology in the social world, he is unwilling to accord any status to 
the model for that explanation; the organic world. He is thus open to attack from 
the perspective of Elster. The root of Lukacs problem is his failure to resolve the 
problem  of individuation;  since  this is what provides  the  concept  of the 
characteristic mode of  behaviour by which the teleological structuring of the social 
world can be understood. Trees, and the individuable contents of the natural world 
are particularly open to being individuated in this way, since the nomological basis 
of kinds applies at its best to natural kinds. But Marx applied such a methodology 
to the social world as well: this is what is meant by the genetical approach and the 
"all  th t  m the entities that constitute  content of the search for the spec!  aws  a  gove 173 
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capitalism; alienated labour, value, classes and the like  Th  °t  °  th  °d  f  .  us 1  IS  e 1  ea 0 
characteristic forms of  behaviour rather than that of a knowmg·  th t'  h  mover  a  is t  e 
best criterion for according the possibility of teleological explanation.  Lukacs is 
prevented from following this path by the lack of a clear criterion for individuation 
within his Ontology stemming fro the overemphasis on the notion of totality. 
Internal relations and social ontology 
One way in which the focus on totality has been expressed is in a development of 
the idealist view that deduces necessary connection from the idea of entailment. 
Causal interaction is seen as a real world manifestation of relations of entailment·  , 
analogous  to  saying,  for  example, that insults entail, rather than cause, 
annoyance. The correlative ontology to this interpretation of necessary connection 
is one in which every element in a complex whole is 'internally related' to every 
other element. However, this ontological picture poses its own problems for 
explanation, since it becomes impossible to isolate causally effective entities from 
the surrounding internally  related conditions, contexts, other entities and so on. In 
short, it becomes impossible to individuate. Such an approach therefore, not only 
waters down the de re and objective status of necessary connection, when it 
deduces a justification of  induction from the entailment of ideas, but it also diffuses 
the notion of a  powerful particular as the basic ontological entity into an infinite 
series of relations. On the other hand, the question of what makes a complete 
explanation and the avoidance of a regression into a 'bad infinity' can be overcome 
by the ontological status of  powerful particulars. 
Despite these problems such an ontology of internal relations has had some 
influence in underpinning an anti-individualist method of social analysis. When 
used in this way, the ontology of  internal relations rests on the notion of the social 
totality and it is Lukacs and the American theorist Bertell Ollman who emphasise 
most strongly the importance of this concept for Marx. Lukacs argues, in  the 
opening sentence of 'The Marxism of  Rosa Luxemburg' that: 
It is not the primacy of economic motives in historical explanation that 
constitutes the decisive difference between Marxism and bourgeois thought 
but the point of  view of  the totality. 21 
.  ,  I  ks  mO tentional description of social  He therefore Interprets Marx sater  wor  as an 
totality. This clearly implies a certain ontological view of the world as well  ~s a 
° .  C  Kit h'  or  for  the  methodological  methodological  pOSItion.  Whereas  lor  c  lng, 
.  ld .  n1  totality in so far as the observer  mdividuallsts such as Hayek, the wor  IS  0  Y a 
21 Lukacs, G., History and Class Consciousness (London, 1971) p. 27 174 
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develops a mental construct of fragmented phenomena as a  hiM  .  .  woe,  arx argues 
that It IS  because the world actually is an organic whole, brought together by 
nature that the method used to understand it must develop concepts appropriate 
to it: organic whole, totality, dialectical relations and so on  Agam" L"  1_-'  tr 
•  UlUlCS s  esses 
this point: 
The dialectical method is distinguished from bourgeois thought not only by 
the fact that it alone can lead to a knowledge of totality; it is also significant 
that such knowledge is only attainable because the relationship between 
parts and whole has become fundamentally different from what it is in 
thought based on the categories of reflection  ... in every aspect correctly 
grasped by the dialectic the whole totality is comprehended in that the 
whole method can be unravelled from every single aspect.22 
Successfully acquiring knowledge of one element of the totality therefore allows 
knowledge of the whole, because of the inherent relatedness of each element to 
every other. On Lukacs' interpretation, this dialectical relation of each to every 
other works not just at one particular time but elements in the present are related 
to those in the future and in the past, in virtue of their position and purpose within 
the totality. OIlman, in his work Alienation interprets Marx in a similar, arguing 
that Marx's 'conception of  reality as a totality composed of internally related parts 
and his conception of those parts as expandable relations is such that each one in 
its fullness can represent the totality.  '23 
On OIlman's interpretation, Marx posits phenomena as knowable only in virtue of 
the relations which they enter into, but he also 'goes a step further in conceptually 
interiorising this interdependence within each thing, so that the conditions of its 
existence are taken to be part of what it is. Each thing is a part of what 
everything else is. '24 
The legacy of  Hegel clearly influences this view in which the sum of all phenomena 
comprises a  single interrelated totality, which Lukacs and OIlman regard as 
Marx's own perspective. For Hegel, all elements are part of a single whole, whose 
elements are interdependent and interpenetrating. No element can exist without 
the other elements since each exists in and for the others. 
Ollman's argument in his earlier writings affirms that the positions of Hegel and 
22 Lukacs, History and Class Consciousness p. 27.  I ~ 
23 Ollman, B., 'Marxism and Political Science: Prolegomenon to a Debate on Marx , 
Method', Politics and Society 3 (1973), p. 495. 
24 Ollman, 'Marxism and Political Science' p. 495. 175 
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Marx are sImIlar, claImIng that Marx's conception of real'ty "  . 
1  IS  as a totalIty 
composed of internally related parts. The strength of Ollman'  "ti""  th  h  s POSI  on IS  at  e 
links this interpretation of Marx's method to his ontology  He  h'  h  .  emp  aSlses t  e 
importance of Marx's understanding of human beings and their relationship to 
nature, from which the notion of  reality as an organic whole derives.  According to 
Marx, people are both a part of nature and its transformers through the activity 
of material production. People related to nature through the mediation of 
productive activity both create artifacts out of it and simultaneously transform 
themselves and the conditions of their own existence Emphasising Marx's 
conception of 'man' as an 'ensemble of social relations'. Ollman responsors the 
view that people only  exist, and can only exist in relation to others, and to nature" 
Given that this is so, OHman points to the importance of relations for Marx's 
dialectical method; the basic unit of reality is not a thing, but a Relation and 
relations between relations. 
At this point, however, certain difficulties arise, as Ollman is aware. The greatest 
of these is the problem of  individuation, which Ollman discusses in relation to the 
work of the autodidact philosopher Joseph Dietzgen. The question is posed: 'how 
can knowledge be possible, if every phenomenon is related to the rest of reality? 
Hegel's own solution is to posit the movement of any particular in relation to the 
universal which then 'explains' the particular, but this only make sense on the 
basis of Hegel's metaphysical schema where, in Platonic fashion universals are 
prior to particulars. For Marx, and OHman this route is not available. AB a result, 
Ollman, who asserts that epistemology is possible, finds it difficult to explain how 
reality could be comprehended. It is clearly impossible to interrogate all the 
elements of reality simultaneously. The only alternative is to investigate aspects 
of reality taken as isolable parts, but this begs the question: how is it possible to 
divide reality into parts when each part is internally related to everything else? 
The question on this conception of social ontology is not just; where do we start? 
but rather; how can we start at all? 
As a solution Ollman offers the practice of  multiple counting; 'what appears as a 
thing here, may be taken as an attribute of some other thing there. Every quality 
.  ality; "t all d  ds on where  can be considered as a thing, and every thing as a qu  , 1  epen 
the line is drawn.  '25 This might make an Aristotelian uneasy since it appears to 
."  d  I  f:  t and loose with the distinction  make relative the notion of  substance an  p ay  as 
b  "  b  I  .  tb.i  "de  Ollman does have a view  etween substance and attrIbute,  ut,  eaVlng  s aSI  ,  " 
on how, if  not where the individuating line is to be drawn. He elaborates on thIS 
further with reference to Dietzgen: 
25 Ollman, B., Alienation (Cambridge, 1971). p. 38. 176 
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the whole is revealed in certain standard parts  ... because these are the parts 
in  which  human beings  through  conceptualisations  have  actually 
fragmented the whole.  The theoretical problem of individuation is 
successfully resolved by people in their daily practice.26 
However, this pragmatic solution of the problem of individuation cannot be 
satisfactory, especially on any understanding of the Marxian perspective as a 
critical perspective on our common sense understanding of the world.  The 
epistemological question of  how reality is conceptualised cannot be assumed to be 
resolved by the optimistic hope that people in their daily lives individuate 
correctly. That people do individuate is surely true, just as people take for granted 
other minds, or believe that the sun  will rise tomorrow, but what counts is whether 
people individuate in the right way, distinguishing necessary from accidental 
changes and the more important and fundamental relations from  the less 
important and less fundamental ones. Equally, the results of a method of multiple 
counting may be a many-sided explanation, but may also lead to an eclecticism 
present in allman's later work.27 
Lukacs who also sees the world as a totality of social relations, finds himself 
confronted with the same problem to which he adds another; perpetual change 
within the totality. 
If  a term is to be defined by its relations, all of which are equally important. 
we can only be said to understand a term if we know how it is related to 
everything else. And even if  this were possible, the relations change all the 
time and the term is consequently modified, so that we cannot identify 
terms from one moment to the next.28 
Lukacs comments that it  is difficult to imagine how the proletariat could exert any 
control over the world when there are no stable objects, and consequently no 
identifiable regular pattern of  behaviour  . 
.  .  hi  bl  .  to  rgue that not all relations are  The only serIOUS resolution to t  s pro  em IS  a  .  . 
equally important and that not all knowledge modifies the object known. ThIS IS 
26 allman, Alienation p. 38.  .  .  1  h  es that the 
27  In his latest work, Dialectical Investigati?ns: for  e~amp  e  dIc:~rship nor a 
Soviet Union 'is neither socialist nor capitahst,  nelt~er :  te  but contains 
democracy, neither a  workers state! nor.a bureau~ratw!cn! 7Ro~tiedge 1993), p. 
elements of all of these.'  allman, Dzalectwallnvestiga 
110. 
28 Lukacs, History and Class Consciousness p. 110. 177 
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the essence of Marx  s own posItion, and in specifyin'  g it th  '  e anCIent provenance of 
Marx's thought becomes clear In articulating the existen  f  rtain b'  ,  , ,  '"  ce 0  ce  aSIc SOCIal 
entIties, and certam basIc SOCIal relations  Marx does I'n  '  t th t  . ,  ,  SIS  a  some entities 
enter into relations and are not  therefore constituted b  th  S  h  .  ,  y  em,  0  t  ere  IS a 
distinction between the two approaches in that unlike Hegel  M  d  d  ,  "  ,  '  arx  oes not regar 
IndIVIduals  as wholly constituted by their relations, since the relations are 
themselves constituted by the actions of social entities.  In this way Marx's 
method is parasitic on his ontology since the social world becomes knowable only 
on the basis of accepting a specific view of the furniture it contains. Some of that 
furniture consists of ontologically basic substances which enter into external 
relations with other similar substances. 
The Problem of  Individuation in  Lukacs' Ontology 
When Lukacs confronts the task of systematically articulating a  Marxist 
ontology, these problems become magnified. The central concern of Lukacs is to 
reiterate his characteristic position,  which dates from  History  and Class 
Consciousness that Marx's perspective is that of the totality: 
The criticism of systems that we accept, and that we  find consciously 
developed in Marx, proceeds from the totality of the existent, and seeks to 
comprehend it as closely as possible in all its intricate and manifold 
relationships. Here the totality is in no way a formal and simple ideal but 
rather the reproduction in thought of the really existing, and the categories 
are not building blocks of a hierarchical system, but are actually forms of 
being,  characteristics of existence,  elements for  the construction  of 
relatively total real and dynamic complexes,  whose reciprocal inter-
relations produce ever more comprehensive complexes.29 
Unfortunately, recognition of  the validity of the Hegelian-Marxist notion of totality 
can cause more problems than it resolves. Just in this piece of text, the notion of 
the 'relatively total' is obscure (since the total either is total, or it is not) as is his 
rejection of categories as building blocks of a hierarchical system. The basis of 
Lukacs account of Marx's ontology derives from his positive evaluation of the 
traditional claim that Marx used Hegel's method while rejecting his system. This 
view was uncontroversial for the theorists of classical Marxism and is reiterated 
by Lenin. However it is seldom fully articulated in the canonical texts. It is 
accepted and validated by Lukacs on the basis that: 
With its ideals of  philosophical synthesis the system involves in particular 
29 Lukacs, G., The Ontology of  Social Being Marx p. 19. 178 
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the  prIncIple  of completion  and  closure  ide  th t  .  ..  '  as  a  are  completely 
IncompatIble wIth the ontological historicity of an  . te  t  d al 
to irresolvable antimonies in  Hegel's own work.30 
eXlS  n  an  ready led 
This is a radical statement.  By rejecting the notions of  I  ti  d  I  comp e  on an  c osure 
Lukacs aims to preserve the Marxian insight that phenomena are interrelated, 
and specifically to reject the static notion of the complete, bounded, element; the 
unchanging individual  abstracted out of any context (itself changing). But in 
arguing in this manner, Lukacs effectively makes epistemology,  and indeed 
ontology impossible. For what is essential to ontology is the outlining (note 
outlining - the drawing of  lines) of what there is and what there is not, and in this 
task the notions of  completion and closure are absolutely indispensable. The same 
applies to any epistemology which admits the know  ability of any element at all, 
since that which is known must be bounded from that which is not. Otherwise the 
apparently known, since not closed off from the unknown, must assuredly be 
infected by it. It is not logically possible that what is known necessarily includes 
what is not known.31 If  we take Lukacs seriously his only tenable epistemological 
position must be that of the absolute skeptic. 
In the course of his account of the system/method counter-position, both Engels 
and Kautsky are specifically inveighed against. Engels is charged both with 
occluding the distinctions between logic, epistemology and ontology and on the 
30  Lukacs, G., The Ontology of  Social Being Marx  p. 18 (italics added). 
31  Consider the Masked Man fallacy, which shows that I can know something 
under one description but not under another. Suppose I  am shown a man in a 
mask and asked whether I know him or not. I can truthfully assert that I do not 
know him, even though I truthfully assert that  I do know my father. However, the 
man in the mask is my father. What we have here is a basic substance, which is 
either known or not known according to which contingent description is applied to 
it 
Suppose though, that the descriptions were in a relation of lopcal necessity. In 
this case (assuming knowledge of the meanings of the words) It would not make 
sense to say that I knew my father but I did not know the man who begat me. To 
assent to this would simply be a confusion (if an enlightening one). If  I truthfully 
know my father, I must know the man who begat me.  . 
On the logical entailment model of  the internal relatedness ofth~  S?CIal world, we 
are concerned with the second model of knowledge. To know A It IS necessary to 
know all the elements to which A is necessarily related. But within a totality, A is 
related to all other elements  so that knowledge of A is knowledge of all the 
elements and of  the totality  its~lf, or it is knowledge of  nothing. If, for any  reaso~, 
knowledge of the entire totality is impossible, then all we are able to know IS 
notlrin~  . 
Ifhowever, we work on the first, Aristotelian model, we rum for knowledge of the 
basic substances. This knowledge is not dependent on the knowl~dge of ~l the 
contingent descriptions that might apply to that substa!lce. What IS clear IS  ~hat 
some sort of  boundary between substances is necessary if  knowledge of them IS to 
be possible. basis that: 
179 
Chapter }line 
Engels ... was less consistent and deep than Mar  d t  k  x an  00  over unaltered 
from.  Heg~l much that Marx rejected on the basis of deeper ontological 
consIderation or at least decisively modified.32 
Following the lead of  Engels, the orthodox Marxists of the Second International are 
critiqued for the importation ofundialectical rigidity into Marxism  33. The onus is 
thus placed heavily on Lukacs to make good his claim to redraw Marx's social 
ontology in a way that  delivers on the system/method distinction. His whole 
account here stems from his opposition to the hierarchical structuring of thought 
which is taken to be the central failing of Hegel's logicisation of history, and the 
corresponding view that Marx consistently separated ontology from epistemology. 
This philosophical view consequently frames a  role for  ontology as a  critical 
backstop: 
Only an uninterrupted and vigilant ontological criticism of that which has 
been established as a fact or a relation, a process or a law can reestablish 
in thought a true insight into the phenomena.  34 
If  we take this route the question is obviously posed of  just how the back stop role 
is to be made operative: what criteria are to be applied in this back stop role for 
assessing that which has been established as a fact or relation, and so on. This 
brings us back in the direction of the problem of individuation outlined above in 
connection with the discussion ofOllman's theory of  internal relations. 
The opening section of Lukacs second volume on Marx makes clear his picture of 
the totality as central to the enquiry of social being. These abstractions help to 
situate his account in the Hegelian tradition, with the caveats  about the 
ontological rather than logical structures implicated in the account outlined above. 
But they  give little guidance to Marx's actual methodological procedure, and evince 
a permeating uncertainty on how to demarcate the categories Marx regards as 
basic to his inquiry. Initially Lukacs considers the problem ahistorically35 and his 
reading is more dogmatic here, than later in the book when classes, capitalism and 
historicity are introduced36 As a result the viability and exposition of this part of 
32 Lukacs, G., The Ontology of  Social Being 2.  Marx  p.22. 
33 Lukacs, G., The Ontology of  Social Being 2. Marx  p. 2l. 
34 Lukacs, G., The Ontology of  Social Being 2. Marx  p. 29. 
35 Lukacs, G., The Ontology of  Social Being 2. Marx  p. 34. 
36 Lukacs, The Ontology of  Social Being 2. Marx 180 
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the work is weakened, and it  is not surprising that his critical  ~  .  th  1 
.  lOCUS IS on  e ear y 
parts of the IntroductIon to the Grundrisse  where Marx hlID'  If .  t hi  '  se  IS a  s most 
speculative, and tentative. Lukacs cites Marx's attack on the Hegelians and 
socialist belletrists who 'regard society as  a  single subject, that is  to  say 
speculatively'37 but his critical comment goes far beyond what Marx has to say: 
Here as on so many other occasions, Marx warns against making the 
irreducible, dialectical and contradictory unity of society, a unity that 
emerges as the end product of  the interaction of  innumerable heterogeneous 
processes into an intrinsically homogeneous unity, and impeding knowledge 
of this unity by inadmissible and simplifying homogenisations of this kind. 
We may add that whether this homogenisation is speculative or positivist, 
it amounts to the same thing in this respect.38 
But in any  discussion of Marx's method of abstraction, the need to make 
simplifying homogenisations is apparent, so it is not clear here what Lukacs is 
advocating. What is more, this is not an isolated remark; Lukacs says exactly the 
same thing at a later stage where he draws out the conclusion that this means 
that 'dialectical knowledge has a merely approximate character'39. But if the 
processes which build up to society as a substance or as a totality really are 
innumerable then it is impossible to have a concrete knowledge of them at all. IT 
we cannot number the processes how much less can we know them? Here the 
problem of individuation which dogs over-Hegelian readings of Marx emerges 
again. Lukacs' response is usually  just to assert a denial that the problem is a real 
one, since the necessary picking out of  elements just can be done: 
every element and every part in other words is just as much a whole, the 
element is always a  complex with concrete and quantitatively specific 
properties, a complex of  various collaborating forces and relations. However 
this does not negate its character as an element. The genuine categories of 
economics really are something final which can be further analysed but 
cannot be further decomposed in  reality.40 
Yet this leaves unresolved the question of how we can know that, for example, 
value is a  constitutive element of bourgeois society. Lukacs of course would 
accept this role for value, but he is bereft of means to show why it is that value 
should be considered ontologically basic. He simply works without such criteria, 
37 Marx, Grundrisse p. 94. 
38 Lukacs, The Ontology of  Social Being Marx p. 60. 
39 Lukacs, The Ontology of  Social Being Marx p. 103. 
40 Lukacs, The Ontology of  Social Being Marx p. 30. 181 
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and confuses the issues by referring to elements either as 'relatively total', as 
'dynamic complexes', and to the backstop role of ontology as cited above. The first 
is just a mystifying description: if  a thing is total, it is presumably totally total. 
The second term, though appropriate when applied to the 'dynamic complexes' of 
Marx such as labour, value, product, and so on, is unhelpful and is not up to the 
task of  individuation. The third possibility; to refer to the critical use of ontological 
considerations, is on the right lines but is the shell of a  theory of social 
individuation and not a theory itself. Although Lukacs grapples with this problem 
he does not resolve it and we are left with the ad hoc individuation which OIlman 
uses in his work Alienation. Despite his failure to resolve this question,  Lukacs 
proceeds to give an account of the relations between production and distribution, 
of labour and its forms, and of class struggle, in which the problem of demarcating 
entities is simply put on one side. It is tempting to suggest that Lukacs' system, 
which has no clear criterion for individuation and is hostile to the very idea that 
one should be sought, contradicts his method, where he, like Marx and any social 
theorist is automatically pushed into demarcating different social entities. In 
contrast to Lukacs'  account,  an Aristotelian reading would  suggest that 
homogeneity emerges from observation of  how things behave, that social theorists 
individuate social processes and the things that instantiate them by observing 
behaviour of a certain sort, and not from a preconceived idea of what exists. In 
contrast, Lukacs' hostility to a theory of individuation is perhaps best explained 
by his characteristic hostility to the reification he sees in competing accounts of 
social reality: 
We  have already seen how  the primitive mode  of appearance of the 
ontological 'intention recta' can easily lead to a reification of this kind of any 
existent in the human consciousness and how this process finds a further 
extension and a fixation in thought in  science and philosophy.41 
This is combined with his critique of the theorists of  the Second International. they 
are condemned for their 'undialectical fixity', as we have seen and the critical 
attitude to fixity and reification is a dominant theme throughout Lukacs work.. 
Nevertheless, the general polemical characterisation of theorists in this ~ay 
evades the question of how to correct the good intentions of Marxist ontolOgIsts, 
and has problematic politico-theoretical consequences. What is more, the absen~e 
of a theory of individuation in Lukacs Ontology is implicated in the way that his 
critique of  Stalinism is left only partial. 
41 Lukacs, The Ontology of  Social Being Marxp. 41. 182 
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Lukacs and Stalinism in the Social Ontology of  Being 
Lukacs' relation to Stalinism is complex and dynamic 42 but  h  te  be·d  ,  waver  may  SID 
about his later welcoming of  the Khrushchev thaw and its limited anti-Stalinism 
his internal criticism of the Communist Party, or his turn to the  studen~ 
movements and the NLF in 1968, two  central commitments  remained unrevised 
from the mid twenties up to his death. The first was to the political irreplaceabilit 
of the official Communist Parties, and the second was to the basic doctrine :r 
Stalin: 'Socialism in One Country'. In the 1967 Preface to History and Class 
Consciousness, Lukacs argued that: 
After 1924 the Third International correctly defined the position of the 
capitalist world as one of 'relative stability'. These facts meant that I had 
to rethink my theoretical position in the debates of the Russian Party. I 
agreed with Stalin about the necessity for socialism in one country and this 
shows very clearly in the start of a new epoch in my thought.  43 
What is more, this long lasting commitment to socialism in one country was not 
merely a theoretical position: that country existed, and it was the Soviet Union. 
An identification with the Soviet Union as actually existing socialism, albeit with 
errors and distortions driven by Stalinism, was axiomatic in Lukacs' thought. 
Even in the anti-Stalinist work The Present and Future of Democratisation, 
published in  1988 he writes that 
'One can  doubt the objectively socialist character of actually existing 
socialism only from the standpoint of  bourgeois stupidity and slander  44 
It  is inconceivable that these deep rooted commitments would have no echoes in 
the Ontology;  and they do  resonate in its pages. The lacunae and tensions 
discussed above are not arbitrary technical problems which any grand project of 
this sort might throw up, but are intimately linked to this identification with the 
Soviet Union.  Lukacs' political commitments find expression in two forms in the 
Ontology; the absence of a theory of individuation, and the reduction of  teleology 
exclusively to the realm of  individual human action. 
42  For an account written from the perspective, of. the  Ma~d~lite United 
Secretariat of the Fourth International, in its m~st third .,,:orldist  clothes, see 
Lowy, M., 'Lukacs and Stalinism' in Western Marxl,Sm: A Crztical Reader (London, 
1978) pp. 61- 82.  ..  ." 
43 Lukacs History and Class Consciousness, (Lo~do~,  1971) pp. XXVll-XXVlll. 
44 Lukacs, G.  A demokratizalodas jelene es JovoJe: (The. Present and F~tu~~f 
Democratisation,  (Budapest,  1988)  p.  1  ?8'Mclted  ~nL~~:S~~~O~~iti~ue 2; 
Communitarian System and the Law of  V alue m  arx an  a  , 
pp. 33-72. 183 
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Since it was his identification with the official commum·st part  I·  th  th  es, ra  er  an a 
particular line on the scope of teleology, which was more important to Lukacs' self 
definition as a communist intellectual, it would be tempting to argue that Lukacs 
simply adopted the ontological positions that fitted best with the political 
considerations at the forefront of his mind. But this would be a little unjust. A 
more adequate explanation of the complexities faced by Lukacs, in a time very 
different to our own, would involve some consideration of the room for manoeuvre 
that he had, at particular historical conjunctures. Meszaros explains the situation 
that Lukacs faced as follows: 
from the end of the Twenties, criticism was condemned to be abstract 
theoretical  and generic-ideological.  Its practical side  was  narrowly 
circumscribed by the only feasible instrumentality: the Stalinist Party as 
the final arbiter over the fate of  the competing ideological positions.45 
What  consequences  were  there  in  accepting  this  authority,  as  Lukacs 
emphatically did? It betokened a certain lack of independence of thought, which 
was less sharply posed within the field of  literary criticism, or aesthetics, areas to 
which Lukacs retreated after the denunciation of the Blum theses of 1928. In the 
political sphere, such dependence on authority led to an increasingly tensioned and 
contradictory position being taken up on the nature of the Soviet Union.  Within a 
wider theoretical realm, this position carries with it ontological considerations, 
since on this view, the Soviet Union provides a model of socialism, whether or not 
it behaves as a socialist society. The basis of this identification comes from  the 
dictat and authority of the Party, from the self ascription of the social form or 
simply by virtue of its isolation; the sole society that justified itself on socialist 
principles. Meszaros explains this by saying that: 
it became ever more difficult to envisage concrete material forces of socio-
political mediation as an effective form  of practical criticism of the 
prevailing trend of Stalinism. Soviet developments thus increasingly 
acquired the character of a  model of socialism,  despite the obvious 
violations of some elementary principles of socialism, however paradoxical 
this might seem. 46 
So the isolation and uniqueness of the Soviet Union led many to accept as good 
coin its self  definition.  The principle of  identity of the Soviet Union: what it is, and 
45 Meszaros, I., LuJuies' Concept of  Dialectic (London, 1972)  p. 8l. 
46 Meszaros, Lukacs Concept of  Dialectic p. 84 184 
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how  it is  to  be  distinguished  from  other  social  fiorms'  .  .  h  ,  IS  gIven  In  t  e 
pronouncements of  its ruling group; 'developing socialism' under Khrushchev then 
for Brezhnev, 'developed socialism', and so on. Specifically against that  PO~ition: 
and in line with the ontological commitments of Marx, can be posed the view that 
isolates the criterion of  individuation of a sort of thing in how it  behaves. This is no 
more than the Aristotelian view that what a thing is, is given by what it does, not 
what it calls itself.  But such a view has wide implications: it is implicitly critical, 
suggesting that the self description of a social form may not be accurate, and 
posing an essentially critical view of social reality. 
This can be expanded on by a straight forward example derived from Kripke: Fool's 
gold may  look like gold, but  it  just  is not gold, because it does not have the essential 
structure of gold. Even supposing we have an account of the atomic structure of 
real gold, but only examples of fools gold; it is simply not appropriate to say that 
fools gold is the closest we have got and therefore may be counted as  gold. It  may 
very well be that real gold does not exist except on paper, in the form  of a 
theoretical description, but an  acceptance of iron pyrites as 'near enough to gold 
to count' is in this example obviously unsatisfactory. 
In the real world issue an analogous issue is the identification of Stalinism with 
socialism;  we may understand why the wish to defend and assert the 'actual 
existence of  socialism' because of a kind of gold rush fever - might well lead one to 
misidentify what one has found, but the mistake is still just that; an objective 
mistake. The meaning of socialism, like meanings more generally,just 'ain't in the 
head'. 
If, on the other hand, we utilise a different conception of individuation, analysing 
the behaviour of social forms and, within them, the categories that go to make up 
the social forms, the special laws that cover the causally potent particulars 
within a  social formation, this can be the first step to an assessment of the 
politically potent mediations between the fact of the existence of Stalinism and 
the universalistic principles of socialism. It enables an explanation of the ways in 
which the Soviet Union differs from those principles in terms of the role of the 
party,  social  groups,  the  overall  political  economy  of an  isolated  and 
underdeveloped state and so on.  Missing this element out, as Lukacs does means 
that the distance between what is, and what ought to be, can only be overcome by 
an ethical plea. Faced with the gap between his conception of socialism and the 
practice of Stalinism, but bereft of the Aristotelian equipment to generate an 
informed analysis of the nature of the beast that he was confronted with, Lukacs 
is driven back to an 'ought-ridden' perspective, reminiscent of Orwell's Boxer, the 185 
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totem  of the  Stakhanovite  worker,  who  responds  to  the  purges  with 
incomprehension and moralism: 
I do not understand it. I would not have believed that such things could 
happen on our farm. It must due to some fault in ourselves. The solution as 
I see it, is to workharder.47 
This view of Lukacs' moralism, ably argued by Meszaros in both  Lukacs' Concept 
of  the Dialectic and in Critique is reinforced by the circumscription of teleology to 
acts of human labour, and not to wider social processes. This feature of the 
Ontology, I have argued, returns Lukacs to the inadequate forms of explanation 
that Elster advocates. This conception eventually regards super individual social 
entities as mute, linked only by contingent causation. In  Lukacs this emphasis on 
ethics  has the status of a return; as early as 1919 he had recognised the logic of 
the degeneration of an isolated and underdeveloped proletarian state, but he had 
focussed on the ability of  the proletariat to discipline itself, or to be disciplined from 
the outside as the critical choice that had to be made in determining in the future 
of the young Russian workers state.  His explanation of Stalinism then, was 
couched in terms of the moral failings of the proletariat, a perspective that is 
always likely to prevent theorists from generating an adequate theory of society. 
Such a theory is a necessary but, of course, not a sufficient basis for being able to 
control and determine its pattern of development. Without an ontology that 
focusses  on the supra individual collectivities, their potencies and forms  of 
behaviour, all that is left is an ethical plea, as Meszaros argues: 
Since the political intermediaries, and instrumental guarantees are missing, 
the gap between the immediacy of social political realities and the general 
programme of Marxism has to be filled by means of assigning the role of 
mediation to ethics, by declaring that ethics is a 'crucial intermediary link' 
in this whole process. Thus the absence of effective mediatory forces  is 
'remedied' by a direct appeal to 'reason', to man's ' moral responsibilitY , to 
the 'moral pathos of  life' to the responsibility of the intellectuals etc. etc. So 
that, paradoxical as it might seem Lukacs finds himself in this respect in 
the position of ethical utopianism despite his repeated polemics against it, 
and despite his clear realisation that the intellectual roots of ethical 
utopianism can be pinpointed in the lack of mediations48 
S·  ·1  1  ft  di  .  ·th Marx's ontology Elster also reduces Marxism in  uni ar y a  er  spensmg WI  , 
47 Orwell G. Animal Farm in Collected Novels, (London 1976) p. 45 
48  Mesz~os,  1.,  Lukacs' Concept of  Dialectic (London, 1972) p.81. 186 
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the end to a  tiny portion that he finds intellectually respectable: its values. 
Without ontological tools, change becomes a  giant act of will, and in this manner 
Lukacs reinforces an illusion that a  sufficient moral effort can restore the 
universalistic principles of socialism to the Soviet Union. It is just such a 
perspective that motivated some critics in their judgement of Gorbachev's 
attempts at reform; a moral appeal, eventually directed to the people over the 
party, but which in fact operated as an political, ethical and rhetorical veneer over 
social processes running beyond the control of the centre. It  is speculation, but not 
idle, to suggest that Lukacs theoretical direction would have been greatly in 
sympathy with Gorbachev. If  that is found plausible, then we might reflect that 
the failure of Gorbachev's attempts at reform from above represented also the 
post mortem on Lukacs; that it was August 1991 that finally  ended the 
aspiration. As  Meszaros points out, it is in the constraints imposed by his 
affiliation to Stalinism that the roots of his ethical view are founded: 
Once we accept the structural constraints that inevitably go  with such 
premisses, only the moral imperatives of an abstract ethical discourse 
postulated  by  Lukacs  remain  as  our  slender,  materially  quite 
unsubstantiated, hope to overcome the contradictions of the present.49 
Today it is unlikely that Lukacs Ontology is going to receive much attentions; 
since, regardless of whether it, as a text, is implicated in a system that has been 
sent into the dustbin of history, Lukacs himself certainly is so implicated. it may 
be able to agree with Lukacs earliest critics that the project of the Onrology was a 
failure. But not for the reasons they thought. If  Marx is to be recovered, it must 
be in the form of an Aristotelian Marx and against the tendencies toward making 
ontology relative that exist in postmodem thought. So the task that Lukacs 
undertook still was worth the attempt.  Lukacs' vision lies in the fact that, late in 
his life he did just  that; his failure lies in the inability, because of the constraints of 
his accommodation to Stalinism, to carry it through. Nonetheless his directing 
slogan: 'No Ethics without Ontology' is still one that can provide a firm bed rock for 
the development of  emancipatory social theory. 
49  Meszaros, I. 'The Communitarian System and the Law of V  alue in Marx and 
Lukacs' in Critique 23, p. 69. Glossary 
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187 
Glossary 
dynamis: This has two meanings in Aristotle i) power and ii) potentiality These 
are distinguished in the  Metaphysics  (1045b-1046a).  Potentiality cannot be 
defined, he says, but only illustrated as, for example, the waker being potentially a 
sleeper. The passage between potentiality and actuality is either through art or by 
means of  a principle of  nature. The linkage of the two concepts is implicit in Marx; 
the power of the proletariat is its potential, which however, is necessarily only 
potential under a social form inimical to the full flourishing of human powers. 
What is important to the account of Marx here, is the link between potentiality/ 
actuality, and form/matter the former is more prominent in the early works and 
the latter in the later works, but they form part of a common ontology. Lukacs 
notices the importance of  dynamis for Marx in his Social Ontology 
eide: constitutive nature or, more commonly, form. The important distinction here 
is between the eide of Plato and the eide of Aristotle. The chief distinction is that 
for Aristotle the eidos  is not a  separate existent but a  principle of complete 
substances. Marx follows Aristotle in this respect, as the Grundrisse shows, and 
his critique of the vulgar economists is at least in part, a  critique of their 
Platonism. 
ergon: work or, for Aristotle, function and so also used to refer to the (proper) 
activity of a thing. For Marx the ergon of a thing is a way of recognising it as that 
kind of  thing. 
genesis: coming into being. Aristotle affirms genesis  as a version of substantial 
change, against its denial by Parmenides, and conceives of genesis  within an 
overall cycle of  kinesis. Its correlative is phthora. 
hyle: matter, (hence hylomorphism; the theory of form and matter) is a purely 
Aristotelian term. Hyle is like a substance, but it is not a substance since it is not 
a separate existent or an individual. For Marx, social matter is an essential part of 
his ontology. It refers both to the process of production that subtends any social 
form at all  and to the bare individuals who carry out that function, Matter is 
,  f  '  gul  ,  ld'  th t'td  tpermito sm  ar  preeminently a mass noun; like sugar or go  ,In  a  I  oes no 
.  I  th t £or Marx, the sorts of things that 
locutions: a sugar, a gold, a matter.  argue  a 
,..  t'all  behave in a similar way, so 'an 
serve In hIS  conception as matter, essen I  Y 
individual'is a problematic term (hence his polemic against the Robinsonades). as 
is 'a labour'. 188 
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kinesis: motion or change. Aristotle's definition of motion is that it is the 
actualisation of a potentiality qua potentiality (Physics 200b).  kinesis is primary 
(265b-266a) is primary, taking precedence even over genesis 
logos: account, reason or definition. This is a notoriously difficult term to render 
into English. Aristotle sometimes uses the term to mean reason or rationality, 
especially in an ethical context, such as in the Politics 1332a. But Castoriadis 
plausibly suggests that Marx's account utilises a much wider concept of logos 
such that the account of  capital is also its logic and definition. 
telos: end, purpose. telos is a deeply embedded notion in Aristotle's metaphysics 
and it is variously explained as the Good, (Physics 195a) or as the ultimate Good 
(Metaphysics  l072b). The interpretation of Aristotle's teleology is controversial 
and  is discussed in  Chapter nine. 
on:  Parmenides, who first investigated the nature of being postulated a series of 
logical dichotomies; that which is, cannot not be, and that which is not, cannot be. 
Consequently genesis and phthora; the passage from being to non being, and its 
reverse, are denied. It was at least in part to overcome these dichotomies that 
Aristotle evokes the notion of  substantial and accidental change. 
ousiai: substance Aristotle transforms the question of what being is to into the 
question of what substance is, since being is first and foremost, substance the 
criteria of substantiveness, are non predication and non parasitism  .. substances 
come to be and pass away as matter is enformed and then loses form. Marx's 
broad ontology of social existence follows this pattern, allowing him to conceive of 
society as a substance. 
phthora: decay or passing away. For Aristotle phthora is a particular form of 
substantial change, and takes when matter throws of its form. Marx uses the 
notion in his conception of the transitory nature of a social form such as bourgeois 
society. BIBLIOGRAPHY 
A note on the works of  Marx and Aristotle used 
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~arx  cit~tions in translation are from the following sources: The Penguin Marx 
LIbrary IS  used for  the later works  of political economy:  Capital  and  the 
Grundrisse.  References are to Marx: Capital in three volumes (translated by Ben 
Fowkes) with an introduction by Ernest Mandel (Harmondsworth, 1976) and 
Marx:  Grundrisse  (translated  and  with  a  foreword  by  M.  Nicolaus) 
(Harmondsworth, 1973).  The second source is the English translation of Theories 
of  Surplus Value  in three volumes, (edited by S. Ryazanskaya and translated by 
E. Burns) (1969, Moscow) I also use  A Contribution to the Critique of  Political 
Economy (London, 1970). 
Other citations are to the standard collected English translation; Marx-Engels 
Collected Works, published by Lawrence and Wishart, Progress and International 
Publishers which is cited as CWo  I  also use  A Contribution to  the Critique of 
Political Economy (London, 1970) 
Where  works  are  currently untranslated  I  have  used  the  Marx  Engels 
Gesamtausgabe (MEGA) in preference to the Marx Engels Werke, since the former 
has fuller coverage of Marx's very earliest writings as well as material from the 
manuscripts of the 1860's. For the Grundrisse der Kritik der Politischen Okonomie 
I have used the Nicolaus translation, but also referred to the first commonly 
available German edition in one volume: the 1953 version issued by Dietz Verlag. 
Correspondence is from Marx, K.,  and Engels, F., Selected Correspondence 
(Moscow, 1955) (ed. S.W. Ryazanskaya, trans. I. Laskar) or, if that fails, from 
Raddatz, F. J. (ed.) and Osers, E., (trans.) The Marx Engels Correspondence: the 
Personal Letters 1844-1877 
Aristotelian texts are from The Complete Works of  Aristotle: The Revised Oxford 
Translation edited by Jonathan Barnes, (London, 1984) Following this edition, 
titles are given in English, except in the case of De Anima for which the Latin title 
is much more well known. The references are to Immanuel Bekker's edition of the 
Greek text of Aristotle beginning in 1831 and consist of a page number, a column 
letter and a line number, so that, for example Metaphysics  1003a 21  refers to 
column a of  page 1003, and line 21. For the sake of simplicity I have omitted book 
numbers and letters, except when reference is made to a substantial argument, 
too long to cite in full, which is most easily referred to in this manner. 190 
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